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This thesis aims to provide a recategorisation of the semantic potential of the 
polysemous lexeme qōl with the input of notable theoretical insights from cognitive 
linguistics. The extant body of knowledge regarding the lexeme’s semantic potential, 
comprising Biblical Hebrew lexicons and theological dictionaries of the Old Testament, 
is thoroughly detailed; however, there is a clear lack of consensus around how to 
categorise the specific senses comprising the semantic potential. Cognitive linguistics 
presents a guiding theoretical framework for linguistics research that prioritises 
empirical study and the growing understanding of what is generally known about the 
brain’s functional processes. This thesis argues that with relevant insights from 
cognitive linguistics the Biblical Hebrew corpus can be analysed and described more 
systematically in terms of a lexeme’s semantic potential. More specifically, this thesis 
argues for the practical benefit of three tools from cognitive linguistics that have been 
proven to be productive for the study of meaning in Biblical Hebrew: 1) prototype 
theory, 2) frame theory, and 3) conceptual metonym and metaphor theory and 
conceptual blending. After a discussion of the extant body of literature and the 
productivity of partnering with cognitive linguistics for lexical semantics research, a 
working hypothesis is formulated with the help of insights from the three cognitive 
linguistics instruments mentioned. In the main body of the thesis, an account of the 
lexeme’s sense categories is offered that attempts, on the one hand, to describe the 
semantic potential of qōl while, on the other hand, offer an analysis and description of 





Die doel van hierdie verhandeling is ’n herkategorisering van die semantiese potensiaal 
van die polisemiese lekseem qōl deur gebruik te maak van ter sake teoretiese insigte 
vanuit kognitiewe taalkunde. Bestaande kennis aangaande die semantiese potensiaal 
van die lekseem word in detail in Bybels-Hebreeuse leksika and teologiese 
woordeboeke van die Ou Testament weergegee. Daar is egter geen konsensus oor die 
wyse waarop die verskillende betekenisonderskeidings wat die semantiese potensiaal 
van die lekseem verwoord, gekategoriseer moet word nie. Kognitiewe taalkunde bied 
’n rigtinggewende teoretiese raamwerk vir taalkundige navorsing wat ’n hoë premie 
plaas op empiriese studie en die al hoe groterwordende insig in die brein se rol in 
menslike kommunikasie. Hierdie tesis redeneer dat met ter sake insigte vanuit 
kognitiewe taalkunde die semantiese potensiaal van ’n lekseem in die Bybels-
Hebreeuse korpus meer sistematies ontleed en beskryf kan word. Daar word 
geargumenteer dat daar drie instrumente is wat al getoon het dat hulle van groot waarde 
is vir die bestudering van betekenis in Bybelse Hebreeus: 1) prototipe-teorie, 2) 
raamteorie, en 3) konseptuele metonomie- en metafoorteorie en konseptuele 
vermenging (“conceptual blending”). Die tesis skop af met ’n bespreking van die 
voorhande literatuur oor qōl, en die waarde van kognitiewe taalkunde vir leksikale 
semantiek. Daarna word ŉ werkshipotese geformuleer met behulp van die insigte van 
die drie kognitieftaalkundige instrumente wat genoem is. In the hoofafdeling van die 
tesis, word die lekseem se betekenisonderskeiding op so manier beskryf, om aan die 
een kant, uitdrukking te gee aan die semantiese potensiaal van qōl, terwyl aan die ander 
kant, ŉ analise en beskrywing van betekenisuitbreidings gebied word wat die 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The meanings of many Biblical Hebrew lexemes can often be taken for granted due to 
the availability of numerous resources such as lexicons, theological dictionaries, and 
commentaries. As such, a simple gloss could, at first glance, be considered definitive. 
For example, the meaning of the lexeme qōl can easily be taken for granted as existing 
simply on the basis of a translation of either “voice” or “sound”. The semantic potential 
of this lexeme is, to a large degree, well-understood and ably explained by available 
lexicons and theological dictionaries. However, while the academic attention afforded 
Biblical Hebrew and the exegesis of the biblical texts is almost endless, there is a need 
to consistently review what has come before in light of new theoretical advances – in 
the case of lexical semantics, this (as this work argues) entails partnering Biblical 
Hebrew semantics with the field of cognitive linguistics. One major problem with 
lexical entries for qōl, however, is the lack of a definitive, or at least consistent, 
categorisation of the semantic potential. Entries suffer from, as will be discussed, a 
troubling vagueness that leaves much of the lexeme’s use unexplained. This problem 
of categorisation it is hypothesised can be eased with the help of insights from cognitive 
linguistics in delineating the senses which comprise a lexeme or lexical expression’s 
use throughout the Biblical Hebrew corpus. The research problem is thus, how can the 
application of a cognitive linguistics approach to categorisation and sense mapping help 
one to better construe the senses of qōl as well as the relationships between them in a 
principled manner?   
This study first explores the range of available lexical entries for the lexeme qōl. As 
mentioned, there is a wealth of existing research that ably covers the use of this lexeme. 
By reviewing our available sources, this study hopes to prove the inconsistency with 
which the lexeme is described and, as a result, the need for a recategorisation of the 
lexeme’s semantic potential. Second, it introduces linguistics and, in particular, the 
emergence of cognitive linguistics as a potential dialogue partner for Biblical Hebrew 
semanticists. Third, based on the theoretical discussion of cognitive linguistics in 
Chapter 3, a working-hypothesis will be described for semantics research. The working-
hypothesis expresses the theoretical foundation needed to prove the hypothesised 




hypothesis is translated into a methodology which defines how this specific study’s 
corpus-based analysis was undertaken. The results of this analysis are then delineated 
in the final chapter, which also functions as an overview of the newly categorised 
semantic potential of qōl. A conclusion will summarise the results of this study and 
offer some final remarks on the usefulness of cognitive linguistics for semantics 




Chapter 2: A survey of existing lexical entries 
2.1. Introduction 
Chapter 1 introduced and outlined the background to this study, highlighting the 
problem that while there is a general agreement regarding the semantic potential of the 
lexeme qōl, there is no consensus regarding the categorisation of the individual senses. 
Partially, the difficulty arises from the challenge of understanding the conceptual 
knowledge upon which a native language use, in this case Biblical Hebrew, is founded. 
One viable solution to this problem, it was noted, entails drawing on advances of 
cognitive linguistics for a more justifiable categorisation of the senses of qōl. This is 
the hypothesis put forward by the current study. However, the first step is to establish 
the extent of our problem. For this purpose, I will consider what available resources of 
Biblical Hebrew propose regarding the meaning and use of qōl.  
I will chronologically examine lexical entries for qōl from Wilhelm Gesenius’ 
Handwörterbuch über das Alte Testament (1810–1812) through to David Clines’ The 
Dictionary of Classical Hebrew (1993–2011) as well as the 18th edition of Gesenius’ 
Handwörterbuch, edited by Rudolf Meyer and Herbert Donner, completed in 20131. 
Additionally, three theological dictionaries are discussed, as a wealth of semantic 
analysis regarding Biblical Hebrew can be found in more theologically oriented 
resources. The theological dictionaries are discussed separately for the sake of clarity. 
Lexicons and theological dictionaries have divergent foundational principles, which is 
clear from the difference in how entries are structured, what semantic material is given 
precedence, and importantly, which lexemes are considered worth analysing. In this 
survey I attempt to answer the following questions: How does each source describe the 
lexeme’s senses, and are there areas of well-attested agreement? What existing points 
 
1 Two lexicons will not be consulted for this study: Franciscus Zorell’s Lexicon Hebraicum et 
Aramicum Veteris Testamenti (1954) and Luis Alonso Schökel’s Diccionario bíblico hebreo-
español (1994). As Michael O’Connor (2002:188-189) notes regarding their lack of 




of semantic analysis can be said to align with the perspective offered by cognitive 
linguistics? Which problem areas of sense categorisation would need to be addressed? 
2.2. Lexicons of Biblical and Classical Hebrew  
2.2.1. Gesenius 
Wilhelm Gesenius’ Handwörterbuch über das Alte Testament remains a vital resource 
for Biblical Hebrew lexical analysis (Schorch and Waschke, 2013:xi). It functions as a 
point of departure for this study’s exploration of Biblical Hebrew lexicology. While 
there are earlier lexicographical reference works – for example, Johannes Reuchlin’s 
De Rudimentis Hebraicis (1506) – with Gesenius one finds a “modern, scientific 
Hebrew lexicography” (Muraoka, 2013:3). First, we turn to Samuel Prideaux Tregelle’s 
1857 translation, Gesenius's Hebrew and Chaldee Lexicon to the Old Testament 
Scriptures.  
Gesenius identifies the foundational concept of the lexeme to be voice. Three major 
sense categories are here distinguished by Gesenius: 1) voice, 2) rumour, and 3) sound. 
The first sense of voice comprises all sound which is conveyed through vocalisation. 
This includes the basic sounds produced by animals as well as the broader range of 
articulation which the human voice is capable of communicating. By virtue of 
anthropomorphism, supernatural persons too communicate as humans do. The human 
voice is complex in that this type of qōl can refer to both speech and a range of non-
speech vocal sounds. Speech and such non-speech vocal sounds are interpretable by 
other humans, in that they are attributed meaning. For example, the sound of crying can 
communicate sadness and a sudden shout signal surprise or fear. 
Gesenius’ second major sense, rumour, refers to occurrences where qōl expresses not 
the sound of someone’s voice but, rather, the speech content that has been conveyed. 
The limited account Gesenius gives here is problematic in that it offers neither a 
compelling range of exemplar texts (we could, for example, consider Exodus 36.6 
where qōl is used for reported speech, or Ezra 1.1 and 10.7 where it seems qōl has 
further lexicalised to reference a formal proclamation). Furthermore, in naming this 




seemingly indicates reported speech, of which rumour is but one example (see Chapter 
5 Section 6 for the recategorisation under which this sense of rumour falls). 
Lastly, the third sense denotes all sound and noise that originates with “inanimate 
things” (Gesenius, 2003/1857). This includes various non-vocal sounds resulting from 
natural phenomena or human activity. Ezekiel 1.24, noted by Gesenius, is a prime 
example, mentioning the qōl of rushing waters, a tumultuous army, and the flapping 
wings of Ezekiel’s visionary creatures. Gesenius (2003/1857) concludes his discussion 
of this third sense by saying qōl is used “of speech, words”. However, Gesenius’ 
interpretation of Ecclesiastes 5.2 and 5.5 in terms of his explanation “of speech, words” 
is unclear. As such, the relationship between these two verses and the third sense 
category is unexplained. 
The early edition of Gesenius’ Handwörterbuch features a concise and useful, although 
somewhat haphazard, categorisation of the lexical senses. Firstly, the second sense of 
rumour cannot be considered a major sense on par with the other two, because it is only 
one contextual expression of a broader sense. Secondly, the organisation of the sub-
senses offers little more than identified patterns. For example, under the first sense 
Gesenius notes the phrases ntn qōl, ntn beqōl, and šm' beqōl. There is little joining these 
phrases beyond the fact that each deals, on a literal level, with qōl as voice. In all 
fairness, this offers the reader a summary of syntactic constructions wherein qōl 
expresses voice, but it fails to organise the cases of use beyond the literal (See Sections 
5.4.1 and 5.5.3).  
2.2.2. Brown–Driver–Briggs (BDB) 
First published in 1906, A Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament by Francis 
Brown, S.R. Driver, and Charles A. Briggs was intended to be a revision of Gesenius’ 
Handwörterbuch and, furthermore, a re-examination of Biblical Hebrew lexicology at 
the turn of the 20th century (O’Connor, 2002:187). The entry on qōl is similar to the 
early Gesenius in its threefold organisation of the lexeme’s senses (Brown, Driver and 




The first sense category BDB provides, is described as the sound of a voice: human 
acts, such as singing or weeping; the speech of Yahweh2, seraphs, and angels; and 
vocalised sounds of animals. Additionally, this category includes the interjectional 
function: qōl – literally “a sound of …!” as BDB (2000/1906:876) puts it – is explained 
as drawing attention to the presence of a sound (in other words, “hark!”).  
The second sense is also labelled as sound but concerns examples which we can term 
non-vocal. Sources of such non-vocal sounds are varied, but include musical 
instruments, thunder, footsteps, the stamping of hoofs, chariots, the sea or other bodies 
of water, an earthquake, a fall, a multitude, the din of war, wings, flames or other 
elemental sounds (air and wind, for example), and the sound of millstones. This sense, 
expressed in the construct state, is infinitely malleable – sound is a characteristic that 
can be attributed to any source.  
Lastly, in its most specialised sense, qōl is used to refer to articulate speech – things 
said, or even written down. These articulations can be found in various forms: “advice, 
command, entreaty”, “report”, “proclamation”, and an “utterance of adjuration”. 
Furthermore, it has already been mentioned with regard to the first sense that speech is 
a capability conferred to Yahweh and other supernatural agents. The communication of 
God is a vital theme throughout the Hebrew Bible. With regard to qōl, BDB specifically 
mentions the words of Yahweh and the speech of the angel of Yahweh.  
BDB follows Gesenius in beginning its entry with the sense of voice. However, it uses 
a slightly revised wording that emphasises the sound by which voice is produced. The 
categorisation has also diverged from Gesenius and, in some ways, provides a more 
nuanced account of the major sense categories. For example, BDB separates voice into 
 
2 In the Hebrew Bible, there is the overarching presence of the character of God – “character” 
precisely in the sense that this figure takes part in the texts in a manner that is functionally 
indistinguishable from human beings. However, the character of God – or Elohim, as first 
introduced in Genesis 1.1 – is complex precisely because it is an amalgamation of characters: 
Elohim, Yahweh, El, and so on. The difference in name is of vital importance for many analyses 
of the Hebrew Bible (e.g. the fact that Yahweh and El have complex and dynamic theological 
or cultic histories as originally separate deities), but for the sake of clarity and simplicity the 




an object that is heard (the first sense) and a container for communication (the third 
sense), which allows for a more nuanced discussion of the more complex speech-related 
uses of qōl (furthermore, which Gesenius failed to capture under his second sense label 
of “rumour”). Moreover, BDB regards the interjectional use as an extension of the first 
sense, whereas this was left unmentioned by Gesenius. 
2.2.3. Koehler and Baumgartner 
Ludwig Koehler and Walter Baumgartner’s The Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of the 
Old Testament (HALOT) was first published in 1953, with an English translation of the 
second edition by M.E.J. Richardson first published in 1994 and the series completed 
in 2000. In contrast to the generalised major sense categories of Gesenius and BDB, 
Koehler and Baumgartner (1994-2000:1083-1085) make eight distinctions, each either 
describing a specific sense (1 to 6) or acting as a group (7–8) to simplify the 
lexicographic task:  
1. Noise;  
2. Din;  
3. Either (1) or (2) in reference to musical instruments;  
4. A noise made by animals or the human voice;  
5. The voice of God;  
6. Reported speech, in the form of messages, tidings, and proclamations;  
7. Common expressions involving (4) or (5); and  
8. Particular instances not categorized as belonging to any of the senses 
distinguished in (1) through (6).  
The first four categories concern various forms of auditory phenomena which are 
conceptually similar. With the first, noise, Koehler and Baumgartner mention sources 
such as thunder and storm clouds, along with various other sources such as, for 
example, the sound of walking, fire, and millstones. Also included here is the “windless 
silence” mentioned in 1 Kings 19.12. The first category can be summarised as referring 
to individuated noises: a sound produced by a specific, or identifiable, source. The 
second category deals with a noticeably more complex relationship between qōl – as 




The third category refers to qōl produced by musical instruments which can be either 
specified, as with the first sense (for example, the sounding of the ram’s horn), or 
complex, as in the second sense (such as the raucous songs of Ezekiel 26:13). 
Admittedly, there is some ambiguity in deciding whether an example of this third 
category aligns with the sense of the first or the second category. Within the framework 
of Koehler and Baumgartner, this sense possibly exists as a bridging category between 
the environmental nature of the first two categories and the intentional or volitional 
nature of qōl as voice in the fourth and fifth categories. In other words, while staying 
firmly within the conceptual frame of sound, the use of musical instruments conveys 
an element of intent. Whereas walking, for example, produces sound as a natural by-
product, to blow a horn (commonly a ram’s horn, or shofar) communicates some 
context-bound meaning. Examples provided by Koehler and Baumgartner include the 
aforementioned shofar, bells decorating the high priest’s garment, and the merrymaking 
of musicians and singers. It is questionable, however, whether this sense deserves to be 
considered a main semantic category. The idea of volition is complex: the priestly bells 
may communicate something of conceptual significance, but it remains a by-product of 
movement, the same as with the sound of footsteps, an example Koehler and 
Baumgartner relegate to the first category. This is, as such, a fuzzy semantic category 
that is here presented as a major sense. 
The fourth category covers noise made by animals and the human voice. Koehler and 
Baumgartner diverge from Gesenius and BDB in not separating the basic idea of animal 
and human communication. However, there is a difference between the simple 
expressions afforded to animals and the variety available to human vocalisation. As 
such, Koehler and Baumgartner describe the various examples of animal sounds one 
finds in the corpus. Turning to the human voice, Koehler and Baumgartner provide 
several subcategories: a) the individual’s voice; b) a voice of prayer, lament, or praise 
before God; c) audible speech, such as through the phrase qōl dbrym; and d) use of a 
descriptor to further specify (e.g. a qōl of weeping).  
The voice of God is treated with a separate, fifth, category. Two subcategories explore 
the conceptual blend between God communicating through thunder and an 
anthropomorphic voice. Koehler and Baumgartner, in discussing the anthropomorphic 




mentions the qōl of Yahweh; Shaddai, El Shaddai, and the words of Yahweh; and, in 
Late Biblical Hebrew, “the voice” as an indirect invocation replacing Yahweh.  
With the sixth category, Koehler and Baumgartner (1994-2000:1085) refer to an 
expression where qōl equates reported speech – in their words, “message, tidings, 
proclamation”. Its origin is most likely in listening to someone’s voice as adhering to 
their words (i.e., acknowledging that one’s qōl acts as a container for what is 
communicated). Only one example, Exodus 36.6, lies outside of Late Biblical Hebrew 
texts. By Late Biblical Hebrew, however, it has lexicalised as a reference to a formal 
proclamation (see 2 Chronicles 24.9, 30.5, and 36.22; Ezra 1.13, 10.7; and Nehemiah 
8.15).  
The seventh category includes a mixture of common expressions involving qōl as (4) 
or (5). Notable expressions involve the following verbal roots: ’zn, bkh, nš‘, qr’, qšb, 
r‘m, and šm'. Lastly, the eighth category lumps together certain particular instances: 
rumour (Genesis 45.16), teaching or witness (Exodus 4.8), the phrase “to notice the 
thunderclaps” (Exodus 20.18), a shout introducing a message (Jeremiah 50.46), the 
negation of sound (1 Kings 18.26-29), and the interjectional function to show or call 
for focus on something heard.  
Koehler and Baumgartner begin the lexical entry not with voice but sound. This choice 
is not inconsequential. Rather, it provides direction for the entry’s categorisation: The 
movement from environmental sound through volitional sound to complex human 
communication illustrates a logical mapping of major senses which explores the 
conceptual world of Biblical Hebrew. However, with the seventh and eighth categories 
there is a breakdown in the entry’s coherence. These final categories are filled by either 
irregular or syntactically complex occurrences. This is, as such, poor lexicography 
because the entry offers no reasoning with which to understand the relationship between 
the more coherent senses of categories one through six and the vaguer categories seven 
and eight. We can conclude that Koehler and Baumgartner succeed in going beyond 
both Gesenius and BDB in offering a more comprehensive description of sense 
 




extensions. Yet, eventually, Koehler and Baumgartner also encounter this recurring 
challenge of accounting for more complex and peripheral sense extensions.  
2.2.4. Clines 
The Dictionary of Classical Hebrew (DCH, 1993-20114) edited by David J.A. Clines 
declares itself to be “an entirely new work” – that is to say, in contrast with most other 
works which have together “stood in a lexicographical tradition” (Clines, 1993:24). The 
introduction to the first volume states that two features distinguish the DCH from 
previous lexicons (Clines, 1993:14-15). Firstly, it accounts for all available sources of 
Classical Hebrew (all sources before 200 CE) instead of favouring the extant Hebrew 
Bible5 (Clines, 1993:31). Secondly, it rejects the philological roots of Hebrew 
dictionaries in favour of “modern linguistics” Clines, 1993:14). The introduction does 
not offer an in-depth exploration of what comprises “modern linguistics”, but the 
dictionary does lean towards structuralism in its primary concern for syntax for 
clarifying semantics. It aims to describe the normal uses of words (O’Connor, 
2002:202). Thus, we find a shift in emphasis from the word in and of itself “to the larger 
units of meaning” (Clines, 1993:25). With regard to qōl, the DCH entry differentiates 
between five major sense categories that each contains numerous subordinate senses. 
A feature of Clines’ lexicon is that it provides all syntactic frames in which qol may 
occur. It thus contains the most exhaustive syntactic description of qōl to date. 
The first major sense Clines speaks of is the voice of various entities: humans, Yahweh, 
the heavenly host, seraphs, angels, Ba‘al, animals, and personified beings (Clines 
 
4 In 2018, the first volume of the Dictionary of Classical Hebrew Revised (DCHR) was 
published. According to Clines (2017), this revision features some 100,000 improvements, 
1933 added words in comparison with the DCH, 3500 additional byforms, and many extended 
definitions. It is yet to be seen how it will compare to the original and, unfortunately, the entry 
for qōl is not yet available. 
5 O’Connor (2002:195) concludes that the DCH has overconfidently “leveled the sources and 
thereby distorted the evidence.” It is not for scientific or linguistic reasons that Biblical Hebrew 
is situated within a broader tradition of Classical Hebrew. Rather, it is so as not to “privilege” 
the biblical texts, a decision that ignores the linguistic warnings against doing so in favour of 




2010:213). The second sense is sound, of which sources include human activity, 
Yahweh and other divine beings, military activity, musical instruments, entities of the 
natural world, and tangible objects.  
The third major sense is the metonymic expression of qōl as speech content (Clines, 
2010:221-222). With verbs of hearing qōl references the voice which is heard or 
obeyed. The DCH here also discusses qōl as the sound of speech, for example in qōl 
dbrym as the sound of words. According to the DCH, this sense appears to have been 
the basis for further extensions, for example, instances where qol is used to reference 
reported speech in the form of a proclamation, report, or message.  
The fourth sense refers to instances where qōl – or the feminine plural form, qōlōt – 
alone denotes thunder (Clines 2010:222). The DCH notes qōl with regard to thunder in 
two other instances: as a subcategory of (1) concerning the voice of Yahweh, and then 
as a subcategory of (2) indicating the sound of thunder produced in a natural 
environment. However, throughout the Hebrew Bible there is a complex interplay 
between the natural phenomenon of thunder, the voice of God, and some form of 
conceptual blend such as God answering in or through thunder. The DCH does, 
nevertheless, conclude that these three readings of qōl as thunder are not clearly 
distinguished. As such, several occurrences are noted as options under multiple 
readings. 
Lastly, qōl carries the interjectional sense. Twenty-two occurrences are listed, many of 
which are suggested as having other possible interpretations (Clines, 2010:222). As 
with previous entries, this short treatment of the interjectional sense is a consequence 
of its syntactical ambiguity. 
What the DCH has set out to be is linguistic in nature. It lists this purpose over and 
against other dictionaries. However, the end product, as can be seen with the entry on 
qōl, is little more than a listing of the syntagmatic distribution. The DCH makes no 
attempt to provide relevant syntactic frames for the semantic categories that are 
distinguished. A useful outcome of the DCH is its illustration of the variety of syntactic 
frames in which qōl occurs – this is where Clines’ dictionary succeeds. As Takamitsu 
Muraoka has said, the DCH is “often serviceable as a database where deficient as a 




functionality because it never goes beyond syntax as the defining feature of language 
use. While it does offer a compelling breakdown of the lexeme’s syntactic variation, it 
does not offer any commentary on the use of these variations or their relationship to 
one another. In terms of lexicons, it fails where Koehler and Baumgartner succeed, and 
while the DCH cannot offer the same level of discussion as theological dictionaries can 
provide, it does not provide a better account of the lexeme’s use when compared with 
Botterweck and Ringgren or Jenni and Westermann. 
2.2.5. Meyer–Donner Gesenius 
The 17th edition of Gesenius’ Handwörterbuch was published in 1925 and remained a 
staple in the study of Biblical Hebrew for decades. Eventually the need for an updated 
version was evident Now, we consider the Meyer–Donner 18th edition of the 
Handwörterbuch, the latest lexicon provided here. For qōl, as with the early edition, 
the Meyer–Donner Gesenius distinguishes three senses. The first and second senses 
compare, respectively, to the first and third of the earlier Gesenius. The primary point 
of divergence is with the second sense, rumour. In the Meyer–Donner Gesenius it has 
been replaced with the interjectional sense, which will be discussed momentarily.  
The first sense, similarly, deals with the concept of voice (Gesenius, 2013:1157). Actors 
of such vocalisation include 1) human beings, 2) animals, and 3) God. A final sub-sense 
deals with 4) the audible quality of speech, by means of a range of specific expressions. 
Secondly, qōl refers to various sounds not understood as speech (Gesenius, 2013:1157). 
In the German, the Meyer–Donner Gesenius (2013:1157) differentiates between four 
nuanced terms for sound – “Geräuch, Laut, Schall, Klang” – to describe occurrences of 
this sense. Notable references include the sound of music; speech, through the phrase 
qōl dbrym; footsteps, or walking; a general noisiness (“Lärm”); and thunder.  
The third sense is where qōl functions as an interjectional when found in the construct 
state form at the beginning of clauses. In contrast to BDB, where the interjectional 
function of qōl is treated as a sense extension of voice, here it is given as an independent 
sense category. Several example texts are given: Gen. 4.10; Isa. 52.8 and 66.6; Jer. 




The entry, being overtly concise, in no way captures the full semantic potential of the 
lexeme. Furthermore, although completed in 2013, it fails to take into account any 
advancements already present a century earlier in Brown–Driver–Briggs. The decision 
to separate the interjectional use into its own category can also be found in Clines’ 
DCH. However, the choice to offer only two broad categories for voice and sound in 
keeping with the early Gesenius is a categorisation choice that should be questioned. 
Modern lexicons and theological dictionaries have offered much more engaging 
explorations of the lexeme, which thus leaves this twofold categorisation unreasonably 
simplistic. 
2.3. Theological dictionaries  
2.3.1. Jenni and Westermann 
Ernst Jenni and Claus Westermann’s Theologisches Handwörterbuch zum Alten 
Testament (THAT) was originally published in the 1970s and subsequently translated 
into English. Labuschagne (1997:1133), the author of the entry, defines the lexeme as 
“everything that can be perceived acoustically”. This generic sense is then split into two 
major senses – sound and voice – that each possesses several subcategories or sense 
extensions.  
The first major sense concerns sound, with the most prominent sources for sound being 
phenomena of the natural world, specific animal and human actions, and complex 
sounds such as those grouped under din by Koehler and Baumgartner (1996:1083). 
Lastly, the negative phrase ’ēn qōl describes the absence of sound while “the whisper 
of a light breeze” (1 Kings 19.12) indicates the barest perceivable sound.  
An extension of this first sense is the interjectional function. Essentially, Labuschagne 
argues against BDB, which saw the interjectional as an extension of voice. Labuschagne 
(1997:1134) refers to this use as a “deictic interjection”, which means that it is a 
context-bound lexeme conveying a speaker’s awareness of, in this instance, an acoustic 
phenomenon. This is a particularly astute explanation of how the interjectional function 
relates to the basic sense. A consequence of the interjection occurring in the construct 
state is that it is never assuredly identifiable. Importantly, Labuschagne (1997:1134) 




As voice, the second of Labuschagne’s (1997:1134-1135) senses, qōl refers to the 
intentional communication of humans, animals, and divine beings. Furthermore, with 
descriptors – a voice of weeping or of anguish – qōl more prominently relays the diverse 
character of the human voice. Labuschagne also mentions the adverbial use of qōl in 
contexts where two connected verbs are used for more complex phrasal meanings. For 
example, the phrase nś’ qōl bkh features prominently as this type of construction (See 
Chapter 5 Section 5.3.2).  
Figuratively, qōl is associated with several syntactic frames that each emphasises the 
speech content imparted by a voice. For example, listeners are called to hear or obey a 
voice. Through a sense extension, it increasingly communicates concepts such as 
“report” or “proclamation”. The figurative use of qōl is also seen in the phrase qōl 
dbrym (“audible words”) and the “audibly pronounced curse” of Leviticus 5.1 
(Labuschagne, 1997:1134). Also, commonly in the Psalms, qōlî (my voice) is used as 
a metonymic reference for the speaker. Finally, qōl can function adverbially, such as 
when used to support verbs of speaking and calling. Frequently, the phrase qōl gadol 
occurs with the verb qr’ describing the act of calling as being exceptionally loud. 
Another example provided by Labuschagne (1997:1134), occurring only once in the 
biblical corpus, is the phrase qōl ’eḥād to describe a unanimous agreement, or literally 
speaking as “one voice”. 
In a separate section, Labuschagne (1997:1135-1136) deals with the specifics of “God’s 
voice”. God within the Hebrew Bible often conveys speech through thunder or in 
association with thunder. Labuschagne (1997:1136) notes that the biblical texts 
developed concurrent with a growing emphasis on the audible speech of God over and 
against traditions asserting thunder, for example, as a vehicle for speech is also 
noticeable. In texts such as 1 Kings 19.13 and Daniel 4.28, there is a fine distinction 
between the speech of God and natural phenomena. Deuteronomy repeatedly stresses 
that the qōl of Yahweh referred to in these contexts is obeyed through adhering to the 
Mosaic Law. 
Labuschagne (1997) offers a sophisticated interpretation of the semantic potential of 
qōl. A distinctive quality of the entry is its preoccupation not only with listing examples 
(many of which are so similar that an overtly expansive discussion risks redundancy) 




shifts in meaning which support sense extensions. Labuschagne presents the most 
comprehensive starting point for further semantic engagement with qōl.  
A possible point of critique concerns his decision that qōl has only two sense categories: 
voice and sound. Labuschagne treats these as broad categories from where sense 
extensions can be seen as originating. This is a fair appraisal, but when compared to the 
maximalist categorisation of Koehler and Baumgartner, I believe there is merit in 
providing more weight to the various uses that Labuschagne distinguishes. Several uses 
Labuschagne speaks of in only loose terms in relation to his primary categories can 
themselves be regarded as independent categories. For example, Labuschagne deals 
with certain figurative usages but treats them as subject to the broader sense of “voice” 
instead of distinguishing these as independent senses6.  
2.3.2. Botterweck and Ringgren 
The Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Alten Testament (TWAT), edited by G. Johannes 
Botterweck, Helmer Ringgren, and Heinz-Josef Fabry, was originally published 
between 1973 and 2000, with Benjamin Kedar-Kopfstein authoring the entry on qōl 
(the English translation done by Douglas W. Stott). Kedar-Kopfstein (2003/1993:576-
588) divides his entry into three sections: First, he introduces the basic understanding 
of qōl as an object of acoustic perception. Here, he discusses “Natural Sounds, 
Animals” and the qōl produced by the use of “Utensils, Instruments”. Secondly, Kedar-
Kopfstein considers all expressions of qōl referencing the sphere of human action and 
communication: “Human Sounds”, “Speaking”, and the “Interjection”. Thirdly, the 
entry deals with the significance of qōl and God. This is the most theologically prescient 
section of the entry, but does not hold much value for this study. 
First, Kedar-Kopfstein (2003/1993:578) states that as sound the semantic potential 
“extends from the rumbling of a storm (Ps. 77.18[17]) and the chaotic ocean (Ps. 93.4) 
to the softest rustling of a single leaf (Lev. 26.36)”. He continues with sound produced 
 
6 See Chapter 5 for the present study’s formal sense categorisation in comparison with 
Labuschagne’s (1997:1134) informal discussion of the idiomatic expressions involving the 
verb šm' (corresponding here to Chapter 5 Section 4) and figurative sense of “news, 




by animal action and communication, and concludes with the sounds of utensils and 
instruments. This final group includes sounds produced by proxy of human action. The 
use of musical instruments requires human action but the sound is produced by the 
instrument itself; this logic can be extended to the use of weaponry and, interestingly, 
to the sounding of the trumpet not haphazardly but to communicate alarm for 
settlements or commands in battle.  
The second sense comprises human sounds, speech, and the interjection. The human 
body produces sound through movement, for example. Anthropomorphically, similar 
activity is afforded to divine beings. More importantly, the human voice communicates 
a wide range of emotive expressions: weeping, lamenting, merrymaking, singing, and 
praising. Musical instruments and the human voice more often than not occur in tandem 
and express a similar acoustic phenomenon. The categorisation here becomes 
ambiguous. Kedar-Kopfstein speaks so widely of human activity that it includes the 
noise of weapons and trumpets; the vocal cries of the mob or the battle cries of soldiers; 
and the complex sounds of battle or a city being sacked.  
Kedar-Kopfstein (2003/1993:582-584) provides a thorough overview of qōl in terms of 
speech communication. The voice can be raised, or communicate aloud. It can be 
described so as to be called “pleasant” or “like a ghost” and be recognised as belonging 
to a known speaker. The voice communicates speech content. The latter is also 
expressed as qōl but is associated with relevant frames, such as qōl dbrym or a call for 
obedience. As noted elsewhere, this understanding of qōl and reported speech extended 
to the sense of “report” or “decree”. Finally, as an interjection, qōl is used by a speaker 
to “express their subsequent attentiveness or solicit that of someone else” (Kedar-
Kopfstein, 2003/1993:584). 
In conclusion, Kedar-Kopfstein (2003/1993:578) describes the prototypical referent of 
qōl as acoustic phenomena. The entry can, however, be unclear. The reason why Kedar-
Kopfstein discusses utensils and instruments and then separately human movement and 
activity is unexplained. The corpus reflects a large amount of overlap between these 
categories. Regardless, Kedar-Kopfstein does not describe the criteria for his 
categorisation. Furthermore, the entry does not attempt to explain the sense extensions, 
although this is a weakness noted across the survey. When compared with Labuschagne 




this entry complements Kedar-Kopfstein’s so that together these two, it can be argued, 
offer the best and clearest representation of our existing knowledge of the semantic 
potential of qōl. 
2.3.3. VanGemeren 
The final entry in this analysis, authored by W. R. Domeris, comes from Willem 
VanGemeren’s five-volume New International Dictionary of Old Testament Theology 
and Exegesis (1997). In contrast to the other entries discussed here, Domeris’ treatment 
of qōl is not organised according to major sense categories but rather according to the 
patterns of use that can be identified in specific biblical books. This structural decision 
aligns with the purpose of guiding readers through theological and exegetical concerns. 
However, for the current study, it does not add to what has already been discussed in 
this chapter.  
2.4. Conclusion 
This survey sought to answer three questions. How does each source describe the 
lexeme’s senses, and are there areas of well-attested agreement? The first part of the 
question has been illustrated throughout this chapter. As for well-attested agreement, 
the survey has identified several patterns. Each source understands the lexeme as 
referring to, broadly, acoustic phenomena, which can be further separated into cases of 
voice and sound. Also, each source accounts for the role played by the lexeme in 
describing the complexity of the human voice – importantly, it is how to categorise this 
complexity about which there is disagreement. There is also the noted ambiguity of 
thunder as a natural phenomenon and an attribute of divine speech. Several sources, 
furthermore, offer similar accounts of the metonymic use of qōl in referencing reported 
speech. The early Gesenius offers a limited understanding of this use, but notes it all 
the same, while Koehler and Baumgartner, for example, present a more exhaustive 
account. Lastly, there is widespread agreement over the interjectional function of qōl 
and its characteristic ambiguity. Each source offers a list of potential occurrences that 
should be taken into account, but the disagreement and uncertainty is just as important 





The second question: What existing points of semantic analysis can be said to align 
with the perspective offered by cognitive linguistics? Firstly, both Koehler and 
Baumgartner and Labuschagne offer convincing attempts at categorising the lexeme’s 
semantic complexity. The former fails to explain irregular and syntactically complex 
uses, collecting them in lexicographically weak categories, and consequently, the entire 
entry’s categorisation suffers as a result. The latter suffers from a lack of defined sense 
categories and instead opts to treat the lexeme in terms of only two major senses. 
Nevertheless, one can find across the two sources an appreciation for the relationship 
between the lexeme’s more basic sense and the resultant sense extensions. Secondly, in 
theory Clines helpfully emphasises the role played by syntax in distinguishing 
individual senses. However, the entry never explains on what syntactic basis senses are 
identified. It is, thus, a record of semantic categories with potential translation values 
which the reader is asked to accept at face value. 
The final question: Which problem areas of sense categorisation would need to be 
addressed? This survey identified a general weakness in the struggle to categorise 
senses. It is not that dictionary entries fail to note particular uses. Rather, many uses are 
never relegated to useful sense categories. Consequently, as with the two editions of 
Gesenius and BDB, uses are vaguely attached to one of two broad conceptualisations – 
voice or sound. Or, as with Koehler and Baumgartner, peripheral uses are consigned to 
throwaway categories. Furthermore, apart from Koehler and Baumgartner and 
Labuschagne, entries lack a reasonable account of the relationships between senses. 
Our collective knowledge of qōl fails to categorize the semantic potential satisfactorily. 
It is in this regard that we hypothesize that cognitive linguistics provides a promising 
perspective. 
In Chapter 3, we explore the history of linguistics, the introduction of cognitivist 
perspectives, and the application of certain conceptual tools – namely, prototype theory, 
semantic frames, and a conceptual view of metaphor and metonymy – to the study of 





Chapter 3: Cognitive semantics and Biblical Hebrew 
3.1. Introduction 
Semantics, as a subset of linguistics, is the study of meaning within language and the 
mechanisms through which linguistic expressions convey meanings (Riemer, 2010:2). 
This chapter explores the development of semantics as a subset of linguistics and the 
relationship between semantics research and biblical scholarship. Any approach to 
Biblical Hebrew semantics has to deal with the particular task of researching an ancient 
language (Shead: 2011:181). It is the argument of this study that cognitive linguistics 
offers a proven and efficient methodology for semantics research; however, the goal of 
this chapter is to provide evidence for this argument. Without a well-reasoned 
methodology, the foundations of any thesis are put in question. 
First, this chapter explores the history of semantics research, providing a cursory glance 
at its origins and formalisation in the 19th century before engaging with the 20th-century 
tradition of structuralism. Second, the chapter offers an analysis of cognitive linguistics, 
its history, and its primary theoretical principles. Importantly, this discussion centres 
on adopting a cognitive approach to semantics for ancient languages. Three tools of the 
cognitive semantics framework will be discussed as meaningful for Biblical Hebrew 
research: prototype theory, frame theory, and a conceptual view of metaphor and 
metonymy. The theoretical exploration of this chapter will be used to present a practical 
working-hypothesis in Chapter 4 ahead of the data analysis discussion in Chapter 5. 
3.2. Historical overview of semantics research 
3.2.1. The formalisation of semantics in the 19th century  
Throughout the Western tradition of philosophical inquiry, the mechanisms of 
semantics have been a recurrent topic of discussion (Riemer 2010:4; Allan, 2016:48-
51). In Plato’s Cratylus one clear point of departure for the philosophy of language is 
given with a discussion of naming (Geeraerts 2010:2). In Cratylus, Socrates argues that 
meaning is a matter of appropriateness; he postulates “that the earliest name-giver 




(Allan, 2016:48). Meaning, as such, relies on essentialism: the linguistic symbol is 
endowed with certain innate characteristics that relate to its referent. Allan (2016:48) 
references an example of Socrates: the name for the god Dionysus is a true 
characterisation that originates in the Greek phrase diduos ton oinon, “giving wine”.  
Well into the 19th century, Dirk Geeraerts (2010:3) notes, semantic essentialism 
justified “speculative etymology”. However, the abandonment of speculative 
etymologies arose from the scientific methodology of comparative philology7. The two 
innovative principles of the scientific approach are 1) beginning with the comparison 
of forms and not meanings, and 2) seeking similar forms across languages (Geeraerts, 
2010:3).  
Formal use of the term semantics began with Michel Bréal toward the end of the 19th 
century (Allan, 2016:51). Geeraerts (2010:10) discusses Bréal and Hermann Paul as 
foundational theorists in the historical-philological tradition. This tradition rests on two 
claims: On the one hand, it is diachronically oriented, concerned with the mechanics 
behind semantic change, and on the other hand, it operates with a conceptualisation of 
meaning as psychological in nature.  
First published in 1897, Bréal’s Essai de sémantique describes three fundamental 
qualities of semantic research. Firstly, semantics is historical and concerned with 
etymology. Any consideration of a word’s contemporary usage requires historical 
investigation. Secondly, semantics is essentially psychological. Both meaning – 
broadly speaking – and the mechanics by which meanings change are mental 
phenomena (Geeraerts, 2010:11). The Essai speaks of language as a product of the 
whole cognitive system. Lastly, the study of language belongs to the human sciences, 
which are strongly hermeneutical. Linguistics research interprets the historical record 
 
7 It is worth noting that semantics was in no way monolithic up to the 19th-century introduction 
of comparative philology. This thesis does not have the space to offer a full discussion on the 
topic, but as an example of the diversity of thought on the topic merely a few decades after 
Plato’s Cratylus one finds in Aristotle’s On Interpretation the idea that names are merely 




of a language in order to extrapolate the “expressive intent” which drives language use 
(Geeraerts, 2010:13-14).  
Bréal ably explained language as a dynamic system psychological in nature, but it was 
Paul who connected the seemingly individualistic nature of a psychological 
conceptualisation of language with the collectivist nature of language use. Paul (as 
quoted in Romanova, 2015:84) argues that “We have, strictly speaking, to differentiate 
as many languages as there are individuals”. Paul distinguished, firstly, between the 
“usual” and “occasional” meanings of a word or linguistic expression. The former refers 
to a collective’s shared understanding of a word’s meaning (what can be thought of as 
the dictionary meaning); the latter refers to the slight changes in use as practised by 
individuals in context (Geeraerts, 2010:14-15). It is specifically context that allows for 
words to develop occasional meanings; however, an occasional meaning can itself 
become usual8. This, in short, is the foundation for Paul’s usage-based theory of 
semantic change with which he explains the psychological nature of language as 
employed by a collective that comprises individual users. 
Geeraerts (2010:42) notes two vital contributions of the historical-philological school. 
Firstly, it emphasises the dynamic nature of language and semantic change. Words 
accumulate meanings and are, in fact, by nature polysemous. Secondly, it requires 
linguists to answer for the psychological nature of meaning. In the next section, we 
shall in part discuss how structuralism rejected the psychological basis of meaning and 
its resurfacing in cognitive linguistics.    
3.2.2. Structuralist semantics 
During the 20th century, structuralism advanced semantic theory in vital ways, 
providing the next step beyond the historical-philological tradition (Geeraerts, 
2010:47). Based on the work of Ferdinand de Saussure, structuralist semantics can be 
seen most prominently in the publications of Leo Weisgerber and Jost Trier in the 1920s 
and 30s. It was the dominant form of semantic theory, Burton (2017:3) notes, until the 
 
8 For example, leaf as its usual meaning refers to the foliage of a plant; an occasional meaning 
hinging on context refers to the individual pages of a book, which itself has resulted in the 




end of the 1960s. The most lasting influence of structuralism on the study of biblical 
languages is Johannes Louw and Eugene Nida’s 1988 Greek-English Lexicon of the 
New Testament Based on Semantic Domains (Burton, 2017:3-4).  
Weisgerber corrected what he saw as the theoretical errors of the historical-philological 
tradition, rejecting altogether a psychological foundation of meaning. For Weisgerber, 
this “is a major mistake, because it blocks an adequate view on language as a symbolic 
system” (Geeraerts, 2010:47). Based on Weisgerber’s “Die Bedeutungslehre: ein 
Irrweg der Sprachwissenschaft?” (1927), Trier published the first monograph of 
structuralist semantics, Der deutsche Wortschatz im Sinnbezirk des Verstandes (1931), 
on the development of medieval German vocabulary.  
Structuralism advocates three methodological proposals. Firstly, language is analysed 
as a system in which the meaning of one factor can only be studied in relation to other 
elements (Geeraerts, 2010:48). The bulk of modern semantic research has adopted this 
principle (Burton, 2017:4). Secondly, it holds an externalist view of language (Burton, 
2017:4). De Saussure himself makes a comparison between a language and the game 
of chess where “no factors that lie outside of the system of rules itself” should affect 
the system itself (Geeraerts, 2010:48). Lastly, to study the independent system of a 
language, linguistics should adopt a synchronic approach (Burton, 2017:4). Diachronic 
research can, as a result, only be conducted between synchronously comparable 
systems. 
Three methods of analysis are made use of extensively within structuralism: 1) lexical 
field theory, 2) componential analysis, and 3) relational semantics (Burton, 2017:4). 
Lexical field theory proposes that reality is organised within a language system 
according to lexical fields, groupings of related linguistic units. It, therefore, attempts 
to understand these groupings within the system.  
The second method, componential analysis, explores the implications of lexical field 
theory by analysing the linguistic properties and cultural suppositions that characterise 
a lexical field. A lexical field can be thought of as a group of words that are related 
together by virtue of their semantic similarities and use (e.g. “aunt”, “uncle”, and 
“cousin” are all included in the lexical field of “family relations”). As such, lexemes 




analysis, the way to identify the differences between terms belonging to a lexical field 
is to chart the differences and similarities in characteristics. For example, the difference 
between MAN and WOMAN can be described as [+ male], [+ mature] and then [− male], 
[+ mature], respectively. Native speakers are constantly processing such innate 
characteristics and assigning the correct linguistic label.  
Relational semantics, the third method, is functionally similar to componential analysis, 
but employs a restricted theoretical apparatus. Whereas componential analysis 
considers the conceptual content which controls the use of a word, relational semantics 
is concerned only with “the structure of the language rather than the structure of the 
world outside of language” (Geeraerts, 2010:52-53). Geeraerts (2010:52) thus notes 
that for relational semantics the contrast between black and white is less about this 
“world outside of language” and more to do with the fact that these terms are antonyms. 
One prominent benefit of structuralist linguistics is the consensus that languages exist 
holistically, each “a network of expressions that are mutually related by all kinds of 
semantic links” (Geeraerts, 2010:91). However, certain insights from cognitive 
linguistics led to the questioning of the structuralist approach (Burton, 2017:5-6). 
Firstly, since language functions under generalised cognitive processes, it becomes 
difficult to analyse meaning, following structuralism, as part of an independent system. 
Secondly, on a practical level, structuralism understands language as an orderly 
conceptual system separate from actual usage. This demands a separation of the system 
and the encyclopaedic knowledge that supports actual language use, a requirement that 
is increasingly difficult to justify (Geeraerts, 2010:94). Thirdly, structuralism 
emphasises onomasiology while simultaneously rejecting semasiology as an 
unnecessary concern of the historical-philological tradition. This rejection is not upheld 
by cognitive linguistics in its emphasis on semasiology and necessarily related topics 
such as polysemy. (Geeraerts, 2010:91-93). 
After classical structuralism, semantics research developed in mainly two directions: 
neostructuralism and cognitive semantics. Each offers its own critique of structuralism 
regarding the relationship between language and human cognition (Burton, 2017:9). 
The neostructuralist affirms its predecessor’s distinction between language and 
psychology. Therefore, language can be studied as an orderly, linguistic system because 




states that the introduction of componential analysis into generativist linguistics 
inspired a renewed focus on the “psychological reality” of semantics. This was the 
origin of the second direction after classical structuralism, cognitive semantics, which 
will be discussed in the following section. Neostructuralism, for the purposes of this 
study, will not be discussed further because it diverges too greatly from the hypothesis 
of this study surrounding the usefulness of cognitive linguistics for Biblical Hebrew. 
3.2.3. Cognitive semantics 
Cognitive linguistics9 emerged in the 1980s as a “conscious reaction” to the generative 
linguistics which followed structuralism (Taylor and Littlemore, 2014:1). More 
specifically, it was a rejection of the structuralist – and Chomskyan – emphasis on the 
externalist view of language (Burton, 2017:11). A cognitive approach to semantics, 
therefore, takes seriously the commitment of the cognitive linguistics framework in 
studying “the relationship between human language, the mind and socio-physical 
experience” (Evans, Bergen and Zinken 2007:2). Meaning, it is argued, is a product of 
the way in which mental concepts become entrenched through social and bodily 
experience (Lemmens, 2016:92). Simply put, “meaning is in the mind” (Shead, 
2011:31, emphasis in original).  
Within the broad framework of cognitive linguistics, a distinction is made between 1) 
semantics from a cognitivist perspective and 2) cognitive approaches to grammar 
(Evans, Bergen and Zinken, 2007:5). The object of study in cognitive linguistics is, of 
course, language. However, it takes language to be the product of cognitive processes 
which facilitate interactions with the world. Thus, a language is built as “a repository 
of world knowledge, a structured collection of meaningful categories that help us deal 
with new experiences and store information about old ones” (Geeraerts and Cuyckens, 
2007:4-5).  
 
9 Geeraerts and Cuyckens (2007:4) distinguish between cognitive linguistics (“all approaches 
in which natural language is studied as a mental phenomenon”) and Cognitive Linguistics (CL), 





Cognitive linguistics is, however, not a “single theory of language”, but rather a guiding 
framework for research10 (Geeraerts and Cuyckens, 2007:4). Nevertheless, all relevant 
research presupposes two general commitments. This first is the requirement for 
expressing the principles of language in “accord with what is known about the mind 
and brain from other disciplines” (Evans, Bergen and Zinken, 2007:4). The second 
commitment states that linguistics should seek “the broadest generalizations possible” 
rather than appealing to a specialised mental faculty (Evans, Bergen and Zinken, 
2007:3).  
In addition to these original two commitments, Geeraerts (2016:528) has more recently 
proposed a third, sociosemiotic, commitment to a “social perspective”. Often cognitive 
linguistics has been criticised as maintaining a reductionist view of language as 
primarily a mental phenomenon. However, language is social precisely because it is 
cognitive: it is in the “shared and socially distributed” makeup of the mental world that 
the individual cannot be separated from the social environment (Geeraerts, 2016:533). 
Furthermore, cognitive linguistics understands language as usage-based. For these two 
justifications, one cannot study language without consideration for the social reality.  
Cognitive semantics is, again, the study of meaning as a product of general cognitive 
processes. Binding this research framework together are four principles (Evans, Bergen 
and Zinken, 2007:6-9). Firstly, human cognition is embodied. It functions within 
cultural and physical realities that manifest in tension between the universal and 
embodied experiences of language users (Lemmens, 2016:92). Secondly, language use 
references of conceptual entities within the mind instead of external realities, but this 
does not imply that language can exhaust the conceptual structure of either an individual 
speaker or a language community as a whole (Evans, Bergen and Zinken, 2007:7-8). 
 
10 Kövecses (2005:136) argues that “the scope of cognitive linguistics is arguably much broader 
than language” and the field should therefore be renamed. The two options that Kövecses 
(2005:169) suggests are cognitive social science and cognitive semiotics, but as Geeraerts 
(2016:538-539) notes, the argument over naming is insignificant. He suggests emphasising the 
social character over the strictly cognitive element. Following Croft (2009:395), linguistic 
research should thoroughly take into account advances from the fields of pragmatics and 




Thirdly, lexemes and linguistic expressions prompt encyclopaedic conceptualisation of 
meanings. Language use involves a vast depository of knowledge, not everything of 
which might be useful for the construal of the meaning of a linguistic construction in a 
specific context. Nevertheless, cognitive linguistics argues that semantics (meaning) 
and pragmatics (contextual language use) cannot be easily separated as they do not 
function independently11 (Lemmens, 2016:94-95). Lastly, the conceptual structure 
behind linguistic expressions extends from logically simple concepts to more complex 
semantic frames. For example, the concept of weekday requires understanding the basic 
structure of the week as divided between days of rest and days for which you 
contractually perform work for payment or attend school; and the more complex 
concept of weeknight involves further complexities in addition to the conceptual 
requirements of weekday (Lemmens, 2016:92). 
After this summary of cognitive linguistics and a cognitive approach to semantics, the 
question arises, what comprises applying this framework to the study of Biblical 
Hebrew? Building on this introductory discussion, the next section investigates the 
constraints of studying ancient languages, offers a summary of relevant studies 
concerning cognitive semantics and Biblical Hebrew, and delves into the use of 
cognitive semantics in further detail. Specifically, it asks the question, how viable is 
cognitive semantics for the study of Biblical Hebrew? 
3.3. Cognitive semantics and ancient languages 
3.3.1. Specific methodological constraints of Biblical Hebrew  
In summarising the ancient language problem, Shead (2011:181) notes that the study 
of Biblical Hebrew faces critical issues of “a limited corpus, a complex history, and 
textual uncertainties”. Shead (2011:181) further argues that the difficulties inherent to 
Biblical Hebrew “intensify” when attempting to apply a cognitive semantics approach, 
which relies heavily on the mental world of native speakers. Furthermore, it is true, as 
 
11 Lemmens (2016:94) uses the example of “school night”, a term which cannot be understood 
by merely analysing the semantics of the two words independently and their “juxtaposition” on 




Burton (2017:18-19) states, that the scholar of Biblical Hebrew is not without the input 
of native speakers; rather, what is missing is access to the “cognitive and 
communicative processes” of the authors of the Biblical Hebrew corpus.  
Realistically, one should recognise that Biblical Hebrew is a fragmentary expression of 
the culture associated with its speakers. The biblical documents are explicitly religious 
and, therefore, express an inconsistent worldview structured according to the religious 
beliefs of certain speakers of the language (Burton, 2017:40-41). Furthermore, the 
compilation, editorial processes, and transmission history of the Hebrew Bible, our 
main source of BH data, form part of a long, highly complex, and debated process12. 
James Barr, in his seminal 1961 work Semantics of Biblical Language, urged biblical 
scholars to adopt a rigorous dialogue with linguistics. However, the difficulty of 
applying modern insights from linguistics to the study of biblical texts pushed scholars 
in two directions. One group would attempt to understand contemporaneous semantic 
theory and so apply up-to-date insights onto their own work in studying ancient 
languages. On the other hand, many scholars grappling with biblical languages would 
rather rely on a conventional theory, as Burton (2017:3) argues, “without regard to its 
date of origin – and indeed in many cases its date of expiration” (this being the second 
 





group). In the context of the biblical languages, convention has come to mean, generally 
speaking, some form of structuralist semantics13. 
A cognitivist approach to semantics, however, should be taken despite the “inevitable 
and unavoidable” difficulties of the Biblical Hebrew corpus, precisely because these 
issues arise no matter what semantic theory is adopted (Shead 2011:182, emphasis in 
original). In fact, the limitations of the corpus do not affect the commitments of the 
cognitive linguistics. Therefore, what is required of semantic analysis is a “cyclic, 
inductive approach” (Shead, 2011:183). Research is, naturally, focused on the language 
itself, but this is then done with reference to “the history of interpretation, comparative 
philology, and cross-linguistic and cognitive research into the nature of language and 
conceptualisation” (Shead, 2011:183). The following subsection will provide an 
overview of Biblical Hebrew research which has employed a cognitive semantics 
approach. 
3.3.2. Literature review of cognitive linguistics for Biblical Hebrew 
Several decades have passed since the introduction of cognitive semantics into 
mainstream linguistics research; however, despite gaining traction, among ancient 
language scholars it is still somewhat underrepresented. One reason for this slow pace 
 
13 Structuralism can afford to treat language as an autonomous system, a compelling rationale 
for those who have only a limited corpus for analysis. One proponent for the viability of 
structuralism in studying Biblical Hebrew is Francesco Zanella, who argues that “an adequate 
theory” for the study of Biblical Hebrew must be able to function without the input of native 
speakers (quoted in Burton, 2017:18). In Zanella’s (2010:12-14) words, componential analysis 
allows the researcher to deal “directly” with the vocabulary of the text (without consulting 
external linguistic or conceptual information) and “feasibly” with regard to a limited corpus all 
the while producing “concrete results” (emphasis in original). Zanella (2010:61) does admit 
that the results of componential analysis “may well be considered inadequate”, but argues that 
“the relationship between the linguistic results of CA [componential analysis] and their cultural 
analysis can be discovered without casting doubt on the theoretical status of CA, but, rather, 
through CA itself” (emphasis in original). Arguably, the framework of cognitive semantics 
allows the researcher to avoid the pitfalls of choosing between linguistic analysis and broader 




of adoption is the difficulty of introducing new methodologies into biblical studies. A 
second reason, as was noted earlier, is the reliance of cognitive linguistics on native 
speaker intuition, although the implementation of corpus linguistics methods for the 
study of the Biblical Hebrew corpus helps to overcome this challenge (Burton, 2017:17; 
Van der Merwe, 2021:10, 13). This section examines several scholars who have 
adopted elements of a cognitive linguistics framework and successfully integrated these 
into their Biblical Hebrew research. The selection here is not meant to represent the full 
engagement occurring between these two fields. Rather, the emphasis is on scholars 
who have provided a theoretical foundation for the current study’s practical application 
of cognitive linguistics tools. 
Ellen van Wolde has engaged with cognitive approaches to linguistics and semantics 
over a decades-long career. Relevant publications include her edited volume Job 28: 
Cognition in Context (2003), for which she contributed the chapter “Wisdom, Who Can 
Find It? A Non-Cognitive and Cognitive Study of Job 28:1-11”, as well as the 
monograph, and culmination of her cognitive linguistic approach to biblical studies, 
Reframing Biblical Studies: When Language and Text Meet Culture, Cognition, and 
Context (2009). In Reframing Biblical Studies (2009:2), van Wolde argues that 
cognitive linguistics allows Biblical Hebrew researchers the opportunity to examine 
“the dynamic interactions of conceptual, textual, linguistic, material, and historical 
complexes” (i.e. the encyclopaedic complexity of these interconnected subjects). Apart 
from these two sources, mention can be made of her chapter, “Cognitive Grammar at 
Work in Sodom and Gomorrah”, in Bonnie Howe and Joel B. Green’s Cognitive 
Linguistic Explorations in Biblical Studies (2014). Van Wolde has advocated for the 
use of Ronald Langacker’s Cognitive Grammar in parsing the patterns of language use 
that express the speaker’s mental world. Importantly, van Wolde (2014:193) argues for 
Langacker’s theory because it is “one of the most comprehensive and most fully 
articulated approaches in cognitive linguistics”. Her specific reliance on Langacker’s 
theory can be seen in “Wisdom, Who Can Find It? A Non-Cognitive and Cognitive 
Study of Job 28:1-11”. In trying to clarify the complex text of Job 28, van Wolde points 




into information regarding the conceptualiser’s worldview or perspective14. This is a 
basic premise of cognitive linguistics, that meaning is both created and housed in the 
mind, but the originality of applying this theory to an ancient text in order to access, so 
to speak, the mind behind Job 28 cannot be overstated. More broadly, van Wolde 
(2014:197-198) argues for applying Langacker’s theory at three levels: First, the 
researcher considers the general “cultural categories and general domains” that define 
the Ancient Near East; second, moving inward, the focus shifts to the textual world of 
the Hebrew Bible as the corpus of Biblical Hebrew; and third, the researcher considers 
a “single biblical textual usage event”. Van Wolde, therefore, sees cognitive linguistics 
(or, more specifically, Langacker’s Cognitive Grammar) as practical for understanding 
a given biblical text as a single piece of the Biblical Hebrew corpus that is itself a 
reflection, however distorted, of Ancient Near East cultural conceptualisations. 
According to Van der Merwe (2021), van Wolde “proposes a detailed cognitive method 
of exegesis of the OT (2009, 204) indicating how to account for (1) the socio-cultural 
embeddedness of the text the Hebrew Bible; (2) the lexical meaning of usage events; 
and (3) the meaning structure of Biblical texts”. 
In 2011, Stephen Shead published Radical Frame Semantics and Biblical Hebrew. The 
book provides a new model for lexical semantics based on William Croft’s Radical 
Construction Grammar (2001) and Charles Fillmore’s Frame Semantics (1982). 
Shead’s model is a synthesis of structural semantics, cognitive semantics, and 
construction grammar. Practically, the model is explored through an analysis of verbs 
for “exploring” and “searching” using the HebrewNet software. Noteworthy is the 
comprehensive theoretical discussion that forms the first part of Shead’s text. Shead 
offers a methodological expertise of immense value. Agreeing with several cognitivist 
scholars (including Geeraerts [2016:530] and van der Merwe [2006:90; 2017:11; 
2019]), Shead (2011:35) argues that meaning is a matter of “dynamic construal in 
context”. Shead also offers an in-depth examination of the reality of applying cognitive 
linguistics to an ancient language. He concludes this examination by reaffirming the 
practical necessity of a cognitivist methodology, noting that “[to] pretend that meaning 
can somehow be detached from conceptualisation is to adopt a dangerously deficient 
 
14 In making the case for a cognitivist approach, van Wolde (2003:26) refers to a purely 




methodology” (Shead, 2011:182). Therefore, it is just not good enough to accept a non-
cognitivist methodology on the basis of a lack of living native speakers. The Biblical 
Hebrew corpus represents, in essence, access to native speakers (Shead, 2011:182). 
Lastly, Shead’s approach to frame semantics is complex, possibly overly so, and a 
widespread adoption is questionable. However, Shead (2011:53) also notes that the 
inevitable “complexity of frame matrices simply mirrors the complexity of human 
cognition”. A simplified version of Shead’s radical frame semantics forms the basis for 
this study’s understanding of semantic frames and the practical application of frame 
theory (one of this study’s three chosen cognitivist tools) to the Hebrew Bible.  
Wendy L. Widder’s “To Teach” in Ancient Israel: A Cognitive Linguistic Study of a 
Biblical Hebrew Lexical Set (2014) attempts to explore the verbal lexical set of 
“teaching” in the Biblical Hebrew corpus. It is primarily concerned with comparing a 
universal concept of teaching with this Biblical Hebrew lexical set (she argues for 
teaching as a basic sense concept that is found across human cultures). Widder 
(2014:19) limits her analysis to four lexemes that fit the criteria of being verbs of active 
binyanim that have a total number of occurrences high enough for an effective study. 
In exploring teaching in Biblical Hebrew, Widder (2014:20, 23-24) is most interested 
in how the various senses of a given lexeme are activated. These senses comprise the 
lexeme’s semantic potential. The manner in which a particular sense is activated 
Widder (2014:22-23) explores in terms of Ronald Langacker’s discussion of the 
“profile/base” relationship15. Lastly, the study intends to identify the prototypical 
senses of the four lexemes so as to clarify “significant nuances of meaning” that 
accompany specific usages16 (2014:24). Prototypicality is indeed a major theme in 
cognitive semantics research and one of the three cognitivist tools used by the current 
study (see: Section 3.3.3.1). 
 
15 For example, the term “arm” is profiled against the base concept “body”. This profile/base 
relationship can then also explain the use of “arm” for one part of an organizational “body” 
(e.g. “the local arm of the government”). 





Christo H. J. Van der Merwe co-authored A Biblical Hebrew Reference Grammar 
(2017), which incorporates elements of cognitive linguistics. Arguing for a 21st-century 
grammar of Biblical Hebrew, van der Merwe, Naudé, and Kroeze (2017:10, quoting 
Geeraerts and Cuykens, 2017:5) recognise the importance of cognitive linguistics in 
affirming language as a tool for “organizing, processing, and conveying” information 
in the human mind. Furthermore, Van der Merwe has written extensively about the 
practical value of cognitive linguistics for the study of Biblical Hebrew and the task of 
translation: “Lexical Meaning in Biblical Hebrew and Cognitive Semantics: a Case 
Study” (2006), “The challenge of better understanding discourse particles: The case of 
 and “The polysemous relationships between the senses of the verbal root ,(2014) ”ָלֵכן
 argue for cognitive linguistics in clarifying semantic potential, especially (2018) ”חזק
through prototypicality. Lastly, in “Biblical Hebrew and Cognitive Linguistics: A 
General Orientation” (2021) van der Merwe provides an up-to-date exploration of the 
dynamic nature of language as well as the value of cognitive linguistics’ usage-based 
thesis, two methodological considerations that underlie the current study. Van der 
Merwe (2021:15-16) notes that the incorporation of insights from cognitive linguistics 
into Biblical Hebrew studies still struggles with the lack of a systematic model; 
however, cognitive linguistics improves engagement with Biblical Hebrew as “a 
dynamic and complex system”, emphasising the interrelated nature of social and 
individual language use that drives meaning forward. 
Marilyn Burton published The Semantics of Glory: A Cognitive, Corpus-Based 
Approach to Hebrew Word Meaning (2017). Important to note, Burton’s (2017:34) 
analysis extends beyond Biblical Hebrew to cover the various strands of Classical 
Hebrew: “the biblical texts (HB), Hebrew inscriptions belonging to this time period, the 
Hebrew Dead Sea Scrolls (DSS) and Ben Sira (Sir)”. Burton provides a convincing 
argument for the practical benefit of cognitive linguistics for understanding the 
uncertain reality of language use. Burton (2017:42, 50) provides an empirical 
foundation for her corpus-based analysis of the semantic domain for “glory”. Focusing 
on word pairs and parallelism, she justifies the boundaries of the semantic domain. The 
methodological introduction is a useful overview of practically applying cognitive 
linguistics for ancient language research. It presents an accessible account of the three 
most engaging developments from cognitive semantics: prototype theory, frame theory, 




has no single defined research methodology, and is rather loosely a consortium of 
research endeavours connected by foundation principles, the three tools discussed by 
Burton are taken as an efficient expression for how cognitive linguistics and the 
purposes of Biblical Hebrew semantics form a functional partnership.  
This brief overview proves that cognitive linguistics is a viable theoretical foundation 
for Biblical Hebrew semantics. Furthermore, it is a choice that is growing in popularity 
among scholars of ancient languages.17 From these scholars, we can conclude that the 
usefulness of cognitive linguistics for the study of Biblical Hebrew is its understanding 
of language as a dynamic system. 
3.3.3. A cognitive semantics toolkit for Biblical Hebrew 
This section explores three analytical tools from cognitive semantics for the study of 
Biblical Hebrew: prototype theory, frame theory, and a conceptual view of metaphor 
and metonymy. This triad of tools is noted by Burton (2017:11) to be “the three most 
significant developments within the cognitive school”. Based on the work of Shead, 
Widder, and Burton, these three tools are hypothesised as representing an effective 
toolkit for Biblical Hebrew semantics research. Together, these tools will be used to 
inform a more practically minded working-hypothesis in Chapter 4. 
3.3.3.1. Prototype theory  
Prototype theory, which explores mental categorisation of meaning, was preceded by 
the classical theory of concepts or checklist theory of meaning (Hanks, 2013:86; 
Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, 2007:144). The classical theory proposes that membership 
for semantic categories can be understood based on necessary and sufficient criteria 
 
17 There are several studies worth noting which were not discussed at length: Kristopher Lyle’s 
“A new methodology for ascertaining the semantic potential of Biblical Hebrew prepositions” 
(2013), Talia Suskover’s “The Frame of Sacrificing in Judges” (2014), Christian Locatell’s 
doctoral dissertation “Grammatical Polysemy in the Hebrew Bible: A Cognitive Linguistic 
Approach to  2017) ”ִכי), and Nathan John Moser Ringenberg’s doctoral dissertation “Divine 
Wrath in the Prophet Isaiah: A Frame Semantics Approach” (2018). See also “Biblical Hebrew 
and Cognitive Linguistics: A General Orientation” (Van der Merwe, 2021) for a comprehensive 




(Burton, 2017:11). This is a logic-based analysis of meaning (it can be traced back to 
Aristotelian and Platonic philosophy) and variants are found in philosophy, psychology, 
and anthropology (Lewandowska-Tomoszczyk, 2007:144).  
The lexeme bachelor is raised as a common example to illustrate the inadequacy of the 
classical theory (Burton, 2017:11; Hanks, 2013:86; Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, 
2007:144). According to the classical theory, “bachelor” is demarcated by the criteria 
“MALE, ADULT, and NOT MARRIED”. However, this fails to account for outliers such as 
celibate priests18. As such, the classical theory struggles with the inherently fuzzy 
nature of word meaning. 
Prototype theory, on the other hand, provided an explanation for mental categories 
which was supported by the psychological research: “linguistic categories may be fuzzy 
at the edges but clear in the centre” (Geeraerts, 2010:183). The origin of prototype 
theory rests in Rosch’s research into perceptual categories and colour schemas. In the 
1980s, it was subsumed into linguistics. Based on Rosch’s findings, prototype theory 
states that linguistic categories are structured hierarchically according to salience; or, 
member representation within a category. For example, a semantic category (e.g. motor 
vehicles) centres on the most salient member (e.g. a sedan) which possesses the highest 
number of shared traits with other members while possessing the fewest number of 
traits belonging to other categories (Burton, 2017:12, 14). The various members of this 
example category can be situated on a scale of gradedness from the centre outward to 
the periphery, where category membership may become ambiguous.  
Geeraerts (2010:187) lists four characteristics of prototypicality. Firstly, category 
members can be described according to degrees of typicality. As Geeraerts (2010:191) 
states, “some birds may be birdier than others”. Category membership exists unequally, 
which defines the category’s hierarchy of membership. Certain semantic categories can 
have rigid boundaries. Consider, for example, the category FISH, where membership is 
quite simple according to what Geeraerts (2010:189) calls “folk models” (i.e. the 
 
18 Similarly, Ludwig Wittgenstein argued that game cannot be properly defined by the classical 
theory. Instead of clearly identified criteria, he suggested thinking of categories in terms of 




categorisation present in common use language). A scientific taxonomy, with its rigid 
borders, would most likely disagree with the folk model on several category members 
based on characteristics that are not regarded as salient enough for common 
consideration (e.g. the fact that a cetacean, such as a whale, gives birth to live young 
and so is a mammal might not be a salient consideration for the folk model). As such, 
models of categorisation can become complex. Nevertheless, the categorisation of some 
phenomena resists rigid boundaries and instead feature graded membership 
(Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, 2007:145). For example, age can be a subjective 
consideration when differentiating between members of the categories BOY and MAN, 
and GIRL and WOMAN.  
Secondly, a category’s internal form consists of interrelated referents forming a family 
resemblance structure. The various referents of a word possess commonalities that bind 
them together – some more concretely and some in abstraction. The family resemblance 
structure is described by Lewandowska-Tomazsczyk (2007:146) as “A: p, q, r; B: r, s, 
t; C: t, u, v” where A, B, and C share “overlapping sets of features” by association, but 
no individual characteristic exists that can define category membership. For example, 
the lexeme frame can reference (a) the literal referent, a support structure such as a 
photograph or art canvas frame; it can be used in abstraction with (b) “the accused 
claims to have been framed” meaning falsely incriminated; and metaphorically one can 
speak of (c) an interpretative frame. These referents differ wildly; however, there is a 
shared conceptualisation: a containment structure for directed viewing by an external 
actor. But while the rigid structure is physical and obvious for (a), it is figurative and 
inconspicuous for (b), and while (b) can be taken as malicious and deceitful, (c) is 
neutral and implies investigative rigour. Nevertheless, each use of frame can be traced 
back to a family resemblance structure. 
Thirdly, the categorical periphery may be ambiguous, lacking exact boundaries. Some 
category members (such as “motorcycle” in the motor vehicle category) may be so 
uncommon as to be, for all practical purposes, unrelated to the central member. A 
practical distinction can be made between common types of cars (sedans, coupes, sports 
cars, etc.) and motorcycles. Nevertheless, a motorcycle is essentially 1) an automobile 
2) reliant on wheels 3) for the purpose of transporting passengers or cargo. In this way, 




Finally, contrary to the classical theory, membership does not result from necessary and 
sufficient criterial requirements (Geeraerts, 2010:187). A category is not based on the 
satisfaction of definitional conditions but on prototype representation. The prototype – 
in Lemmen’s (2016:97) words, “a schematisation over individual usage events” – is 
itself a complex mental phenomenon, related to, but not identified with any specific 
category member. Thus, motor vehicles are not graded within their category according 
to an existing car model but in comparison with the overarching schematic 
conceptualisation (the prototypical motor vehicle). When presented with a common 
sedan, the prototype schema can be said to be activated. This can help the viewer to 
associate a real-world referent more easily with the mental concept, and prototype, of 
the motor vehicle category.19 In short, identifying a prototypical member of a category 
involves the construal of a specific observer. 
With polysemous lexemes consisting of sprawling semantic networks typically centred 
on a prototypical core, how best to illustrate this concept? One answer is radial network 
modelling, introduced in the research of Claudia Brugman during the early 1980s and 
further popularised by George Lakoff in his seminal work Women, Fire and Dangerous 
Things (Geeraerts, 2010:193). Radial mapping is a non-linear method for expressing 
semantic potential that also confirms the notion that cognitive models are formed via 
personal and cultural experiences (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, 2007:148). It is based 
on the notion that central members of a lexeme’s semantic potential motivate the 
existence of peripheral members (Gries, 2015:474).  
Radial mapping is arguably advantageous for lexicographical representation. It is a two-
dimensional construal of non-linear semantic extensions. The subcategories do not 
 
19 The “four types of prototypicality effects” function along two axes: 1) non-equality versus 
non-discreteness and 2) extensional versus intensional perspectives (Geeraerts, 2010:188-189). 
Non-equality refers to the hierarchical nature of a category’s internal structure; non-
discreteness expresses the fuzzy boundaries of categories and their flexible applicability. The 
intensional perspective emphasises the semantic potential of a lexical item; the extensional 
perspective tracks possible exemplars. The first prototype effect expresses extensional non-
equality, the second expresses intensional non-equality, the third extensional non-discreteness, 





proceed logically from a core meaning; rather, all categories share characteristics of 
varying degrees of relation to certain prototypical members. Radial mapping, thus, also 
illustrates how the prototypical member motivates subcategories in a manner that is 
neither foreseeable nor a product of chance. In other words, semantic extensions occur 
sporadically but in ways that can be justified according to the prototypical member. 
Lastly, a radial map employs a wide range of cognitive models (e.g. metonymy and 
image schemas) to account for all senses comprising the category (Lewandowska-
Tomaszczyk, 2007:148). Thus, a lexeme is illustrated holistically, represented in terms 
of all evidenced uses.  
Radial mapping can, arguably, suffer from oversimplification as a result of its two-
dimensionality. In this sense it can suffer from the same linearity that traditional 
dictionary entries illustrate. Furthermore, the complexity of polysemous lexemes can 
entail the presence of multiple prototypes, which problematises the coherence of 
illustrating a lexeme’s semantic potential20.  
3.3.3.2. Frame theory 
Primarily based on the work of Charles J. Fillmore, frame semantics proposes that 
lexical meaning is accessed through conceptual networks of encyclopaedic knowledge 
(Lemmens, 2016:94; Shead, 2011:48). Cognitive semantics works with a maximalist 
account of meaning. In other words, no strict demarcation exists between pragmatics 
and semantics when describing lexical meaning (Geeraerts, 2010:222). The brain stores 
information according to a type of complex and interrelated conceptual structure, what 
Radden and Dirven (2007:9) call a “package of knowledge”. For example, birthday 
does not exist mentally as a simple definition – such as “the anniversary of a person’s 
birth” – but rather in terms of broader conceptualisations that are influenced by 
individual and shared social experiences of family structures, traditions, associations 
that come with the relevant time of year, etc. Such “schematic representations” are 
called semantic frames, and help explain how speakers’ lexicons function in an 
organised manner so as to facilitate communication (Burton, 2017:13). 
 




Context, and a shared personal or cultural understanding of a topic, allow 
communicants to converse clearly, a task that would otherwise be ambiguous. For 
example, Radden and Dirven (2010:10, emphasis in original) discuss the frame of car 
as central to understanding the difference between 1) “Can you start the car?” and 2) 
“Can you wash the car?” In (1) car refers implicitly to the engine, whereas in (2) car 
refers to the body. Geeraerts (2010:225), furthermore, suggests that frames concern not 
just how we see the world, but impact the way in which we choose to verbalise those 
mental models through a process of perspectivisation.  
A cognitive approach to semantics, therefore, aims not to produce linear dictionary 
entries, but to describe the relationship between a given lexeme or linguistic expression 
and fully realised mental structures (Burton, 2017:14-15; Cienki, 2007:173). Individual 
words (for example, borrow versus steal) do not relate directly to each other in terms 
of abstract definitions. Rather, words share common conceptual backgrounds. 
Therefore, the brain functions as a repository of interrelated streams of knowledge of 
subjective experience and biological realities of human nature. At the core of this 
system exist basic frames related solely to “directly embodied human experience” – 
concepts such as time or hunger that are so primal as to ground all others (Croft and 
Cruse quoted in Shead, 2011:52). With the given example of borrow and steal, a 
conceptual understanding of property, ownership, and criminality is necessitated – one 
can go further and suggest an understanding of social relationships, trust, consent, time, 
and so on that together form a network to build the contrast21 (Hanks, 2013:385-386).  
One related and important weakness of frame semantics is worth mentioning: It is not 
a lexical theory and frames are read into existing linguistic data (Hanks, 2013:385, 388). 
There is well-founded justification for acknowledging the cognitive reality of frames, 
and the effects thereof can be identified in linguistic data, but the identification of 
specific frames, or differentiating between frames, can become primarily the 
researcher’s subjective evaluation. 
 
21 This necessary conceptual knowledge is, essentially, implied within dictionary entries. 





What benefits does frame theory offer Biblical Hebrew semantics? Firstly, it results in 
a more thorough description of closely related lexemes by recording all relevant 
conceptual information (Burton, 2017:15). Traditional lexicography results in linear 
dictionary entries unable to account for the multifaceted reality of meaning in language 
use. Secondly, semantic frames allow for a systematic account of polysemous lexemes 
and differentiating between senses based on contextual use and surrounding frame 
elements (Shead, 2011:53). Frame theory supports the notion that meaning is an act of 
dynamic construal and, as such, corpus-based semantic research is tasked with serious 
consideration for the contextual communicative clues that can be identified (Cienki, 
2007:173; Shead, 2011:53-54).  
3.3.3.3. Conceptual metaphor and metonymy 
Everyday language is a flurry of metaphorical and metonymic exchanges arising from 
deep-seated cognitive tendencies (Burton, 2017:16). However, metaphor and 
metonymy are not merely figures of speech; they play vital roles in structuring 
cognition (Lemmens, 2016:99; Shead, 2011:57). Emphasising the conceptual nature of 
metaphor and metonymy was central to historical-philological semantics (Geeraerts, 
2010:204). Cognitive linguistics has worked towards an empirical approach for better 
understanding metaphor and metonymy as conceptual phenomena (Grady, 2007:189). 
Common descriptions of metaphor and metonymy contrast the cognitive mechanisms 
at play: Metaphor functions according to conceptual similarity across two domains, and 
metonymy is a contiguous extension within a single domain (Lemmens, 2016:99). 
Geeraerts (2010:15) questions this neat division based on the number of domains, as 
“domain” is an inherently vague concept. 
Metaphor involves the creative use of “a set of mappings or correspondences” across 
two domains based on some form of identified similarity (Shead, 2011:58). In cognitive 
linguistics, the standard model of metaphor is known as conceptual metaphor theory 
(CMT). The primary tenet of CMT is that metaphor “operates on the level of mental 
processes” (Shutova, Devereux and Korhonen, 2013:1262-1263). The pervasiveness of 
metaphor is a result of the foundationally embodied experience of the human mind, or 
human nature (Geeraerts, 2010:204, 206-207; Tay, 2014:52-53). Metaphoric language 
is the mapping of a source domain onto a target domain (more often than not an abstract 




especially prominent source for metaphorical conceptualisations. For example, Burton 
(2017:16) explains (via the formula “A is B”) that the schema ANGER IS A HOT LIQUID 
expresses the abstract notion of anger (the target domain) through a readily available 
experience (or source domain) that liquids can boil when heated to account for 
expressions such as “to make my blood boil”.  
However, identifying metaphoric patterns encounters two problems. Firstly, 
metaphoric patterns require constant comparison so as to discern which pattern best 
relates to individual expressions (Geeraerts, 2010:209). For example, Geeraerts 
(2010:209) notes that win, related to the ARGUMENT IS WAR pattern, could also relate to 
the ARGUMENT IS GAME-PLAYING pattern. One would, therefore, need to be able to 
explain why precisely it belongs to the latter and not the former. Secondly, metaphors 
should not be distinguished solely in opposition to “the basic meaning of a word” 
(Geeraerts, 2010:209). The radial structure of semantic potential implies that any sense 
could function as the initiator of a metaphoric extension. Geeraerts (2010:209) notes 
the importance of “the existence of dead metaphors” for this assertion; a seemingly 
metaphoric expression can be identified as having transfigured into a basic or literal 
use. Similarly, in his conclusion, Lemmens (2016:101) argues:   
That a strict demarcation between literal and metaphorical may not 
always be easy to make follows logically from the prototype-structure 
of categories where boundaries may not always be very strict. 
Blending theory was introduced by Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner as an expansion 
of CMT to incorporate Fauconnier’s notion of mental spaces (Birdsell, 2014:73; Shead, 
2011:59). Mental spaces are dynamic “conceptual pockets” of information for the 
purpose of specific acts of communication (Fauconnier quoted in Shead, 2011:59). As 
such, they are under the influence of constant change on the basis of individual use. 
Blending theory adds a blend space and a generic space to the conceptual domains of 
CMT (the source and target domains, which are kept as input spaces). The blend space 




contains the shared characteristics of the input spaces22 (Geeraerts, 2010:210-211; 
Shead, 2011:60).  
Critics of blending theory indicate that falsifiability is a requirement, “especially when 
the theory has psychological implications” (Tay, 2014:81). Geeraerts (2010:208-209) 
explains that one could plausibly generate a metaphoric pattern search for relevant 
examples; however, so far it is not possible to test blending theory for falsifiability. It 
has, furthermore, been suggested that proponents of blending theory fail to take other 
possible interpretations into account, and instead choose a metaphorical interpretation 
where desired (Tay, 2014:81).  
Metonymy, in contrast to metaphor, is a conceptual mapping occurring within a single 
domain and affecting entities that are perceived as contiguous. Metonymic links, like 
metaphorical ones, are dynamic associations that “do not exist by conceptual necessity” 
(Panther and Thornburg, 2007:240).  
To avoid the ambiguity inherent in discussions of domains and perceived contiguity, 
Ruiz de Mendoza (2014:147, 150) argues that metonymy is a type of conceptual 
mapping where the source domain accesses the target domain through either one of two 
cognitive operations: domain expansion through source-in-target metonymy, with the 
source as a “subdomain” of the target; or reduction through target-in-source metonymy, 
where the target exists as a “subdomain” of the source. Negro (2019:4-5) identifies 
“spilling the beans” as an example of ACTION FOR RESULT source-in-target metonymy 
(the expression has a long history of use, but in essence the act of “spilling the beans”, 
coming from ancient Greek voting systems, stands in for the result, which is unveiling 
what is secret) and “walking on eggshells” as an example of SPECIFIC FOR GENERIC 
 
22 CMT (or blending theory) distinguishes between three phenomena: foundational conceptual 
schemas, which subconsciously exist within a language community (e.g. GOOD IS UP as a 
conceptual metaphor); novel metaphors, which dynamically emerge from an entrenched sense 
and require mental effort when mapping the received novel metaphor to “a set of 
correspondences”; and conventionalised metaphors, which are understood implicitly because 
they are readily available in the mental lexicon (Shead, 2010:63-65). While it can be difficult 
to easily distinguish between novel and conventional metaphors, Boeyneams et al (2017:2162) 




target-in-source metonymy (the highly specific act “walking on eggshells” stands in for 
the general act of being careful, but the generic or target experience is experienced in 
the overly specific or source act). However, Ruiz de Mendoza (2014:161) concludes 
that metonymy, as a deeply conventionalised and wholly entrenched conceptual tool, 
might require psycholinguistic research to fully understand its functionality. 
3.4. Conclusion 
This chapter set out to present an overview of semantics research, emphasising the 
development from the historical-philological tradition through structuralism to the 
cognitive linguistics framework. Before moving to an expanded discussion on cognitive 
semantics, the chapter also considered the ancient language problem and the general 
viability of cognitive semantics for Biblical Hebrew. Lastly, the chapter explored the 
theoretical foundations of a cognitive approach to semantics as seen in three tools of 
the framework: prototype theory, frame theory, and a conceptual account of metaphor 
and metonymy. These tools are practically used for the study of Biblical Hebrew, as the 
literature review illustrated. Yet, they are also noted as useful for this study because 
they offer a way of engaging with the limited (and sometimes fragmentary) Biblical 
Hebrew corpus in a way that produces empirically founded results. Next, Chapter 4 
offers a practical overview of what the cognitive semantics framework entails for this 
study in the form of a working-hypothesis so as to introduce and contextualise the data 





Chapter 4: Working-hypothesis and methodology 
4.1. Introduction 
The research question for this study rests on the unclear categorisation of the semantic 
potential of qōl (as concluded in Chapter 2) and has been noted as follows: How can 
the application of a cognitive linguistics approach to categorisation and sense mapping 
help one to better construe the senses of qōl as well as the relationships between them 
in a principled manner? This chapter then represents the practical manner in which the 
research question has been addressed on the basis of the theoretical exploration 
undertaken in Chapter 3.  
In Chapter 5, the data for qōl in the Hebrew Bible is laid out in terms of this working-
hypothesis (i.e. the analysis is presented as already completed). Thus, the necessity of 
this chapter is in providing a clear account of how the analysis of Chapter 5 was 
approached. First, this chapter briefly explores the problem of polysemous lexemes, 
which has been an important theme in cognitive linguistics and also describes the 
rationale behind the research problem of this study: the inability of currently available 
lexica and theological dictionaries to define the individual senses for qōl because of its 
polysemous nature. Second, the working-hypothesis is described. This involves the 
practical value of the cognitivist toolkit outlined in Chapter 3 (prototype theory, frame 
theory, and a cognitive account of metaphor and metonymy) as well as the steps 
undertaken in this study’s data analysis. 
4.2. The nature of polysemous lexemes 
As discussed in Chapter 3, Michel Bréal’s Essai was the first modern linguistics work 
to define and describe polysemy. However, during the early 20th century with the rise 
of structuralism and its focus on understanding language as an autonomous system, 
polysemy was more often than not ignored (Gries, 2015:472; Lewandowska-
Tomazsczyk, 2007:139). The theory of generative grammar continued this trend; 
transformational-generative grammar, for example, typically explained cases of 




linguistics, as a result, was reintroducing the problem of polysemy in earnest 
(Lewandowska-Tomazsczyk, 2007:139-140).  
Polysemy refers to the potential for linguistic expressions to refer to entities that are 
wholly independent (Bergen, 2015:18). For example, the word glass is polysemous in 
the following examples: (1) I emptied the glass and (2) I drank the glass. In the first 
case, the referential entity is the container whereas in the second it is the liquid contents 
(Gries, 2015:472). The analysis of polysemy requires it to be established on “language-
internal grounds” (Wierzbicka quoted in Lewandowska-Tomazsczyk 2007:140). 
Polysemy diverges from componential analysis which states that meaning is derived on 
“the basis of necessary and sufficient conditions (or features/markers) without reference 
to contexts” (Gries, 2015:472).  
The question of whether there is a difference between polysemy, vagueness, and 
ambiguity is addressed in an ongoing debate. Consider the following sentence: My 
neighbour is coming over for lunch. The lexeme neighbour is inherently vague because 
grammatical gender is not necessitated within the sentence, but this vagueness does not 
result in polysemy because the compounding interpretations (male or female) merely 
occur on the pragmatic level (Geeraerts, 2016:234). Polysemy requires interpretative 
difficulty to fall beyond the utterance meaning; the systemic meaning has to be 
identified as ambiguous. With neighbour, the added qualification of male or female (on 
the utterance level) does not change the systemic meaning, which is “person who lives 
next door” (Geeraerts, 2016:235). Cognitive linguistics treats the utterance meaning, 
i.e. language use,  as a point of access for the systemic meaning. Structuralism concerns 
itself with the language system and generative grammar with the mental representation, 
which Geeraerts (2016:235-236) argues is why both are concerned primarily with 
systemic meanings. However, the utterance level of analysis is “the primary 
observational basis of semantics” and cannot be ignored (Geeraerts, 2016:236). 
As argued by Lewandowska-Tomazsczyk (2007:140), for cognitive semantics, 
polysemy is a problem of categorisation. Most lexicons of Biblical Hebrew state that 
qōl can refer to a sound or voice, but in practice these entities can be distinguished from 
one another: all voices are mechanically sound, but not all sounds are voices. The 
problem for lexicology, and the current study, is thus how to present this information 




Meaning is flexible (a process of dynamic construal in context); Geeraerts (2016:240) 
further argues that it is not a simplistic matter to differentiate between the utterance 
level of analysis and systemic meanings.  
During the second half of the 20th century, three tests for determining polysemy were 
developed. The first is the logical test (also referred to as the truth-theoretical 
perspective) which asserts that “a word is polysemic if an assertion involving that word 
can be both true and false of the same referent” (Geeraerts, 2016:236; Lewandowska-
Tomazsczyk, 2007:141). An often-quoted example is that of port which can refer to 
either a type of liquor or a docking facility for ships, but it cannot refer to both 
simultaneously. The English lexeme port developed from Latin portus (harbour) for its 
literal sense, and the second sense, the specific liquor, is the result of a metonymic shift 
as the wine was a key export of what is today the Portuguese city of Porto. In this 
example, as with many others, the polysemous term is conceptually related, but the 
manner in which these incongruous meanings came to be might be diachronically 
unrelated (Lewandowska-Tomazsczyk, 2007:142). 
Secondly, the linguistic ambiguity states that if two occurrences of a lexeme require 
semantic elaboration to differentiate between senses then it can be described as 
polysemous (Geeraerts, 2016:236-237; Lewandowska-Tomazsczyk, 2007:142-143). A 
simple example23 (Gries, 2015:473; Lewandowska-Tomazsczyk, 2007:142) should 
suffice for our discussion: “Judy’s dissertation is thought-provoking and yellowed with 
age.” In this sentence, dissertation is used ambiguously so that the contents are thought-
provoking, but the physical copy of the dissertation is yellowed with age.  
Thirdly, the classic definitional test, originating with Aristotle (found in both the 
Metaphysics and the Posterior Analytics of the Organon), argues that a lexeme is 
 
23 It should be noted that this example contains a specific form of polysemy. Croft and Cruse 
(2004:109) give a broad definition of polysemy “variation in the construal of a word on different 
occasions of use”. The sentence in (1) contains what Croft and Cruse (2004:116-117) call a 
facet, which “are not meanings, but pre-meanings, and are both the result of construal processes 
and at the same time the subject of further construal”. This aligns with the example requiring 




“considered polysemic if more than a single definition is needed to account for its 
meaning” (Geeraerts, 2016:237; Lewandowska-Tomazsczyk, 2007:143).  
However, the three tests can in fact produce divergent answers regarding the same 
lexeme as a result of their various methods for analysing and defining polysemy. One 
test may describe a lexeme as polysemous, whereas another may answer that it is a case 
of pragmatic ambiguity. An example given by Geeraerts (2016:237) clarifies this 
sufficiently: The autohyponymous lexeme dog can carry the readings of both “Canis 
familiaris” and “male Canis familiaris” depending on contextual usage. Following the 
logical test, the lexeme as such is polysemous. However, the definitional test cannot 
distinguish between these two readings because the latter reading is contained within 
the “encompassing definition” of dog as the former reading (Lewandowska-
Tomazsczyk, 2007:143-144).  
For lexical semantics, polysemy is a necessary component of sense individuation. 
Firstly, meaning expresses categorisation (Gries, 2015:385). Moreover, to take 
meaning as an act of dynamic construal in context is to acknowledge the innate reliance 
on encyclopaedic knowledge in the mind. Thus, polysemy validates the use of frame 
theory. The specific use of a given lexeme in its frame must be viewed against the 
wealth of conceptual information that is activated mentally (Hanks, 2013:385-386). 
Lexical category membership often revolves around comparison with a conceptual 
prototype (Gries, 2015:474). Frame theory helps, firstly, then to identify a lexeme’s 
patterns of use and, secondly, to relate these various usages to the conceptual prototype. 
The relationships between the senses of a polysemous lexeme are more often than not 
the result of two specific sense extensions: metaphor and metonymy, both of which are 
not merely literary devices but generalised cognitive tools.   
While polysemy has been a central topic for cognitive linguistics since the 1980s, it has 
also been critiqued. The process of identifying a prototype and separating senses related 
to that category has been called into question as an innately subjective task. The basis 
for this criticism is a potentially uncritical confidence in believing the conceptual 
structures are always accessed when doing lexical semantics. Researchers only ever 
access language-internal data, which is used to make inferences of the conceptual 
structure (Gries, 2015:476-477). Gries (2015:477-478) discusses some linguistic 




Tyler and Vyvyan Evans24. Exploring this approach goes beyond the scope of the 
current study, especially considering it involves developing support from large-scale 
corpus linguistic and psycholinguistic research, which are both problematic in lieu of 
the small corpus available for Biblical Hebrew semantics. We can note however the 
methodologies used by Shead (2011) and Thompson and Lyle (2019) as potential ways 
of successfully conducting empirical research of the Hebrew Bible. Nonetheless, the 
study of polysemy is an area to keep watch for further semantic research25. 
4.3. Working-hypothesis 
We now have a better understanding, firstly, of the theoretical foundation of cognitive 
semantics when taking into account prototype theory, frame theory, and a conceptual 
account of metaphor and metonymy; and, secondly, the analytic challenges of 
polysemous lexemes. We are here dealing with language as a complex and dynamic 
system of meaning construal (Geeraerts, 2016b:530; Shead, 2011:35). Following 
Geeraerts (2016a:241), we accept that no model of semantic research can produce 
profitable results without consideration for the variety of contextual senses that occur 
in actual language use.  
Geeraerts (2016a:242) refers to the distributional corpus-based method as “the most 
influential methodological innovation in linguistic semantics”. For the study of Biblical 
Hebrew, it is not an option to mine new data. The corpus of the Hebrew Bible is to a 
large degree the entire scope of research (although new inscriptional material is ever-
increasing in relevance). Consequently, what we are seeking is a lexicological 
methodology that can account for the contextual occurrences of a lexeme in terms of 
its framing, repeated collocations, and other relevant syntagmatic patterns (Geeraerts, 
2016a:242). Shead (2011:36-37), furthermore, lists five general factors, adapted from 
the work of Croft and Cruse (2004), to guide interpretation: 1) human cognition, 2) 
 
24 Evans (2019) refers to his approach now as Access Semantics, whereas previously it was 
known as The Theory of Lexical Concepts and Cognitive Models (LCCM). 
25 Falkum and Vincente (2015:14) state that further research into the nature of polysemy hinges 





individual experience of reality that might favour specific lines of interpretation, 3) 
sociocultural norms, 4) clues born from the internal linguistic context and the external 
context of the communicant, and 5) the wealth of encyclopaedic knowledge. Corpus-
based lexical analysis, therefore, attempts to gather evidence for interpretative rationale 
based on these five factors through the “linguist’s intuition” (Stubbs, 2016:110).  
A corpus-based analysis is oriented towards understanding the way encyclopaedic 
knowledge cements itself in language use (Shead, 2011:39). We distinguish between 
“decontextualized, coded meanings” and “contextualized readings that are realized in a 
specific discourse context” (Geeraerts, 2010:230). For the study of Biblical Hebrew, 
without active native speakers, corpus-based analysis requires paying attention to the 
“invited inferences” in texts and from there attempt to explicate a possible survey of 
the semantic potential (Geeraerts, 2010:230). An invited inference is something not 
explicitly clarified or communicated by a speaker or writer but can be deduced on the 
part of the hearer or reader. For example, if someone were to say, “I’m moving house,” 
there is a metonymic implication that they are not moving an actual house but rather 
relocating from one property to another and, in the process, moving their possessions. 
With the corpus of Biblical Hebrew, we are required to identify such invited inferences 
(see, for example, the discussion of qōl as a metonymic reference to reported speech in 
Chapter 5 Section 5.7.). 
The working-hypothesis of this study is founded on the applicability of prototype 
theory, frame theory, and a cognitive account of metaphor and metonymy in clarifying 
the polysemous lexeme qōl. Firstly, semasiological change is ably examined by way of 
prototype theory (Geeraerts, 2016:233-234). We are able to account for both the 
stability of central senses and the inconsistent nature of less salient category members. 
The lexical category for qōl would be hierarchical: more common senses will typically 
show more stability within the corpus while the periphery is sensitive to shifts in 
meaning. From Chapter 2, we know that the prototypical meaning of qōl is quite firmly 
agreed upon. We thus have this starting point. The problem is that the representation of 
individual senses is complex and their interrelationships even more so. This complexity 
can be seen in terms of the interjectional use of qōl (see Chapter 5 Section 5.2.) and 





Therefore, secondly, exploring the presence of semantic frames is a key analytical task 
for connecting lexical occurrences with relevant encyclopaedic knowledge (Shead, 
2011:48-49). Conceptual frames are broad organisational structures that overlap, as can 
be expected, within the complex possibilities of natural language. Without native 
speaker intuition, the textual corpus is the only evidence of actual language use. In 
delineating frames, it is necessary to consider the interaction of various lexical 
elements. Collocations are “co-occurring word-forms” that give concrete evidence for 
separate senses (Stubbs, 2016:113). The relationship between an individual sense and 
surrounding grammatical information is, furthermore, known as colligation. The benefit 
of frame theory is its emphasis on the relationship between the lexical level and the 
conceptual level of meaning. For this study, a simplified methodology of frame-based 
lexical analysis is taken from Shead (2011:108-118). Each occurrence of a lexeme 
functions according to an individuated sense which occurs somewhere on the 
continuum from prototypical to peripheral. The difficulty is arriving at a persuasive 
argument for each sense. Using corpus-based semantic analysis, this study intends to 
document plausible independent frames, conceptual units that inflect a generic lexeme 
with specific semantic weight. A semantic frame contains various components, either 
compulsory or superfluous, that further entrench the intended referent. Each frame can 
be described in terms of a relationship between the profile and base (Shead, 2011:51). 
For qōl, we can use as an example a common frame from Genesis 27.8: Rebecca, the 
speaker, says to her son, “Listen to me”, where me is literally “my voice”. The text has 
the added collocation of referencing the verb to command (ṣwh), but regardless, the 
stable grammatical structure indicates a clear obedience frame as Chapter 5 Section 
5.5.3 will show. Here, my voice (the base) presupposes the concept of obedience (the 
profile). Logically, frames closer to the conceptual prototype would be more commonly 
occurring. Also, their grammatical structure would be more stable. Thus, prominence 
and stability are two important characteristics for defining the nature of individual 
frames. However, one should take seriously the common criticism of frame theory that 
it is a complex and seemingly subjective task to decide what is and is not part of a frame 
(Cienki, 2007:183). 
Thirdly, cognitive linguistics understands sense extensions as the result of, primarily, 
the mechanisms of metaphor and metonymy. Such semantic extension has been 




communicative decisions (Grondelaers, Geeraerts and Speelman, 2007:996). Words 
and expressions will always develop new senses (or lose existing senses) to 
communicate new conceptual experiences (Grondelaers, Geeraerts and Speelman, 
2007:999). In analysing the identified frames for qōl, the next step would be to explore 
the development of individual senses, which occur through actual language use, in 
terms of the mental processes of metaphor and metonymy.  
4.4. Methodology 
Operationalising the above working-hypothesis comprises the following steps: 
1. Identify and group occurrences according to syntactic patterns and the broader 
context of use, both of which function as frame elements. 
2. Categorise uses from most concrete to least concrete (or most abstract). Sense 
individuation generally occurs from more concrete (literal) lexical meanings. 
3. Note the trends that accompany usage in terms of frequency and distribution of 
senses. This provides evidence for the prototypicality of senses.  
4. Analyse the consistency of frames based on the status of frame elements as 
either necessary or optional for the functionality of a frame.  
5. Identify the plausible mechanism of extension that underlies sense 
individuation. 
4.5. Conclusion 
The working-hypothesis of this study begins with the assertion that language is a 
dynamic system of contextual construal. Lexical meaning is the product of conceptual 
knowledge processed and communicated through linguistic systems. For an adequate 
lexicological analysis of Biblical Hebrew, a corpus-based procedure is a methodology 
that takes seriously the available evidence of native speaker intuition. It is hypothesised 
that a better understanding of qōl can be achieved through an analysis of the lexical 
frames, our access to the speakers’ conceptual world; the construal of a hierarchical and 
radial model of senses based on prototype theory; and a postulation of sense 





Chapter 5: Recategorising the senses of qōl 
5.1. Introduction 
Based on the working-hypothesis established in Chapter 4, we now move on to consider 
the data for this study. The aim of this chapter is to detail the senses of the lexeme qōl 
in terms of the theoretical insights drawn from cognitive semantics in Chapter 3 and the 
practical manner for doing so laid out in Chapter 4, and so chart the lexeme’s semantic 
potential. The discussion in this chapter will provide examples to substantiate the 
individual senses identified and the broad groupings. This then acts as an answer to the 
question laid out in Chapter 2 regarding how best to describe the lexeme’s semantic 
potential given the inadequate formulations and categorisations of available lexicons 
and theological dictionaries. Although most of the accumulated knowledge of the 
senses of qōl (about which there is consensus) is acknowledged as being the foundation 
of this study, the present study is not merely reconfiguring existing source material. 
Rather, an empirical analysis has been undertaken to aid the assessment of our existing 
knowledge and improve on identified weaknesses. As such, the analysis offered here is 
an independent study of the corpus that hopes to add to the ongoing discussion of 
Biblical Hebrew semantics. Lastly, where a lack of data (i.e. an inadequate number of 
occurrences) impedes sense categorisation, the options will be provided along with 
supporting rationale. Throughout this chapter, the NRSV translation is used, unless 
otherwise stated. Example texts will thus note the book, chapter, and verse (e.g. Gen. 
1.1), but where any translation other than the NRSV has been used, this is further noted 
in parentheses (e.g. Gen. 1.1 [NIV]). Furthermore, where applicable, my own 
translations will be given according to the direct translation method explored in, among 
other papers, “How ‘direct’ can a direct translation be? Some perspectives from the 
realities of a new type of church Bible”26 (Van der Merwe, 2016). 
 
26 The goal of a direct translation would be to recreate in “good idiomatic” language “all the 
communicative clues of the source text in the contexts construed for the source text audience” 




This chapter is arranged according to six broad categories that comprise the semantic 
potential of qōl as extrapolated from the corpus with the help of the cognitive linguistics 
toolkit laid out in Chapters 3 and 4. We begin with the most basic category, the use of 
qōl to refer to perceived acoustic phenomena. Second, we consider the debated function 
of qōl to function interjectionally. Third, we discuss the adverbial functionality of qōl 
as “audibility” (or, characterising an action or phenomenon as being “loud” or 
happening “aloud”) an extension of the concept of the more basic level concept of 
“sound”. Fourth, we address several uncommon expressions that build on from the 
adverbial function (these are discussed as plausible dual verb constructions). Fifth, we 
move from the realm of basic “sound” and “audibility” to the place of qōl in the world 
of speech and vocal communication. Sixth, our discussion of speech and 
communication is continued but in the context of divine or supernatural beings. This is 
separated from Section 5 because of the important interaction and intermingling of 
voice and thunder in terms of the divine qōl of Yahweh. Seventh, and last, we address 
a minor category of senses where qōl refers to “reported speech” as an extension of the 
concept of “voice” (i.e. what was said by a “voice”). It is hypothesized that this 
categorisation captures the semantic potential of qōl in its development from the basic 
level sense of “sound” to the ever-increasingly complex world of speech and 
communication.  
5.2. Acoustic phenomena as objects 
The Biblical Hebrew lexeme qōl together with the Biblical Aramaic cognate qāl occur 
512 times: the former, due to the nature of the corpus represents the vast majority with 
505 occurrences, while 7 occurrences of the latter form can be found in the late book 
of Daniel. The most basic, most commonly occurring, and therefore most prototypical 
use of the lexeme27 (with 250 occurrences, or 48.8% of the joint Biblical Hebrew and 
Biblical Aramaic corpus) involves a reference to the qōl of a person, an animal, created 
by various types of activity (human and non-human), and a plethora of phenomena 
 
27 Due to the minority status of the Aramaic cognate, and its functional similarity to the Biblical 
Hebrew form, references to “the lexeme” concern qōl, unless explicitly stated otherwise. There 
are several specific senses of qōl discussed in this chapter that cannot be extended to qāl 




originating in the natural environment. Acoustic phenomena are experienced as 
arguably tangible objects that are interacted with physically (this is captured succinctly 
through the commonly found relationship between qōl and the ear, e.g. Job 9.16 “Even 
if I summoned him and he responded, I do not believe he would give me a hearing 
[NIV], where literally the second clause uses the verb ’zn [to listen, or perceive, through 
the ear]). We can thus postulate some form of conceptual metaphor such as ACOUSTIC 
PHENOMENA ARE OBJECTS.  
With the expansive range of qōl in the construct state expressing the source of acoustic 
phenomena, one could argue that a first language speaker would have been able to use 
this syntactic construction to identify or point out any sound. For example, imagine two 
English speakers in dialogue where Speaker A suggests they have heard a noise. 
Speaker B then asks after what exactly Speaker A heard, with Speaker A answering, “It 
was the sound of X,” where X can be any comparable sound (e.g. music, birdsong, 
voices, etc.). Of these 250 occurrences, 143 occur within the broader syntactic frame 
šm' qōl (or, leqōl, beqōl) that is discussed in Section 5.5.  
The syntactic construction of the first frame (the remaining 107 occurrences) involves 
qōl in an absolute state or qōl in the construct state. There is little semantic difference 
between the two frames28. The two examples of #1 and #2 can be compared to illustrate 
the lexeme’s fluidity. Whereas qōl is used twice in #1 to identify a specific speaker’s 
voice, #2 contains several occurrences of qōl to remark upon and identify the nature of 
a complex environmental soundscape. When hearing the collective din of the people, 
 
28 Any decision by a lexicographer to translate uses of qōl with voice or sound based on their 
relation to human or non-human animals is subjective. Available lexicons and theological 
dictionaries indicate this subjectivity in their varied considerations of voice and sound as 
translation values: while Gesenius (2013), BDB (2000/1906), Labuschagne (1997), and Clines 
(2010) treat voice and sound as separate products of both humans and non-human animals, 
Koehler and Baumgartner (1994-2000) and Kedar-Kopfstein (2003) speak of voice only in 
relation to human beings who are then also capable of producing sound through numerous 
physical acts. The corpus conveys an obvious increase in linguistic complexity when dealing 
with human communication or the anthropomorphised speech of divine beings, but it is unclear 





Joshua hears “the sound of the people” and states that he hears the sound of war. Moses, 
answering him, pinpoints the acoustic phenomenon through three constructions 
involving qōl.  
ב ֶאל־ִיְצָח֥          1 אֶמר ַוִּיַּגׁ֧ש ַיֲעקֹ֛ ֹ֗ הּו ַוּי יו ַוְיֻמֵּׁש֑ ק ָאִב֖
ו׃ ֣קֹול ַהּקֹל֙  י ֵעָׂשֽ ִים ְיֵד֥ ב ְוַהָּיַד֖  ַיֲעקֹ֔
So Jacob went up to his father Isaac, 
who felt him and said, “The voice is 
Jacob’s voice, but the hands are the 
hands of Esau.” (Gen. 27.22) 
 2          �ַ ע ְיהֹוֻׁש֛ אֶמ֙ר  ֶאת־֥קֹולַוִּיְׁשַמ֧ ֹ֙ ה ַוּי ם ְּבֵרעֹ֑ ָהָע֖
ה  ַּמֲחֶנה׃ ֥קֹולֶאל־ֹמֶׁש֔ ה ַּבֽ  ִמְלָחָמ֖
ין          אֶמר ֵא֥ ֹ֗ ין  קֹול֙ ַוּי ה ְוֵא֥ ֲע֣נֹות  ֖קֹולֲע֣נֹות ְּגבּוָר֔
ה  ַ�׃ ֣קֹולֲחלּוָׁש֑ י ׁשֵֹמֽ  ַעּ֔נֹות ָאֹנִכ֖
When Joshua heard the noise of the 
people as they shouted, he said to 
Moses, “There is a noise of war in 
the camp.” But he said, “It is not the 
sound made by victors, or the sound 
made by losers; it is the sound of 
revelers that I hear.” (Ex. 32.17–18) 
Kedar-Kopfstein (2003/1993:578) states that qōl extends “from the rumbling of a storm 
(Ps. 77.18[17]) and the chaotic ocean (Ps. 93.4) to the softest rustling of a single leaf 
(Leviticus 26.36)”. In this basic sense, qōl can also be qualified or described in a variety 
of ways: there is the faintest whisper of a sound (1 Kings 19.12); a voice majestic or 
filled with grandeur, as with Yahweh’s speech (Is. 30:30); a voice pleasing to the ear 
(Ezek. 33.32); anguished, as when Darius approached Daniel in the lion’s den (Dan. 
6:20); and sounds described through comparison, such as the beating of angelic wings 
or the awe-inspiring voice of Yahweh, both described as the sound of rushing waters 
(Ezek. 1.24, 43.2), and again the voice an angelic being described as the roaring sound 
of a crowd (Dan. 10.6). More specifically related to speech content, qōl can be used in 
constructions such as “the voice [speech] of a fool” (Ecc. 5.2) – something to be 
scorned.  
A few further examples should suffice in illustrating the generic acoustic world native 




ה  3 ל ּוֶמ֛ אֶמר ְׁשמּוֵא֔ ֹ֣ אןַוּי ֹ֥ ַהֶּז֖ה ְּבָאְזָנ֑י  ֽקֹול־ַהּצ
ַ�׃ ְו֣קֹול י ׁשֵֹמֽ ר ָאֹנִכ֖ ר ֲאֶׁש֥  ַהָּבָק֔
But Samuel said, “What then is this 
bleating of sheep in my ears, and the 
lowing of cattle that I hear?” (1 Sam. 
15.14)29 
ה          4 י ֶאְרֶאה־ֵּנ֑ס ֶאְׁשְמָע֖ ר׃ ס  ֥קֹולַעד־ָמַת֖  ,How long must I see the standard ׁשֹוָפֽ
and hear the sound of the trumpet? 
(Jer. 4.21) 
ע          5 ם  ֶאת־֣קֹולָוֶאְׁשַמ֣ ים ְּכקֹו֩ל ַּכְנֵפיֶה֡ ִים ַרִּב֤ ַמ֨
ם ְּכקֹול־ַׁשַּדי֙  ה ֥קֹול ְּבֶלְכָּת֔ ַמֲחֶנ֑ה ְּכ֣קֹול ֲהֻמָּל֖
ן׃  יָנה ַכְנֵפיֶהֽ ם ְּתַרֶּפ֥  ְּבָעְמָד֖
When they moved, I heard the sound 
of their wings like the sound of 
mighty waters, like the thunder of 
the Almighty, a sound of tumult like 
the sound of an army; when they 
stopped, they let down their wings. 
(Ezek. 1.24) 
ם          6 ָפאִי֗ ין ֳע֝ ִים ִיְׁשּ֑כֹון ִמֵּב֥ ֵליֶהם עֹוף־ַהָּׁשַמ֣ ֲע֭
 ׃ ֽקֹולִיְּתנּו־
By the streams the birds of the air 
have their habitation; they sing 
among the branches. (Ps. 104.12) 
י־ ק  ַאְנָּתה         7 ׁש ִּדֽ י ָכל־ֱאָנ֡ ְמָּת ְּטֵע֒ם ִּד֣ ַמְלָּכ֮א ָׂש֣
ע  לִיְׁשַמ֡ ְׁשרִֹקיָתא ִקיָתרֹס ָק֣ ק  ַקְרָנ֣א ַמ֠
א ְפַסְנֵּתִרין֙ ְוִסיֹּפְנָיה א ק  ַׂשְּבָכ֤ ל ְזֵנ֣י ְזָמָר֑ ְוכֹ֖
א׃ ֶלם ַּדֲהָבֽ ל ְוִיְסֻּג֖ד ְלֶצ֥  ִיֵּפ֥
You, O king, have made a decree, 
that everyone who hears the sound 
of the horn, pipe, lyre, trigon, harp, 
drum, and entire musical ensemble, 
shall fall down and worship the 
golden statue, (Dan. 3.10) 
 
29 While a literal translation does read “the sound of sheep” and “the sound of cattle”, it is 
reasonable to suggest that these expressions function similar to the onomatopoeic moo and baa 
that English speakers would connect with cows and sheep, respectively. As such, the native 
speaker of Biblical Hebrew would have registered different conceptual referents for the two 
expressions in #3. The requirement in Biblical Hebrew to state the origin or owner of the qōl 
does not mean that this formulation triggers one generic conceptualization, such as “the sound 




The basic syntactic frame qōl in the construct state is as such generic enough that it is 
used to specify any and all acoustic phenomena encountered. 
5.2.1. Basic metonymic inference for speaker and/or speech content 
A construct state use of qōl in relation to human beings regularly and consistently 
conveys a form of metonymy30. In 77 occurrences31 qōl is as a contiguous placeholder 
for either 1) the person uttering the speech content or 2) the speech content conveyed, 
whereby the voice acts as a container for what is said (Radden and Dirven, 2007:12-
13).  
Such a sense extension via metonymy is a key example of the lexeme’s polysemous 
nature (Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, 2007:148). Here we can understand references to 
the speaker as metonymic expansion (or, source-in-target metonymy) and references to 
speech content as metonymic reduction (or, target-in-source metonymy). However, the 
boundary between speaker and speech content is oftentimes ambiguous; we will focus 
on those exemplars where the distinction is obvious and noteworthy.  
5.2.1.1. Source-in-target metonymy  
ר ָקְדׁ֣שֹו  ֭קֹוִלי         8 ִני ֵמַה֖ ֲעֵנ֨ א ַוַּיֽ ֶאל־ְיהָו֣ה ֶאְקָר֑
ָלה׃  ֶסֽ
I cry aloud to the LORD, and he 
answers me from his holy hill. (Ps. 
3.5 [NRSV 3.4]) 
 
30 Often these are called part-for-whole and whole-for-part metonymies, but following Ruiz de 
Mendoza (2014), this chapter will continue to use the terms source-in-target and target-in-
source due to its indebtedness to the work of De Mendoza’s (2014). 
31 Gen. 3.17, 4.23, 16.2, 21.12, 27.8, 27.13, 27.43, 30.6; Ex. 4.1, 4.9, 18.19, 18.24; Num. 20.16, 
21.3, Deut. 1.45, Deut. 21.18a, 21.18a, 21.20, 33.7; Josh. 6.10, 10.14, 22.2; Judg. 18.25, 20.13; 
1 Sam. 2.25, 8.7, 8.9, 8.19, 8.22, 12.1, 15.24, 19.6, 28.21, 28.22, 28.23; 2 Sam. 12.18, 13.14, 
22.7; 1 Kgs. 14.6, 17.22, 20.25; 2 Kgs. 6.32, 10.6; Is. 10.30, 28.32, 42.2, 50.10, 58.4; Jer. 4.31, 
35.8; Ezek. 27.30; Jonah 2.3; Micah 6.1; Nahum 2.14; Ps. 3.5, 5.4, 18.7, 19.3, 27.7, 55.18, 
58.6, 64.2, 77.2 [x2], 81.12, 116.1, 119.149, 130.2a, 141.1, 142.2 [x2]; Prov. 5.13, 8.4; Job 




י         9  ָקה  קֹוִל֣ ים ְוֶאְצָע֑ יֶאל־ֱא�ִה֣ ים  קֹוִל֥ �ִה֗ ֶאל־ֱא֝
י׃  ין ֵאָלֽ  ְוַהֲאִז֥
I cry out to God—I cry for help; I 
cry out to God, and he will hear me. 
(Ps 3.5 [Own translation]) 
Metonymic expansion is commonly found in the Psalms and other poetic texts. There 
is a noticeable trend to use qōl with a pronominal suffix (often the first-person singular) 
with cries for help or absolution. While pronominal suffixes are often attached to qōl 
(as with any noun), in poetic texts this form often stands in for the first-person subject. 
A literal translation of #8 reads “My voice cries out to Yahweh” – a good English 
translation could also be “I cry out to Yahweh”. The more complex question with regard 
to the poetic nature of this text is ascertaining which translation captures the spirit, so 
to speak, of the psalm.  
In #9, one clear example of metonymic expansion is present in v.2a while a parallel in 
v.2b can be interpreted similarly on the basis of the verbal ellipsis. Both clauses contain 
the metonymic expression “My voice is to God”. A similar case without the verbal 
ellipsis can be found in Ps. 142.2. Clearly qōlî in this expression is used metonymically, 
and the text should be examined for the poetry it is. But I suggest that there is some 
overlap between the use of qōlî as a stand-in for the speaker and the adverbial capacity 
of qōl, which will be discussed in Section 5.3. Thus, the poet explicitly uses the image 
of their voice being directed at God (one could even say directed upwards to God, 
according to the threefold worldview of the Ancient Near East32) and so emphasises the 
urgency or audibility of their cry. 
Metonymic expansion can also accompany an instruction to be silent such as in #10 
and #11. While this syntactic frame – lō or ’al šm' (in the Hiphil [causative] stem) and 
qōl – occurs infrequently, the basic use of qōl is comparable with #8 and #9. In #10 and 
 
32 Rochberg (2005:317) notes the inseparable Sumerian linguistic pair of An and Ki – heaven 
and earth. The third cosmological realm, which negates to an extent An and Ki, is the 
netherworld or the abyss. For example, the sun travels between these realms and, as such, 
provides order to the functioning of the world: “In the lower regions you take charge of the 
netherworld gods, the demons, the Anunna-gods, in the upper regions you administer all the 




#11, qōl with a pronominal suffix acts as the source domain through which the target 
domain is experienced.  
יעּ֙ו          10 א ָתִר֙ ֹ֤ ר ל ַ� ֵלאֹמ֗ ה ְיהֹוֻׁש֜ ְוֶאת־ָהָע֩ם ִצָּו֨
יעּו  א־ַתְׁשִמ֣ ֹֽ ם ְול ם ֶאת־קֹוְלֶכ֔ א ִמִּפיֶכ֖ ְולֹא־ֵיֵצ֥
ד ֣יֹום ָאְמִר֧  ר ַע֠ יעּו ָּדָב֑ ם ָהִר֖ י ֲאֵליֶכ֛
ם׃  ַוֲהִריֹעֶתֽ
To the people Joshua gave this 
command: “You shall not shout or 
let your voice be heard, nor shall you 
utter a word, until the day I tell you 
to shout. Then you shall shout.” 
(Josh. 6.10) 
ע          11 ן ַאל־ַּתְׁשַמ֥ נּו קֹוְל֖� ַוּיֹאְמ֤רּו ֵאָלי֙ו ְּבֵני־ָד֔ ִעָּמ֑
ה  ֶפׁש ְוָאַסְפָּת֥ ֵרי ֶנ֔ ם ֲאָנִׁשי֙ם ָמ֣ ן־ִיְפְּג֣עּו ָבֶכ֗ ֶּפֽ
�׃  ַנְפְׁש֖� ְוֶנֶ֥פׁש ֵּביֶתֽ
And the Danites said to him, “You 
had better not let your voice be heard 
among us or else hot-tempered 
fellows will attack you, and you will 
lose your life and the lives of your 
household.” (Judg. 18.25) 
The difference is in the negation used by #10 and #11. In #10, the speaker uses a basic 
negative command, prohibiting speech “until the day I say to you, ‘Shout!’” In #11, on 
the other hand, the use of ’al is antagonistic on the part of the speaker, not desiring to 
hear the speech of the addressee. This frame only occurs once, so it is debatable whether 
the use of ’al here is unique or represents some common phrase unrepresented in the 
corpus. 
Lastly, a possible example of metonymic expansion can be seen in 2 Kgs. 6.32 (as well 
as 1 Kgs. 14.6, but a single example will suffice): 
יו׃֛קֹול ֲה֗לֹוא          12 יו ַאֲחָרֽ י ֲאדָֹנ֖  Is not the sound of his master’s feet ַרְגֵל֥
behind him?” (2 Kgs. 6.32) 
Both of these texts make reference to the qōl of an approaching person’s feet or 
footsteps. The approaching subject is associated with the sound of their footsteps and, 
therefore, the sound being made (the foremost sensory information available) is a 
reduction of the person approaching. It could be argued that this is highly irregular 




5.2.1.2. Target-in-source metonymy  
It is common for qōl to be used in the context of speech. The majority of occurrences 
work to construct a broader semantic frame33 involving the verbal root šm' (to hear). 
Frame elements include the aforementioned verb along with an optional but common 
prepositional prefix. With the correct frame elements, qōl triggers a conceptualisation 
of listening not only to the sound of another’s voice but to the content of their speech34.  
For example, because you listened to the qōl of your wife (Gen. 3.17) or Yahweh would 
not heed your qōl (Deut. 1.45) can be translated as because you listened to your wife 
and Yahweh would not listen to you, respectively. The whole (the speaker) is 
experienced in terms of one part (the speaker’s qōl). Example #13 provides the 
standardised syntax used by this semantic frame: 
ַען          13 ה ְוִצָּל֙ה ְׁשַמ֣ יו ָעָד֤ ֶמ� ְלָנָׁש֗ אֶמר ֶל֜ ֹ֨ יַוּי  קֹוִל֔
ְגִּתי֙  יׁש ָהַר֙ י ִא֤ י ִּכ֣ ֶמ� ַהְאֵזָּ֖נה ִאְמָרִת֑ י ֶל֔ ְנֵׁש֣
י׃  י ְוֶיֶ֖לד ְלַחֻּבָרִתֽ  ְלִפְצִע֔
Lamech said to his wives: “Adah 
and Zillah, hear my voice; you wives 
of Lamech, listen to what I say: I 
have killed a man for wounding me, 
a young man for striking me. (Gen. 
4.23) 
The speaker, Lamech, makes use of parallel constructions: “hear my voice” corresponds 
with “give ear to what I say”. Lamech’s voice and what he has to say are one and the 
same. Therefore, this is an example of reduction: the target domain (the speech content, 
or in this case the content of Lamech’s request) is experienced as a part of the source 
domain (the voice).  
 
33 The broader semantic frame will be discussed in depth in Section 5.4. 
34 In Leviticus 5.1 qōl is used –irregularly, occurring only this once – to describe something as 
having occurred in a public manner. The construct state expression qōl ’alah (the sound of an 
oath) is taken to mean “a public oath”. But the metonymic inference is the same, since the text 




5.3. The interjectional sense 
Any list of the interjectional sense of qōl has to be considered debatable; each lexicon 
and theological dictionary contains its own list (see Chapter 2). For the purposes of this 
study, the Masoretic accentuation has been deemed an invaluable guide for consistency 
of interpretation. Nevertheless, one should keep in mind the nonexistence of any 
interjectional interpretation within the LXX and Targums (Labuschagne, 1997:1134). 
The interjectional sense is treated as the second sense category for two reasons: first, 
because it is syntactically comparable to the prototypical sense discussed in Section 5.2, 
and second, because it semantically deals with “sound” on a very basic level (i.e. while 
the interjectional sense is complex, it functions simplistically as the pointing out or 
drawing of attention to a sound).  
Instances of the interjectional sense are difficult to classify because syntactically they 
occur as qōl in either the absolute or construct state, depending on how the clause is 
interpreted. This section starts with a discussion of deixis as the basis of certain 
interjections (such as this sense of qōl). It then considers a list of plausible interjectional 
occurrences according to identified criteria and ends with a short analysis of certain 
rejected cases. 
5.3.3. Deixis and interjections 
As discussed in Chapter 2 Section 2.3.1, according to Labuschagne (1997:1134) qōl 
can be understood as a deictic interjection in certain instances. Deixis, simply put, 
involves a contextual reference to something. It is a foundational communication skill, 
common also to monkeys and apes: pointing at a tree is deictic, while a person pointing 
at a tree and using the deictic word “that” in reference to the tree is verbalised deixis 
(Moulin-Frier et al., 2011:199). The referents of deictic words shift constantly, but their 
meaning never changes (e.g. the word “here” possesses a fixed meaning, but its referent 
depends on contextual use).  
Important for the interjectional sense of qōl is understanding discourse deixis: the use 
of deictic expressions for discourse active elements. Deictic terms activate conceptual 
structures (mental spaces generated by idealised cognitive models [ICMs]). For 




referent exists within the conceptual world of Person A but might be unknown or 
forgotten for Person B – Person A informing Person B regarding the referent, “There it 
is”, thus activates the referent for Person B (Yang, 2011:129).  
Deictic expressions exhibit graded prototypicality (Yang, 2011:132). Words such as 
there and you can be considered highly deictic when used relative to a speaker (e.g. 
driving to a specific destination, a passenger says, “When we get there…” where we 
refers to the group in the car and there refers to the destination). However, you, for 
example, can sometimes lose its deictic quality when used in generalised expressions 
(e.g. in the English proverb “Don’t bite off more than you can chew”). The lexeme qōl 
is often deictic, but it is not innately so.  
Interjections are “internally complex and heterogenous” and therefore difficult to define 
(Andrason and Dlali, 2010:164-165). Ameka (1992:106-107) states that interjections 
are “relatively conventionalised vocal gestures” which “encode speaker attitudes and 
communicative intentions” and, as such, are innately pragmatic. Furthermore, 
interjections are culturally-bound; general conventions can be deduced, but individual 
examples arise out of contextual use (Wierzbicka, 1992:160). In lieu of a definition, 
Andrason and Dlali (2020:164-166) offer a prototype of a primary interjection 
demarcated by “functional (semantic and pragmatic) and formal (phonological, 
morphological, and syntactic)” criteria. Their discussion is comprehensive and presents 
a wide-ranging survey of contemporary scholarship on the interjection category. The 
lexeme qōl, however, cannot be defined as a primary interjection, which means a 
restating of Andrason and Dlali’s (2020) argument would fail to tell us anything exact 
about qōl. Rather, through use qōl has gathered certain grammatical and pragmatic 
similarities to interjections and can thus be classified as a secondary interjection 
(Ameka, 1992:111). Qōl is a non-interjectional construction that – through 
interjectional usage – has adopted certain grammatical and lexical qualities of 
interjections (Andrason and Dlali, 2020:170). It is, as most secondary interjections are, 
underdeveloped in terms of interjectionalisation, meaning that the interjectional 
function accompanies more established and widely used senses (Andrason and 
Hutchison, 2020:7).  
According to the three classes of interjections offered by Ameka (1992:113-114), qōl 




their attention or a relevant response (Ameka, 1992:113). This, furthermore, aligns with 
the prototypical non-referential characteristic of interjections: They function 
performatively as used by the speaker (Andrason and Hutchison, 2020:4-5, 30). Lastly, 
as an interjection, qōl is separated from the rest of the clause as noted by the Masoretic 
accentuation. This clausal separation is consistent with how interjections are used 
generally (Ameka, 1992:108). 
5.3.2. Consulting the corpus 
An important quality of interjections is their dual nature as lexemes and utterances 
(Wilkins, 1992:127-128). Qōl, when used as a secondary interjection, does not occur 
often. The interjectional sense of qōl can potentially be distinguished based on its 
syntactic isolation according to the Masoretic accentuation. The 10 occurrences judged 
as plausibly interjectional possess two important characteristics: 1) all are accompanied 
by disjunctive accentuation, and 2) all are fronted within their respective clauses35.  
ה׃  14 ֲאָדָמֽ י ִמן־ָהֽ ים ֵאַל֖ י� צֲֹע ִק֥ י ָאִח֔  Listen; your brother’s blood is crying ֚קֹול ְּדֵמ֣
out to me from the ground! (Gen. 
4.10)36 
ים 15 ֱאָסִפ֔  Listen! An uproar of kingdoms, of ֠קֹול ְׁש֞אֹון ַמְמְל֤כֹות ּגֹוִי֙ם ֶנֽ
nations coming together. (Is. 13.4b 
[CEB]) 
יר 16  .Listen, an uproar from the city! (Is ֤קֹול ָׁשאֹון֙ ֵמִע֔
66.6) 
 
35 Ex. 15.26 is an example where a disjunctive accent is present, but syntactically the 
interjectional sense would be ill-fitting because qōl is not fronted in the clause, and the lexeme 
is identified as belonging to a separate syntactic frame.  
36 The interjectional reading here is not adopted by all translations, but it is syntactically 
reasonable and illustrates the prototypical frame elements of the interjectional “scene”: A 
speaker [Yahweh] gains control over a listener’s [Cain’s] attention by the sudden interruption 
of “A sound!” for something the listener either previously did not take note of or which the 




ֶרץ  17 ַעׁש ָּג֖דֹול ֵמֶא֣ ה ְוַר֥ ֤קֹול ְׁשמּוָע֙ה ִהֵּנ֣ה ָבָא֔
 ָצ֑פֹון
Hear, a noise! Listen, it is coming— a 
great commotion from the land of the 
north (Jer. 10.22)37 
אן 18 ֹ֑ י ַהּצ ת ַאִּדיֵר֣ יְלַל֖ ים ִוֽ רִֹע֔ ת ָהֽ  Hark! the cry of the shepherds, and ֚קֹול ַצֲע ַק֣
the wail of the lords of the flock! (Jer. 
25.36)38 
א  19 יר ִיְקָר֔  Listen! The LORD is calling to the city ֤קֹול ְיהָו֙ה ָלִע֣
(Micah 6.9 [NIV])39 
ם ִּגּֽבֹור׃  20 ַ� ָׁש֥ ר צֵֹר֖ ה ַמ֥  Listen, the day of the LORD! In it the ֚קֹול ֣יֹום ְיהָו֔
warrior cries out bitterly. (Zeph. 1.14 
[NASB])40 
ם 21 ה ַאַּדְרָּת֑ י ֻׁשְּדָד֖ ים ִּכ֥ ת ָהרִֹע֔ ְלַל֣  Listen, the wail of the shepherds, for ֚קֹול ִיֽ
their glory is despoiled! (Zech. 11.3a) 
 
37 The compounded anticipation created by the interjectional qōl and the particle hinneh can be 
noted in several translations: “A voice, a rumor! Behold, it comes!—” (ESV), “Listen! News is 
coming even now.” (NET Bible), and “Behold, the noise of the bruit is come”. Common to 
prophetic announcements, hinneh here points out something the speaker considers newsworthy 
(Van der Merwe, Naudé and Kroeze, 2017:410-411). The participle in #17 ba‘ah (is coming) 
that follows hinneh is common to this function of hinneh. 
38 Lundbom (2004:279) translates here “The sound of a scream of the shepherds”, taking this 
to be a “triple construct chain”. He notes the possibility of the interjectional use here, but 
chooses against it in favour of the parallelism created by the triple construct chain in 48.3 and 
51.54.  
39 Waltke (1993:737) notes that there is some support for the interjectional use here from 
Joüon’s A Grammar of Biblical Hebrew (1991) and Gesenius’ Hebrew Grammar (1813), but 
he concludes that it is not enough to “overturn the normative grammar”. 
40 Motyer (1998:920, 922) argues that qōl here interjectionally functions as a “dramatic 
opening” to link the first oracle of Chapter 1 with 1.14b-18. This interpretation, however, is 
taken by the NASB, the 2004 Dutch Nieuwe Bijbelvertaling, and Die Bybel 2020-vertaling in 




ן׃ ס 22 ד ְּג֥אֹון ַהַּיְרֵּדֽ י ֻׁשַּד֖ ים ִּכ֥  Listen, the roar of the lions, for the ֚קֹול ַׁשֲאַג֣ת ְּכִפיִר֔
thickets of the Jordan are destroyed! 
(Zech 11.3b) 
ק  23 י דֹוֵפ֗  .Listen! my beloved is knocking ֣קֹול׀ ּדֹוִד֣
(Song. 5.2) 
When we take qōl to express itself as an interjection (“Listen!” as a metonymic 
extension of the literal “a sound!”), it becomes syntactically disjoined from what 
follows. This requires a deictic interpretation: the acoustic referent is being selectively 
identified by the speaker for the sake of the audience. It is valuable to note the 
contextual elements of the above examples. Firstly, all occur within direct speech and, 
secondly, provide a description of the referent. Consider the two occurrences in Zech. 
11.3 (with the translation of the ESV on the left, and the interjectional interpretation on 
the right. 
Construct state expression Interjectional formulation 
The sound of the wail of the shepherds, 
for their glory is ruined! 
Listen, 
Shepherds wail, for their glory is 
ruined. 
The sound of the roar of the lions, for 
the thicket of the Jordan is ruined! 
Listen,  
Lions roar, for the thicket of Jordan is 
ruined! 
It could be argued that the divergent translations have a similar pragmatic effect in 
calling attention to the specific sound; however, the rhetorical effect is perhaps more 




applies to the other examples as well: the speaker is introduced as being singularly 
aware of the deictic referent and proceeds to bring the audience to its attention.41  
5.3.3. Rejected possibilities 
In addition to the examples where a clear reliance on disjunctive accentuation is 
evident, there are 11 texts42 offered by lexicons and theological dictionaries as arguably 
interjectional. Interpretation can be weighed according to individual grammatical, 
syntactical, and semantic contexts; however, the majority share a common conjunctive 
accentuation. There are, nevertheless, examples where the disjunctive accentuation is 
not enough to distinguish an interjectional interpretation. Two rejected examples, for 
example, are Jer. 3.21 and 8.1943. In Jer. 3.21, a reason for discounting its status as an 
interjection is qōl functioning as a fronted constituent (i.e. “A voice on the barren 
heights was heard, [a voice of] weeping…”) and not an independent unit within the 
clause (i.e. “A voice! On the barren heights weeping is heard…”). Jer. 8.19, on the other 
hand, links qōl with the discourse marker hinneh. 
Lastly, Labuschagne (1997:1134) mentions Ps. 3.5 as a possible example.  
א 24  (I cry aloud to the LORD (PS. 3.5 ֭קֹוִלי ֶאל־ְיהָו֣ה ֶאְקָר֑
However, it clearly utilises the type of poetic source-in-target metonymy explored in 
Section 5.1. It would, as such, be the only example of qōlî to express an interjectional 
sense. Furthermore, the lexeme is marked by a conjunctive accent. 
 
41 Gen. 4.10 occurs within direct speech (for a conceptual parallel, see Job 16:18), and so does 
1 Kgs. 18.12. Song. 5.2 is the only example where the speaker responds to a phenomenon, but 
there is still some relationship between the speaker’s words and the reader or audience’s 
experience of the text. Lastly, the other 11 examples all occur within prophetic texts, which are 
commonly written addressing the audience directly.  
42 Song. 2.8; Is. 13.4a, 40.3, 52.8; Jer. 3.21, 4.15, 8.19, 31.15, 48.3, 50.28, 51.54.  
43 See also Is. 40.6; Micah 6.9; Zeph. 2.14; Ps. 118:15 (although Motyer, 1998:920) argues for 





In the introduction to this sense category, it was noted that the interjectional sense is 
syntactically simplistic and differs from the uses discussed in Section 5.2, to an extent, 
on the basis of whether one identifies an occurrence as a absolute or construct state. 
The injectional sense takes on a form of metonymy whereby the presence of a sound 
(i.e. merely noting, “A sound!”) stands in for the command or request to listen. The 
interjectional function, while uncommon and not easily identified, extended from the 
prototypical sense for the pragmatic purpose of pointing out something audible for 
another person. The prototypical sense is thus the acoustic phenomena as an object in 
the world, and the interjectional sense brings this prototype into the realm of dialogue. 
In other words, not only is one person hearing acoustic phenomena as objects (which 
concerns the prototype), but this person is doing so for the sake of another (the 
interjectional sense).  
The interjectional interpretation is typically correlated with disjunctive accentuation 
and a fronted position of qōl in the clause. However, this alone is not enough to discern 
a concrete pattern of use. Furthermore, translations both modern and ancient 
consistently disagree on interpretations of this usage. It is plausible to interpret qōl in 
this light, but only where the text does not naturally call for an alternative reading. 
Unfortunately, this often becomes a matter of subjectivity.  
5.4. Adverbial audibility 
From Sections 1 and 2, we can so far summarise the use of qōl, firstly, as referring to 
acoustic phenomena (voices and sounds) as objects that exist as part of the world. 
Secondly, what we called the interjectional use, are cases where qol has a conative 
function – in other words, an acoustic phenomenon is referred to in an attempt to draw 
another’s attention to it. Both of these uses involve referents that exist as sound (in the 
broad sense, which includes voices). It is a characteristic of sound that it can be further 




sense category, now, concerns uses of qōl where the referent sound is placed into the 
context of adverbial audibility44, to describe an action occurring aloud or loudly. 
5.4.1. Audible speech acts 
Firstly, qōl can occur within an adverbial phrase modifying a verb so that the action is 
characterised as occurring loudly or aloud. Two basic frame elements are used in 
tandem to convey the adverbial use. First, an instrumental beth is prefixed to qōl (i.e. 
“with sound/voice”), and second, qōl is frequently modified by the adjective gadol but 
with or without the original prefixed beth45. The first element, (be)qōl, functions as a 
type of derived adverbial adjunct, where the combination of a preposition and noun is 
used adverbially (Van der Merwe, Naudé and Kroeze, 2017:381).  
As such, the frame for this sense often looks as such: (be)qōl gadol (“with a great/large 
voice”), as can be seen in #25. This frame follows an obvious conceptual metaphor that 
can be termed AUDIBILITY IS QUANTITY. 
ק          25 ל ַוִּתְזַע֖ ִאָּׁש֙ה ֶאת־ְׁשמּוֵא֔ ֶרא ָהֽ ָּג֑דֹול  ְּב֣קֹולַוֵּת֤
ר ה ֶאל־ָׁש֧אּול ֵלאֹמ֛ ִני  *ַוּתֹאֶמ֩ר ָהִאָּׁש֨ ָּמה ִרִּמיָת֖ ָל֥
ה ָׁשֽאּול׃  ְוַאָּת֥
When the woman saw Samuel, 
she cried out with a loud voice; 
and the woman said to Saul, 
“Why have you deceived me? 
You are Saul!” (1 Sam. 28.12) 
Usually, this syntactic frame is supplemented with further description of the speech act. 
In #25, the speaker cried out (z’q) aloud. It is the supplementary material that 
contextualises the more basic frame, but there is no divergence in meaning. The 
adverbial qualification of audibility is consistent. The phrase (be)qōl gadol is regularly 
 
44 Van der Merwe, Naudé, and Kroeze (2017:379) state that Biblical Hebrew contains 
“members of other categories” that function like adverbs but exist as a “less homogenous” 
group.  
45 Neither the instrumental beth with qōl gadol nor qōl gadol alone represents a fixed pattern, 
and either form can be found in a variety of similar and dissimilar contexts with the same verb 




used with the verbs qr‘ (to call)46 and z’q (to cry out)47, as well as infrequently with bkh 
(to weep)48, brk (to bless)49, dbr (to speak)50, šb’ (to take an oath)51, ’mr (to say)52, hll 
(to praise)53, and r’m (to thunder)54.  
ק          26 יו ַוִּיְזַע֥ ט ֶאת־ָּפָנ֔ ֶל֙� ָלַא֣ ֶל� ֣קֹול ְוַהֶּמ֙ ַהֶּמ֖
י׃ ס י ְבִנֽ  ָּג֑דֹול ְּבִני֙ ַאְבָׁש֔לֹום ַאְבָׁש֖לֹום ְּבִנ֥
The king covered his face, and the 
king cried with a loud voice, “O my 
son Absalom, O Absalom, my son, 
my son!” (1 Sam. 19.5 [19.4 NRSV) 
ֶקר         27 דֹול ַּבּבֹ֣ הּו׀ ְּב֣קֹול ָּג֭ � ֵרֵע֨ ֵר֤  ְמָב֘
ֶׁשב ֽלֹו׃ ה ֵּתָח֥ ָלָל֗ ים ְק֝  ַהְׁשֵּכ֑
Whoever blesses a neighbor with a 
loud voice, rising early in the 
morning, will be counted as cursing. 
(Prov. 27.14) 
ל וַ ּיֹאְמ֖רּו ֣קֹול ָּג֑דֹול         28 ל־ַהָּקָה֛ ְע֧נּו ָכֽ  ַוַּיֽ
ינּו ַלֲעֽׂשֹות׃  ן ְּכִדְבֶרי� ק ָעֵל֖  ֵּכ֛
Then all the assembly answered with 
a loud voice, “It is so; we must do as 
you have said. (Ezra 10.12) 
ים         29 י ַהְּקָהִת֖ מּו ַהְלִוִּי֛ם ִמן־ְּבֵנ֥  ַוָּי ֻק֧
י ל ַליהָו֙ה  ֱא�ֵה֣ ים ְלַהֵּל֗  ּוִמן־ְּבֵנ֣י ַהָּקְרִח֑
ְעָלה׃  ל ְּב֥קֹול ָּג֖דֹול ְלָמֽ  ִיְׂשָרֵא֔
And the Levites, of the Kohathites 
and the Korahites, stood up to praise 
the LORD, the God of Israel, with a 
very loud voice. (2 Chron. 20.19) 
A similar syntactic frame combines qōl (often with a prominal suffix, e.g. “your voice”) 
with certain verbs to achieve a similar effect as the derived adverbial adjunct frame 
 
46 Gen. 39.14; 1 Kgs. 18.27, 18.28; 2 Kgs. 18.22; Is. 36.13; Ezek. 8.18, 9.1; 2 Chron. 32.18. 
47 1 Sam. 28.12; 2 Sam. 19.5; Ezek. 11.13; Neh. 9.4. 
48 2 Sam. 15.23; Ez. 3.12. 
49 1 Kgs. 8.55; Prov. 27.14. 
50 Deut. 5.22. 
51 2 Chron. 15.14. 
52 Ez. 10.12. 
53 2 Chron. 20.19. 




above. These uses all rest on the AUDIBILITY IS QUANTITY conceptual metaphor that is 
informed by the raising of the horn as an input for the conceptual blend. This occurs, in 
descending order of frequency, with the verbs rwm, ntn, nś’, and ṣhl. These verbs often 
mimic conceptualisations such as the roaring of a lion, for example. 
ל          30 ם ַע֤ ימּו ֖קֹול ָלֶה֑ ס ָהִר֥ אּו־ֵנ֔ ַהר־ִנְׁשֶּפ֙ה ְׂשֽ
ים׃  י ְנִדיִבֽ אּו ִּפְתֵח֥ ד ְוָיבֹ֖ יפּו ָי֔  ָהִנ֣
On a bare hill raise a signal, cry aloud 
to them; wave the hand for them to 
enter the gates of the nobles. (Is. 13.2) 
ר         31 א ְבָגרֹון֙  ַאל־ַּתְחׂשֹ֔ � ַּכּׁשֹוָפ֖  ְקָר֤
ם קֹוֶל֑�   ָהֵר֣
Shout out, do not hold back! Lift up 
your voice like a trumpet! (Is. 58.1) 
With rwm, there is some correlation between raising one’s voice and the image of the 
raised horn: 1 Chron. 15.16 and 2 Chron. 5.13 add to this image of rwm in the context 
of musical instruments. However, Ezr. 3.12 employs it in a context of weeping and 
joyful shouting (weeping is a common contextual frame as will be discussed in Section 
5.4.2.). Also, Ezek. 21.27 calls for the raising of a “battle-cry”. As noted with ntn qōl 
below in #32, there is no fixed emotion or context of use for this expression. It deals 
with, rather, loudness of one’s voice to fulfil a function dependent on context.  
ים ָנְת֖נּו         32 יתּו  *ָעָלי֙ו ִיְׁשֲא֣גּו ְכִפִר֔ ם ַוָּיִׁש֤ קֹוָל֑
יו ִנְּצָתה ה ָעָר֥ יק  ַאְרצֹ֙ו ְלַׁשָּמ֔ ב׃  *ִמְּבִל֥  יֵֹׁשֽ
The lions have roared against him, they 
have roared loudly. They have made 
his land a waste; his cities are in ruins, 
without inhabitant. (Jer. 2.15) 
As will be discussed in Section 5.6, ntn has a strong correlation with the image of a 
lion’s roar (it is only the roaring lion image, and no other animal, that accompanies the 
sense of loudness). The “giving” of the voice idiomatically infers making a loud noise. 
The formulation in #32 is iconic of the leonine roar that can also be seen in Jer. 12.8 
and Amos 3.4. However, ntn qōl does carry the meaning of shouting, crying out, roaring 
in a variety of contexts. Prov. 1.20, 2.3, and 8.1 make use of this expression in the 
context of “giving” one’s voice, not aggressively as the image of the lion can suggest. 
Furthermore, while Hab. 3.10 uses this expression in a violent image concerning the 




As such, the expression is not foundationally coupled with negativity or aggression, 
and rather only expresses a strong raising of one’s voice or calling out. 
Unlike rwm and ntn, which occur frequently, nś’ and ṣhl only occur once each. The use 
of nś’ in #33 is unproblematic, because the verb is a common collocation for adverbial 
expressions, as will be discussed in Section 3.2. The verb is also arguably similar in 
semantic potential to rwm, which is the more frequent collocation. The conceptual 
blend occurring here broadly is a link formed between using one’s voice loudly (i.e. 
audibility) and the physical act of raising the trumpet or shofar (i.e. ram’s horn). In #34, 
ṣhl functions as a unique image; the verb usually functions in a positive sense, according 
to BDB (2000/1906). Here it is negative: The various towns mentioned in Isaiah 10 all 
fall to the Assyrian forces, and in #34 Gallim gives a shrill cry aloud at the impending 
doom. 
ם ִיְׂש֖אּו  33 ה ָנְׂש֣אּו ְנָה֣רֹות קֹוָל֑ הָו֗ ָנְׂש֤אּו ְנָה֨רֹות׀ ְיֽ
 ְנָה֣רֹות ָּדְכָיֽם׃
The floods have lifted up, O 
LORD, the floods have lifted up 
their voice; the floods lift up their 
roaring. (Ps. 93.3) 
ְיָׁשה         34 יִבי ַל֖ ים ַהְקִׁש֥ � ַּבת־ַּגִּל֑ י קֹוֵל֖  ַצֲהִל֥
 ֲעִנָּי֥ה ֲעָנֽתֹות׃ 
Cry aloud, O daughter Gallim! 
Listen, O Laishah! Answer her, 
O Anathoth! (Is. 10.30) 
5.4.2. Serial verbs 
In a 1995 article titled “Ingressive qwm in Biblical Hebrew”, Dobbs-Allsopp discusses 
qwm as an ingressive aspect verb which is used to convey the sense of the initiation or 
beginning of a complex verbal event. What he discusses is one form of a serial verb 
construction (SVC), which can be defined as a monoclausal sequence of verbs that 
conceptualise a singular event through shared qualities of tense, aspect, and mood 
(Haspelmath, 2016:292; Aikhenvald, 2018:1). Importantly, an SVC can only be 
interpreted as a singular event, even if the individual components of a given SVC can 
occur independently in one form or another (Aikhenvald, 2018:1). SVCs, in general, 
describe actions; a stative verb is more likely to become adverbial instead of occurring 




According to these characteristics, the only canonical SVC involving qōl occurs in #35 
where the two imperatives qwm and šm' together express mono-eventhood (Andrason, 
2019:113). 
ְעָנה          35 ְמָנה ְׁשַמ֣ ֲאַנּ֔נֹות קֹ֖ יָנִׁשי֙ם ַׁשֽ ָּבנֹו֙ת  קֹוִל֑
י׃ ט֔חֹות ַהְאֵזָּ֖נה ִאְמָרִתֽ  ּבֹֽ
Rise up, you women who are at ease, 
hear my voice; you complacent 
daughters, listen to my speech. (Is. 
32.9) 
The SVC is ignored by the majority of translations who opt for a translation similar to 
the NRSV. It is easy to find within the verse the parallelised imperative for the women 
addressed to ready themselves for the judgment they are about to receive. But 
translating the SVC requires capturing the singular nature of the event: “You contented 
women, ready yourselves and listen to me”. This might not always be possible or even 
desirable in English; nonetheless, qwm here has to be understood as operating in tandem 
with šm' as it “introduces a single activity or situation” (Andrason, 2019:113). This 
SVC is notable among those involving qōl because it is an established construction that 
does not centre on the lexeme qōl itself. 
In contrast, there are 19 occurrences of a construction55 that is, at best, an 
underdeveloped, non-canonical (non-prototypical) SVC56. Based on all of the evidence, 
it is arguable that this construction is not an SVC but rather shows similarities in its 
grammatical consistency. The basic construction – V1 qōl V2 – is V1 conveying upward 
motion (i.e. to lift, to raise) with qōl as its object followed by V2 conveying a speech 
 
55 Gen. 21.16, 27.38, 29.11, 39.15, 39.18; Num. 14.1; Judg. 2.4, 9.7, 21.2; 1 Sam. 11.4, 24.17, 
30.4; 2 Sam. 3.32, 13.36; Is. 24.14, 52.8; Job 2.12; Ruth 1.9, 1.14  
56 It is possible that the constructions discussed in this section represent double verb 
constructions (DVCs), which can be understood as “lexical idioms” that have the potential to 
become fully entrenched SVCs (Aikhenvald, 2006:46). DVCs are also characterised by a lack 
of a fixed structure in use. For example, Aikhenvald (2006:46) illustrates that the phrase “go 
get your jumper” can have the verb pair interrupted, as with “go and get your jumper” (emphasis 
in original). At the moment, there is insufficient use of the constructions to arrive at a firm 
conclusion as to their use, but there is enough alignment with what is known regarding SVCs 




act. Productive SVCs feature a varied functionality depending on their level of 
entrenchment within a language. However, while bi-verbal, the basic construction 
features the other qualifying characteristics of SVCs – mono-clausality, mono-
predicativity, mono-eventhood57 – to different degrees. Specifically, all occurrences 
feature a subordinated clause with V2 that completes the idea present in V1 + qōl (the 
majority occurrences feature wayyiqtol verbs, and as such, the waw-conjunction can be 
“semi-overt”), arguably all are bi-event, and none are strongly mono-predicative 
(Andrason, 2019:106). According to the Masoretic accentuation, 16 occurrences feature 
the conjunctive mercha falling on V1 and the disjunctive tifcha falling on qōl. The 
relevant V2 then completes the clause with a strong disjunctive such as the sof pasuk. 
Contrasting with this pattern, Judges 21.2, Ruth 1.14, and 2 Samuel 3.32 all feature a 
munach falling on V1 – or the subject of V1 – and either a zaqef qatan (Judges 21.2 and 
Ruth 1.14) or revia (2 Samuel 3.32) on the qōl. The prevalence of disjunctive 
accentuation supports a discontinuity between the actions referred to in these 
expressions, in other words, bi-eventhood. Furthermore, V1 is dependent on V2 in order 
for the verbal idea to be resolved (i.e. V2 is subordinate to V1 + qōl). This subordination, 
along with the bi-eventhood of the two wayyiqtol verbs, all point to a non-canonical 
SVC reading. 
We have four different frames with only one occurring more than twice. As such, the 
constructions present are infrequently used. There are too few occurrences to identify 
any pattern of verbs used, but it is noteworthy that all relay some sense of “to raise” or 
“to elevate”, which further strengthens the idiomatic connection between loudness and 
the physical act of raising a trumpet or shofar. Our four frames are as follows: 1) nś’ 
qōl bkh as in #36, 2) nś’ qōl rnn in #37, 3) nś’ qōl qr’ in #38, and 4) rwm qōl qr’ in #39. 
The first three frames rely on the consistency of nś’ as V1 while the fourth uses rwm, 
which is semantically related to nś’. This internal consistency points to a burgeoning 
asymmetrical SVC. 
 




ת ָׁש֔אּול ַוְיַדְּב֥רּו          36 אּו ַהַּמְלָאִכי֙ם ִּגְבַע֣ ַוָּיבֹ֤
ם  ם ַוִּיְׂש֧אּו ָכל־ָהָע֛ ים ְּבָאְזֵנ֣י ָהָע֑ ֶאת־ ַהְּדָבִר֖
ם   ַוִּיְבּֽכּו׃ קֹוָל֖
When the messengers came to 
Gibeah of Saul, they reported the 
matter in the hearing of the people; 
and all the people wept aloud. (1 
Sam. 11.4) 
ָּמה ִיְׂש֥אּו          37 ם ֵה֛ ה ָצֲה֖לּו קֹוָל֖ ּנּו ִּבְג֣אֹון ְיהָו֔ ָירֹ֑
 ִמָּיֽם׃
They lift up their voices, they sing 
for joy; they shout from the west 
over the majesty of the LORD. (Is. 
24.14) 
ים          38 אׁש ַהר־ְּגִרִז֔ ֹ֣  ַּיֲעֹמ֙ד ְּבר ֶל֙� ַוֽ ם ַוֵּי֙ דּו ְליֹוָת֗ ַוַּיִּג֣
א  ם ִׁשְמ֤עּו ֵאַלי֙ קֹו֖לֹו ַוִּיָּׂש֥ אֶמר ָלֶה֗ ֹ֣ א ַוּי ַוִּיְקָר֑
ים׃ ם ֱא�ִהֽ ע ֲאֵליֶכ֖ ם ְוִיְׁשַמ֥ י ְׁשֶכ֔  ַּבֲעֵל֣
When it was told to Jotham, he went 
and stood on the top of Mount 
Gerizim, and cried aloud and said to 
them, “Listen to me, you lords of 
Shechem, so that God may listen to 
you. (Judg. 9.7) 
ִתי          39 י־ֲהִריֹמ֥ י ְכָׁשְמ֔עֹו ִּכֽ י ַוְיִה֣ א קֹוִל֖ ָוֶאְקָר֑
א ַהֽחּוָצה׃ י ַוָּיָ֖נס ַוֵּיֵצ֥ ב ִּבְגדֹ֙ו ֶאְצִל֔  ַוַּיֲעזֹ֤
and when he heard me raise my 
voice and cry out, he left his garment 
beside me, and fled outside.” (Gen. 
39.15) 
Let us first summarise the similarities of the frames before looking at individual 
differences. Firstly, each construction can be expressed through the formula V1 qōl V2 
– similar to SVCs, the second verb is an “outgrowth” of the action initiated by the first, 
but it functions together with the first verb to express a single action, a single event 
(Aikhenvald, 2006:10-12). Secondly, qōl is the object to a V1 that necessarily conveys 
the act of “raising up”. As discussed throughout Section 5.4., several expressions treat 
qōl as something that can adverbially become raised (i.e. loud, where “loudness” is 
communicated by way of the “upwards motion”). There is enough conceptual overlap, 
as such, to suggest that V1 functions adverbially upon qōl in the context V2 denotes. 
The verb nś’ is most frequently used in the V1 position, but it is somewhat 




Furthermore, the majority, 14 occurrences, feature verbs with compatible tense, aspect, 
and mood (TAM) markers – to be specific, in every occurrence V1 and V2 are Qal 
wayyiqtol verbs with shared person, gender, and number. This TAM consistency is 
characteristic of SVCs (Andrason, 2019:113). Regarding instances where TAM 
markers diverge, in Numbers 14.1 the verbs do not share the same lexically specified 
subject. Following the Masoretic accentuation, the waw-conjunction separating the 
clauses is overt. Regardless, the construction – or a verbal connotation that strongly 
resembles the construction despite the clausal separation – can still be seen in the verbal 
parallelism. The divergent subjects – the “congregation” and the “people – can also be 
seen as representing variants of the same concept, the former being more selective than 
the latter. Next, 1 Samuel 30.4 is easily understood: The verbs differ in number, V1 
being adjacent to a singular subject while V2 is plural because its subject has been 
expanded to include “less salient participants”, as Andrason (2020:117) suggests is 
common among Biblical Hebrew SVCs. The “apparent” gender disparity in Isaiah 52.8 
is logical because V1 is third-person qatal while V2 is third-person yiqtol (the common 
gender of the qatal is thus inclusive of both masculine and feminine subjects). Then, 
while V1 is Qal, rnn as V2 occurs in the Piel formation in both Isaiah 24.14 and 52.8. 
The Piel V2 only stresses the bi-eventhood of the construction, as here the formation 
denotes “an entire series of cries of jubilation” (Koehler and Baumgartner, 1994-
2000:1284). Lastly, the similar constructions of Genesis 39.15 and 39.18 differ only 
that V1 is Hiphil while V2 is Qal. These two examples are the only ones that feature 
rwm as V1, so it is normative for this to be in the Hiphil formation and, as with Isaiah 
52.8, it further confirms the fact that this is a bi-event. 
We can now discuss the four frames in turn. The first frame, with 15 occurrences58, 
vocalises grief. Loud, public weeping is a common element of the grieving process 
throughout the ancient near east (Pham, 1999:23, 28). The verb nś’ is a common 
collocation for the adverbial function; it forms an understandable partnership with bkh 
to convey the emotive act of grieving. As such, in 1 Samuel 11.4 (#36) we can 
understand the singular event as, “the people wept loudly”.  
 
58 Gen. 21.16, 27.38, 29.11, 45.2; Num. 14.1; Judg. 2.4, 21.2; 1 Sam. 11.4, 24.17, 20.4; 2 Sam. 




Worth mentioning is the similar syntactical frame of #40: the construction combines 
ntn with bkh, but the verse opens with a separate verb (nś’) similar to #36. 
 ִּיְּת֖נּו          40 ה ַוֽ ֵעָד֔ ם ַוִּתָּׂש֙א ָּכל־ָה֣ ַוִּיְבּ֥כּו ֶאת־קֹוָל֑
ְיָלה ַהֽהּוא׃  ם ַּבַּל֥  ָהָע֖
Then all the congregation raised a 
loud cry, and the people wept that 
night. (Num. 14.1) 
Both ntn and nś’ commonly express an adverbial function as explored in Section 5.3.1. 
Both verbs share tense, aspect, and mood with bkh; however, nś’ and ntn are governed 
by separate yet synonymous actors (with different grammatical genders and numbers). 
The phrasing in #40 is clearly an instance of bi-eventhood: The semi-SVC ntn qōl bkh 
is governed by the nś’ introductory clause. The three verbs are completed by the same 
actors, but the action unfolds in stages of subordination. The congregation raises its 
voice (supposedly, as this object is left unsaid and should be derived from the context 
of the entire verse), and then the people precede to give their voice in mourning 
throughout the night, as the verse explicitly provides this temporal context. 
Next are three “different” frames that are all highly uncommon asymmetrical SVCs. 
The use of rnn as V2 occurs twice in the poetic text of Isaiah, both in conjunction with 
nś’ as V1. Isaiah 52.8 inserts an adverb between V1 and V2. Andrason (2019:114) states 
that adverbs usually govern the entire SVC, and so with V2 here further removed from 
the action of V1 by an adverb of manner, the expression is non-canonical.  
A single occurrence of nś’ qōl qr’ (Judg. 9.7) can be explored together with the two 
occurrences of rwm qōl qr’ (Gen. 39.15 and 39.18), considering that the two V1 
examples are semantically comparable. Contextually, the one central difference is that, 
with the former, the action precedes speech whereas, with the latter, the action occurs 
in response to a threat and not as the prelude to a speech act. It is plausible to understand 
the Hiphil rwm as a near-synonym of the Qal nś’, which would close the gap between 
these infrequently used expressions.  
To conclude, apart from Isaiah 32.9 where qōl happens to appear in a more established 
SVC, the constructions explored in this section can only be said to share similarities 




the construction is used sparingly, the grief frame is used the most consistently, albeit 
still a non-canonical SVC at best. 
5.5. Speech and communication 
Throughout the biblical corpus, qōl has the capability to convey 1) intentional yet non-
linguistic acts of communication and 2) intentional linguistic speech acts. In either case, 
qōl is often profiled as an object to be received by a listener. Because we can 
differentiate between volitional and non-volitional sounds, the listener can also be said 
to register automatically whether or not the source of qōl is an agent with 
communicational intent59. This section deals with qōl in the context of intentional 
linguistic speech acts, and primarily in relation to the verb šm'. 
5.5.1. To hear 
The most typical syntactic frame – šm' qōl – is one that is also quite polysemous, with 
šm' occurring in three stem formations, the Qal, Niphal, and Hiphil, which are each 
predisposed to differing senses. The frequency of use favours the Qal with 73 
occurrences60, the Niphal with 17 occurrences61, and 13 occurrences with the Hiphil62. 
 
59 This is a complex matter as its roots go deep into the conceptual world of the native speakers. 
As we shall see with the (existent or non-existent) communicative agency of thunder, the 
divergence between the conceptual world of Biblical Hebrew and that of Modern Hebrew can 
explain the shift to a normative use of r’m for thunder, since qōlōt implies a mythologised 
sentiment found in the Hebrew Bible and not carried over into modernity. 
60 Gen. 3.8, 3.10, 4.23, 21.17 [x2], 39.15; Ex. 32.17, 32.18; Lev. 5.1; Num. 7.89, 20.16; Deut. 
1.34, 4.12, 4.33, 5.23, 5.24, 5.25, 5.26, 5.28 [x2], 18.16, 26.7; Josh. 6.5, 6.20; Judg. 33.7; 1 
Sam. 4.6, 4.14, 15.14; 2 Sam. 5.24, 15.10, 22.7; 1 Kgs. 1.41, 1.45, 14.6; 2 Kgs. 11.13; Is. 6.8, 
28.23, 32.9; Jer. 4.19, 4.21 4.31, 9.9, 30.5, 42.14; Ezek. 1.24, 1.28, 3.12, 33.4, 33.5; Jonah 
2.3; Micah 6.1; Ps. 5.4, 6.9, 18.7, 27.7, 28.2, 28.6, 31.23 55.18, 64.2, 116.1, 119.149; Job 3.18, 
4.16, 33.8, 37.2; Lam. 3.56; Dan. 8.16, 10.9 [x2]; Neh. 4.14; 1 Chron. 14.15; 2 Chron. 23.12 
61 Ex. 28.35; 1 Sam. 1.13; Is. 15.4, 65.19 [x2]; Jer. 8.16, 9.18, 31.15, 49.21; Ezek. 10.5, 19.9, 
26.13; Nah. 2.14; Ps. 19.4; Job 37.4; Song. 2.12; Ezra 3.13 
62 Deut. 4.36; Josh. 6.10; Judg. 18.25; 2 Kgs. 7.6 [x3]; Is. 30.30, 42.2, 58.4; Ezek. 27.30; Ps. 




Within the Aramaic portions of Daniel, this frame occurs several times in the Peal63 
mirroring the Hebrew Qal senses. 
The presence of each stem formation corresponds with their prototypical functions. In 
other words, the Qal expresses an active sense, the Niphal a passive formulation, and 
the Hiphil a causative. No deviation from this can be identified which implies a highly 
structured relationship between morphosyntactic framing and semantic potential. 
Furthermore, the Qal also expresses itself through every conjugation (though not 
varying greatly in semantic potential), while the Niphal and Hiphil are more limited in 
this regard, but showing greater nuance in the range of their use. 
The following table outlines the semantic potential of this first sense for ease of 
reference: 
 




 Qal Niphal Hiphil 
Qatal Auditory perception Passive audibility 
without agency 
Causative active to 
make something 
audible 
Yiqtol Auditory perception Passive description of 
inaudibility 
Directive to be silent 
Imperative Plea to be heard  Causative command 










Adverbial64   




As an object of šm' in the Qal conjugation, qōl is treated as a perceivable acoustic 
phenomenon. Sound is sensory information and can be caused by movement #41; 
speech #42; and emotive yet non-linguistic communicative acts, such as the varying 
 
64 This occurs only once, in Job 37.2, and functions adverbially to describe the mode in which 




connotations in #43 and #44. The frame employs no prefix or performative, except for 
the general object marker, in order to convey the basic act of hearing65. 
אֶמר          41 ֹ֕ י־  ֶאת־קְֹל�֥ ַוּי א ִּכֽ  ן ָוִאיָר֛ ְעִּתי ַּבָּג֑ ָׁשַמ֖
א׃ ִכי ָוֵאָחֵבֽ ם ָאֹנ֖  ֵעירֹ֥
He said, “I heard the sound of you in 
the garden, and I was afraid, because 
I was naked; and I hid myself.” 
(Gen. 3.10) 
ר ִאּתֹו          42 ֶהל מֹוֵע֮ד ְלַדֵּב֣ ה ֶאל־ֹא֣ א ֹמֶׁש֜ ֹ֨ ּוְבב
ע ַוּיִ  ל  ֶאת־ַהּ֜קֹולְׁשַמ֨ יו ֵמַע֤ ר ֵאָל֗ ִמַּדֵּב֣
ין ְׁשֵנ֣י  ת ִמֵּב֖ ן ָהֵעֻד֔ ֶר֙ת ֲאֶׁש֙ר ַעל־ֲארֹ֣ ַהַּכּפֹ֙
יו׃ פ  ר ֵאָלֽ ים ַוְיַדֵּב֖  ַהְּכֻרִב֑
When Moses went into the tent of 
meeting to speak with the LORD, he 
would hear the voice speaking to 
him from above the mercy seat that 
was on the ark of the covenant from 
between the two cherubim; thus it 
spoke to him. (Num. 7.89) 
יְׁשַמע־ְיהָו֖ה          43 ִני׃  קֹוִל֥ ִני ַוֲעֵנֽ א ְוָחֵּנ֥  Hear, O LORD, when I cry aloud, be ֶאְקָר֗
gracious to me and answer me! (Ps. 
27.7) 
ִתי          44 י־ֲהִריֹמ֥ י ְכָׁשְמ֔עֹו ִּכֽ יַוְיִה֣ ב  קֹוִל֖ א ַוַּיֲעזֹ֤ ָוֶאְקָר֑
א ַהֽחּוָצה׃  י ַוָּיָ֖נס ַוֵּיֵצ֥  ִּבְגדֹ֙ו ֶאְצִל֔
and when he heard me raise my 
voice and cry out, he left his garment 
beside me, and fled outside.” (Gen. 
39.15) 
5.5.1.2. Niphal 
As is expected, the Niphal conjugation has fewer occurrences than the generalised Qal, 
but it has an explicit function: the passive quality of an object or action having an 
(in)audible nature. As in #45 and #46, the act of hearing is passive in that the acoustic 
phenomena merely exists in its contextual space and affects a general and unspecified 
audience. This is quite strikingly expressed in #47 where the conjugation is used so as 
 
65 The preposition ’l in Gen. 21.17 is almost certainly a scribal error, as its presence in the 
Samaritan Pentateuch and Targum Pseudo-Jonathan is replaced with the expected object 




to express the general absence of sound66. But again, this is the description of non-
existence. There is no agency behind the silence. The participle form of the Niphal 
occurs once in #47 and expresses an absence of sound. 
ר  ְוקֹול֙          45 ע ַעד־ֶהָחֵצ֖ ים ִנְׁשַמ֕ י ַהְּכרּוִב֔ ַּכְנֵפ֣
י ְּבַדְּבֽרֹו׃ַהִחיצֹנָ֑   ה ְּכ֥קֹול ֵאל־ַׁשַּד֖
The sound of the wings of the 
cherubim was heard as far as the 
outer court, like the voice of God 
Almighty when he speaks. (Ezek. 
10.5) 
א          46 ֹ֥ ְרֵעם ְּב֣קֹול ְּגאֹו֑נֹו ְול יו׀ ִיְׁשַאג־֗קֹול ַי֭ ַאֲחָר֤
ַעּקְ  ע ְי֝ י־ִיָּׁשַמ֥ ם ִּכֽ  ׃ קֹוֽלֹוֵב֗
After it his voice roars; he thunders 
with his majestic voice and he does 
not restrain the lightnings when his 
voice is heard. (Job 37.4) 
ע          47 י ִנְׁשָמ֥ ִל֗ ים ְּב֝ ין ְּדָבִר֑ ֶמר ְוֵא֣ ין־ֹא֭ םֵאֽ  There is no speech, nor are there ׃קֹוָלֽ
words; their voice is not heard; (Ps. 
19.4 [NRSV 19.3]) 
5.5.1.3. Hiphil 
In contrast to constructions with the Niphal, with occurrences of the Hiphil the 
communicating agents are explicitly mentioned. Depending on the conjugation used, 
the use of the Hiphil can entail letting oneself be heard #48, commanding verbal silence 
#49, and even yearning for something to be heard #50.  
ה ֶאת־֣הֹוד          48 יַ� ְיהָו֜ ְוַנַ֤חת ְזרֹועֹ֙ו  קֹו֗לֹוְוִהְׁשִמ֨
ֶפץ  ה ֶנ֥ ׁש אֹוֵכָל֑ ַהב ֵא֣ ף ְוַל֖ ה ְּבַזַ֣עף ַא֔ ַיְרֶא֔
ד׃  ֶבן ָּבָרֽ  ָוֶז֖ ֶרם ְוֶא֥
And the LORD will cause his 
majestic voice to be heard and the 
descending blow of his arm to be 
seen, in furious anger and a flame of 
devouring fire, with a cloudburst and 
tempest and hailstones. (Is. 30.30) 
 




יעּ֙ו          49 א ָתִר֙ ֹ֤ ר ל ַ� ֵלאֹמ֗ ה ְיהֹוֻׁש֜ ְוֶאת־ָהָע֩ם ִצָּו֨
יעּו  א־ַתְׁשִמ֣ ֹֽ םְול ם  ֶאת־קֹוְלֶכ֔ א ִמִּפיֶכ֖ ְולֹא־ֵיֵצ֥
יעּו  ם ָהִר֖ י ֲאֵליֶכ֛ ד ֣יֹום ָאְמִר֧ ר ַע֠ ָּדָב֑
ם׃  ַוֲהִריֹעֶתֽ
To the people Joshua gave this 
command: “You shall not shout or 
let your voice be heard, nor shall you 
utter a word, until the day I tell you 
to shout. Then you shall shout.” 
(Josh. 6.10) 
יִני֙          50 ה ַהְרִא֙ ֶת֙ר ַהַּמְדֵרָג֔ ַלע ְּבֵס֙ י ְּבַחְגֵו֣י ַהֶּס֗ יֹוָנִת֞
יִני  ִי� ַהְׁשִמיִע֖ �ֶאת־ַמְרַא֔ �  ֶאת־קֹוֵל֑ ִּכי־קֹוֵל֥
ה׃ ס  י� ָנאֶוֽ ב ּוַמְרֵא֥  ָעֵר֖
O my dove, in the clefts of the rock, 
in the covert of the cliff, let me see 
your face, let me hear your voice; for 
your voice is sweet, and your face is 
lovely. (Song. 2.14) 
As such, the Hiphil denotes a desire to be heard or the intent to be heard, whereas the 
Niphal often occurs where audibility is not explicitly intentional or merely exists as the 
by-product of an action. Compare the similar contexts of #46 and #48: The former 
merely notes that the voice of Yahweh is heard whereas the latter emphasises the 
agency Yahweh displays in making his voice heard. As such, the use of conjugation 
often says something about the context in which the action of šm' takes place or the 
experience of they who are doing the hearing. 
5.5.2. To hear with le 
Varying syntactically from Section 5.4.1 by the presence of the preposition le before 
each occurrence of qōl, this second sense, firstly, exhibits an ambiguous semantic 
potential and, secondly, has few occurrences in comparison to the senses in Sections 
5.4.1 and 5.4.3. There are only 16 examples67, all in the Qal stem formation and present 
in every conjugation except for the infinitive construct (Ex. 15.26 presenting both the 
yiqtol and infinitive absolute).  
The preposition le conveys an unspecialised and vague relationship with the object that 
is heard (Joüon and Muroaka, 1993:488; Van der Merwe, Naudé and Kroeze, 
 
67 Gen. 3.17, 16.2; Ex. 3.18, 4.8, 4.9, 15.26, 18.24; Judg. 2.20; 1 Sam. 2.25, 15.1, 28.23; 1 




2017:348). In each scenario, the object to be heard (and, therefore, the content of qōl) 
is a contextually bounded request, such as in both #51 and #52; speech in the most 
general sense, as in #53; and the voice as something that charms or leads astray, as in 
#54.  
י־ָׁשַמְעָּת֮ ְל֣קֹול ִאְׁשֶּת�֒  51 ר ִּכֽ ם ָאַמ֗ ּוְלָאָד֣
א  ֹ֥ ר ל י֙� ֵלאֹמ֔ ר ִצִּויִת֙ ץ ֲאֶׁש֤ אַכ֙ל ִמן־ָהֵע֔ ֹ֙ ַוּת
ּנּו ל ִמֶּמ֑  תֹאַכ֖
And to the man he said, “Because 
you have listened to the voice of 
your wife, and have eaten of the tree 
about which I commanded you, ‘You 
shall not eat of it,’ (Gen. 3.17) 
ן׃ פ  52 ם ַוַּיַ֥עׂש ֵּכֽ ע ְלקָֹל֖  He heeded their voice, and did so. (1 ַוִּיְׁשַמ֥
Kgs. 20.25) 
י׃  53 ע ְל֥קֹול ְיִריָבֽ י ּוְׁשַמ֖ יָבה ְיהָו֖ה ֵאָל֑  Give heed to me, O LORD, and listen ַהְקִׁש֥
to what my adversaries say! (Jer. 
18.19) 
ר  54 ים חֹוֵב֖ ר לֹא־ִיְׁ֭שַמע ְל֣קֹול ְמַלֲחִׁש֑ ֲאֶׁש֣
ם׃  ים ְמֻחָּכֽ  ֲחָבִר֣
so that it does not hear the voice of 
charmers or of the cunning 
enchanter. (Ps. 58.6 [NRSV 58.5]) 
Yet, there are several texts where the use of leqōl implies obedience in a similar vein to 
the syntactic frames involving be explored in Section 5.5.3. Taking the broader textual 
context into account, it is done in reference to a specific request. In #55 and #56 below, 
there is a clear referential link between the act of obedience and a specific command. 
Example #55 recalls v.2 of the same chapter where the command is to make no covenant 
with the Canaanites. In a similar fashion, #56 calls for obedience to the statute in v.10 
to worship no foreign gods. The psalm states that it is a specific statute (the use of the 
singular ḥōq in v.5) and furthermore contextualises the statute within a narrative (v.6).  
ה ֶאת־  55 ר ָעְב֜רּו ַהּ֣גֹוי ַהֶּז֗ אֶמר ַיַע֩ן ֲאֶׁש֨ ֹ֗ ַוּי
א ָׁשְמ֖עּו  ֹ֥ ם ְול יִתי ֶאת־ֲאבֹוָת֔ ר ִצִּו֣ ְּבִריִתי֙ ֲאֶׁש֣
י׃  ְלקֹוִלֽ
“Because this people have 
transgressed my covenant that I 




have not obeyed my voice, (Judg. 
2.20) 
ָבה  56 ל לֹא־ָא֥ ִיְׂשָרֵא֗ י ְו֝ י ְלקֹוִל֑ ע ַעִּמ֣ ְולֹא־ָׁשַמ֣
י׃  ִלֽ
“But my people did not listen to my 
voice; Israel would not submit to me. 
(Ps. 81.12 [NRSV 81.11]) 
However, there is an exception: Ex. 15.26. Here, in #57, one would expect beqōl 
because of the generality of what it to be obeyed and the regular occurrence of such 
language connecting be with religious obedience to “the law of Moses”. Yet, the speaker 
uses leqōl expecting obedience to all commandments and statutes in a tone 
representative of the covenantal core of the book of Exodus.  
ע ְל֣קֹול׀ ְיהָו֣ה  57 ַוּיֹאֶמ֩ר ִאם־ָׁש֨מֹוַ� ִּתְׁשַמ֜
ֲאַזְנָּת֙  ה ְוַהֽ ר ְּבֵעיָני֙ו ַּתֲעֶׂש֔ י� ְוַהָּיָׁש֤ ֱא�ֶה֗
ה  ֲחָל֞ ל־ַהַּמֽ יו ָּכֽ יו ְוָׁשַמְרָּת֖ ָּכל־ֻחָּק֑ ְלִמְצוָֺת֔
י ֲאֶׁש  י� ִּכ֛ ים ָעֶל֔ ִי֙ם לֹא־ָאִׂש֣ ְמִּתי ְבִמְצַר֙ ר־ַׂש֤
�׃ ס  י ְיהָו֖ה רְֹפֶאֽ  ֲאִנ֥
He said, “If you will listen carefully 
to the voice of the LORD your God, 
and do what is right in his sight, and 
give heed to his commandments and 
keep all his statutes, I will not bring 
upon you any of the diseases that I 
brought upon the Egyptians; for I am 
the LORD who heals you.” (Ex. 
15.26) 
Nevertheless, the Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia does note a variant reading in a Cairo 
Geniza fragment with beqōl. There is not enough evidence to clarify this exception, but 
leqōl clearly functions identical to beqōl in this verse. Given the irregularity of this 
occurrence and the variant reading, hypothetically this could be merely a scribal error, 




5.5.3. To hear with be 
There are 9968 occurrences of the syntactical construction šm' beqōl, the preposition 
consistently linked to an obedience frame69. The prototypical use features a direct 
compulsion towards obedience where the speaker communicates with a socially inferior 
person (four times an infinitive absolute of šm' intensifies the call for obedience within 
the context of direct adherence to the will of Yahweh). With 19 examples the speaker 
is a stereotypical social inferior, but as we shall see there are possible constraints within 
each example motivating the disregard of social mores.  
Obedience to the higher law given by Yahweh through Moses, prototypical of the 
Deuteronomist and the prophetic message of Jeremiah, can be seen in #58 and #59 
below. There is a clear correlation between use of beqōl and the Deuteronomist, or 
covenantal, frame. 
ל ַהְּדָבִר֣          58 ר ְל֔� ּוְמָצ֕אּו� ּכֹ֖ ֶּלה ַּבַּצ֣ ים ָהֵא֑
י�  ים ְוַׁשְבָּת֙ ַעד־ְיהָו֣ה ֱא�ֶה֔ ְּבַאֲחִרי֙ת ַהָּיִמ֔
 ׃ ְּבקֹֽלֹוְוָׁשַמְעָּת֖ 
In your distress, when all these 
things have happened to you in time 
to come, you will return to the LORD 
your God and heed him. (Deut. 4.30) 
ע          59 א ֶאְׁשָמ֑ ֹ֣ ְרְּת ל ִי� ָאַמ֖ ִי֙� ְּבַׁשְלוַֺת֔ ְרִּתי ֵאַל֙ ִּדַּב֤
ִי� ִּכ֥  ַעְּת ֶז֤ה ַדְרֵּכ֙� ִמְּנעּוַר֔ א־ָׁשַמ֖ ֹֽ יי ל  ׃ ְּבקֹוִלֽ
I spoke to you in your prosperity, but 
you said, “I will not listen.” This has 
been your way from your youth, for 
 
68 Gen. 21.12, 22.18, 26.5, 27.8, 27.13, 27.43, 30.6; Ex. 4.1, 5.2, 18.19, 19.5, 23.21, 23.22; 
Num. 14.22, 21.3; Deut. 1.45, 4.30, 8.20, 9.23, 13.5, 13.19, 15.5, 21.18 [x2], 21.20, 26.14, 
26.17, 27.10, 28.1, 28.2, 28.15, 28.45, 28.62, 30.2, 30.8, 30.10, 30.20; Josh. 5.6, 10.14, 22.2, 
24.24; Judg. 2.2, 6.10, 13.9, 20.13; 1 Sam. 8.7, 8.9, 8.19, 8.22, 12.1, 12.14, 12.15, 15.19, 15.20, 
15.22, 15.24, 19.6, 25.35, 28.18, 28.21, 28.22; 2 Sam. 12.18, 13.14; 1 Kgs. 17.22, 20.36; 2 
Kgs. 18.12; Is. 50.10; Jer. 3.13, 3.25, 7.23, 7.28, 9.12, 11.4, 11.7, 18.10, 22.21, 26.13, 32.23, 
35.8, 38.20, 40.3, 42.6a, 42.6b, 42.13, 42.21, 43.4, 43.7, 44.23; Zeph. 3.2; Hag. 1.12; Zech. 
6.15; Ps. 95.7, 103.20, 106.25, 130.2; Prov. 5.13; Dan. 9.10, 9.11, 9.14.  
69 Running contrary to the syntactic frame of beqōl, 2 Samuel 19.36 uses the preposition in its 
more general sense to imply contact with an object of perception (Van der Merwe, Naudé, and 




you have not obeyed my voice. (Jer. 
22.21) 
We can find a similarity to the covenantal language of obedience in more socially 
mundane contexts: parental authority in #60 and wisdom traditions as in #61. 
ע          60 י ְׁשַמ֣ ה ְבִנ֖ יְוַעָּת֥ ה  ְּבקִֹל֑ י ְמַצָּו֥ ר ֲאִנ֖ ַלֲאֶׁש֥
�׃  ֹאָתֽ
Now therefore, my son, obey my 
word as I command you. (Gen. 27.8) 
 
ַמְעִּתי          61 לֹא־ָׁש֭ י לֹא־  ְּב֣קֹולְוֽ ְמַלְּמַד֗ ִלֽ י ְו֝ מֹוָר֑
י׃ יִתי ָאְזִנֽ  ִהִּט֥
I did not listen to the voice of my 
teachers or incline my ear to my 
instructors. (Prov. 5.13) 
With the obedience frame, qōl contains the instruction or wisdom conveyed. One could, 
therefore, translate Proverbs 5.13 as, “I did not listen to my teachers; I turned my ear 
away from my instructors”. The NRSV can be said to over-translate here, as I argue 
that keeping “the sound of” or “the voice of” for the vast majority of instances is 
unnecessary. Doing so translates literally what, as a fixed communicative clue, is 
arguably a dead metaphor. 
In contrast to the occurrences dealt with above where obedience is the clear 
conceptualisation, 19 variants70 feature the same syntactical frame elements but in an 
atypical fashion where social hierarchy is disregarded. Nevertheless, in each text we 
can pinpoint certain factors to explain the use of the linguistic expression.  
Firstly, from #62, we can presume that beqōl does not imply subservience to the speaker 
based on the syntactical construction alone. Important for the interpretation of #62 is 
the belief that never before has divine authority bent to the will of a human being.  
 
 
70 Gen. 21.12, 30.6; Ex. 4.1; Num. 21.3; Deut. 1.45; Josh. 10.14; Judg. 13.9; 1 Sam. 8.7, 8.9, 




ה ַּכּי֤          62 א ָהָי֜ ֹ֨ ַ� ְול יו ִלְׁשֹמ֥ ֹום ַההּו֙א ְלָפָנ֣יו ְוַאֲחָר֔
ל׃ פ  ְּב֣קֹולְיהָו֖ה  ם ְלִיְׂשָרֵאֽ ה ִנְלָח֖ י ְיהָו֔ יׁש ִּכ֣  ִא֑
There has been no day like it before 
or since, when the LORD heeded a 
human voice; for the LORD fought 
for Israel. (Josh. 10.14) 
The uniqueness of this event, and its upending of natural order, is further emphasised 
by the imperative dwm (be still) in Josh. 10.12, which gives the speaker authority. 
However, Dozeman (2015:433) states that “this authority is not unique to Joshua”. He 
goes on to list as evidence Num. 21.3 and 1 Kgs. 17.22. While both make use of the šm' 
beqōl syntactical frame, the context clarifies the difference: Whereas Josh. 10.12 
conveys a set of commands, Num. 21.3 features Yahweh answering a plea for help 
made by the Israelites founded on a vow that further cements the rule of Yahweh. 
Similarly, 1 Kgs. 17.22 has Elijah pray for assistance while maintaining a submissive 
tone through the use of nāh and the jussive.  
Secondly, as with #62 but to a noticeably lesser degree, šm' beqōl can be used where 
the command either represents or coincides with the will of some higher authority 
regardless of the explicitly stated speaker71. Below, #63 and #64 represent an indirect 
realisation of the typical social hierarchy. In Genesis 21.12, Abraham listens to his wife 
because Yahweh has commanded him to do so. As such, Abraham listening to his wife 
does not upend the social hierarchy but upholds it.  
י֙�          63 ע ְּבֵעיֶנ֙ ם ַאל־ֵיַר֤ ים ֶאל־ַאְבָרָה֗ אֶמר ֱא�ִה֜ ֹ֨ ַוּי
ר  ר ּתֹאַמ֥ � ּכֹ֩ל ֲאֶׁש֨ ַעל־ַהַּנַ֣ער ְוַעל־ֲאָמֶת֔
ע  ה ְׁשַמ֣ י� ָׂשָר֖ ּהֵאֶל֛ א  ְּבקָֹל֑ ק ִיָּקֵר֥ י ְבִיְצָח֔ ִּכ֣
 ַרע׃   ְל֖� ָזֽ
But God said to Abraham, “Do not 
be distressed because of the boy and 
because of your slave woman; 
whatever Sarah says to you, do as 
she tells you, for it is through Isaac 
that offspring shall be named for 
you. (Gen. 21.12) 
In #64, Saul is considered disobedient for the manner in which he disregards the social 
hierarchy: the will of his subjects is valued more than the will of Yahweh.  
 




י־          64 אִתי ִּכֽ אֶמר ָׁש֤אּול ֶאל־ְׁשמּוֵא֙ל ָחָט֔ ֹ֨ ַוּי
אִתי֙  י ָיֵר֙ י� ִּכ֤ י־ְיהָו֖ה ְוֶאת־ְּדָבֶר֑ ְרִּתי ֶאת־ִּפֽ ָעַב֥
ע  ם ָוֶאְׁשַמ֖ םֶאת־ָהָע֔  ׃ ְּבקֹוָלֽ
Saul said to Samuel, “I have sinned; 
for I have transgressed the 
commandment of the LORD and your 
words, because I feared the people 
and obeyed their voice. (1 Sam. 
15.24) 
Lastly, some occurrences of this frame feature a stereotypical figure of authority 
heeding the voice of a lesser72. It is possible to see some contextual rationale for each 
occurrence. The reversed hierarchy of listening in both #65 and #66 is countered by the 
use of pragmatic markers for politeness: In #65, Saul’s servant clearly states her status 
as a servant and employs the particle n‘ for polite requests, and in #66 Yahweh responds 
to the repeated requests of Elijah which employ the jussive to align Elijah’s request 
with the will of Yahweh.  
ע־ָנ֤א ַגם־ַאָּת֙ה          65 ה ְׁשַמֽ � ְּב֣קֹול ְוַעָּת֗ ִׁשְפָחֶת֔
י ְב֙�  ֶחם ֶוֱא֑כֹול ִויִה֤ ָמה ְלָפֶנ֛י� ַּפת־ֶל֖ ְוָאִׂש֧
ֶר�׃  � ַּבָּדֽ י ֵתֵל֖ ַ� ִּכ֥  ּכֹ֔
Now therefore, you also listen to 
your servant; let me set a morsel of 
bread before you. Eat, that you may 
have strength when you go on your 
way.” (1 Sam. 28.22) 
ע ְיהָו֖ה          66 ֶפׁש־ַהֶּיֶ֛לד ְּב֣קֹול ַוִּיְׁשַמ֥ ָׁשב ֶנֽ ֵאִלָּי֑הּו ַוָּת֧
 ַעל־ִקְרּ֖בֹו ַוֶּיִֽחי׃ 
The LORD listened to the voice of 
Elijah; the life of the child came into 
him again, and he revived. (1 Kgs. 
17.22) 
In #67, Yahweh ignores the general pleading and weeping of the Israelites. The use of 
beqol for the act of listening in general (in contrast to le) is emphasised through the 
parallel equivalent of Yahweh not giving their weeping his ear.  
 




בּו ַוִּתְבּ֖כּו לִ          67 ע ְיהָו֙ה ַוָּתֻׁש֥ א־ָׁשַמ֤ ֹֽ ְפֵנ֣י ְיהָו֑ה ְול
ם  ְלֶכ֔ ם׃ ְּבקֹ֣ ין ֲאֵליֶכֽ א ֶהֱאִז֖ ֹ֥  ְול
When you returned and wept before 
the LORD, the LORD would neither 
heed your voice nor pay you any 
attention. (Deut. 1.45) 
5.6. Thunder and speech 
One of the most striking attributes of the lexeme qōl is the wide range of senses that are 
attributed to it that are expressed through individual lexemes (i.e. lexicalized) in many 
other languages. The same lexeme is used to describe a variety of acoustic phenomena 
within the biblical corpus. The only exception is the uncommon feminine plural form, 
qōlōt, with a total of 11 occurrences. This form is used exclusively for the sound of, or 
voices manifesting as, thunder. In addition to this specialised form, divine beings 
possess their own individuated qōl similar to human beings. The Hebrew Bible is 
replete with anthropomorphic imaginings of gods, and like humans they are pictured as 
talking, instructing, and desiring obedience. However, there are certain qualities of 
divine speech and its relation to the phenomenon of thunder that require special 
attention.  
In our corpus, Yahweh and Ba‘al are the only specific gods given qōl (in the case of the 
latter, it might be more true to say Ba‘al fails to communicate, but this is in obvious 
recognition of the ideological leanings of the Hebrew Bible). We shall begin with an 
overview of the majority regular uses of qōl referencing divine speech before 
addressing 34 uncommon occurrences of frames where qōl or qōlōt are used in various 
conceptual blends.  
 5.6.1. The voices of divine beings 
In 81 occurrences, the qōl of a divine being is the object of the verb šm' and follows the 
same interpretative cues as those discussed in Section 5.4. Both #68 and #69 reference 
speech without any implication of obedience, or any other condition placed upon the 
hearer. In #69 has Eliphaz heard the speech of a “spirit” (Job 4.15), one of the few cases 
where a supernatural or divine being besides Yahweh is heard speaking (another 




ה          68 ׁש ַהְּגדָֹל֖ נּו ָהֵא֥ אְכֵל֔ ֹֽ י ת ָּמה ָנ֔מּות ִּכ֣ ְוַעָּת֙ה ָל֣
ְׁשֹמַ�  ְחנּו ִל֠ ים׀ ֲאַנ֗ את ִאם־יְֹסִפ֣ ֹ֑  ֶאת־֨קֹולַהּז
ְתנּו׃  ינּו ֖עֹוד ָוָמֽ  ְיהָו֧ה ֱא�ֵה֛
So now why should we die? For this 
great fire will consume us; if we hear 
the voice of the LORD our God any 
longer, we shall die. (Deut. 5.25) 
מּוָנה ְלֶנ֣ ֶגד          69 הּו ְּת֭ יר ַמְרֵא֗ לֹא־ַאִּכ֬ ד׀ ְוֽ ַיֲעֹמ֤
ה  ע׃ ָו֣קֹולֵעיָנ֑י ְּדָמָמ֖  ֶאְׁשָמֽ
It stood still, but I could not discern 
its appearance. A form was before 
my eyes; there was silence, then I 
heard a voice: (Job 4.16) 
Lastly, #70 illustrates the common šm' beqōl (62 occurrences) variant, where obedience 
is absolute. This syntactic frame is primarily used hierarchically (such as with a parental 
figure), but the majority of cases are context-bound to Yahweh. It might be that the 
religious or ritual form of obedience is merely of greater prominence due to the nature 
of the Hebrew Bible. Regardless, there is a special relationship between this syntactic 
frame and the commands given by Yahweh.  
Apart from those instances where obedience is connected to the divine qōl alone, 
common collocations of obedience include commandments (mitzvah)73, statutes 
(hōq)74, and the law (tōrah) or more specifically “this book of the law”75. Several 
collocations that hold the same conceptual value occur only once or twice: judgments 
(mišpāt) in Deuteronomy 26.17, covenant (berit) in Exodus 19.5 and 2 Kings 18.12, 
testimony (‘dt) in Jeremiah 44.23, “the words of the prophet Haggai” in Haggai 1.12, 
and “the sound of his spoken word” in Psalm 103.20.  
י          70 � ְו֕סֹור ְלִבְלִּת֖ ְברּ֙ו ֶאת־ּ֣תֹוָרֶת֔ ל ָעֽ ְוָכל־ִיְׂשָרֵא֗
�ְׁש֣מֹוַ�  ה  ְּבקֶֹל֑ ה ְוַהְּׁשֻבָע֗ ינּו ָהָאָל֣ � ָעֵל֜ ַוִּתַּת֨
“All Israel has transgressed your law 
and turned aside, refusing to obey 
your voice. So the curse and the oath 
written in the law of Moses, the 
servant of God, have been poured 
 
73 Gen. 26.5; Deut. 13.5, 13.19, 15.5, 26.17, 27.10, 28.1, 28.15, 28.45, 30.8, 30.10. 
74 Gen. 26.5; Deut. 26.17, 27.10, 28.15, 28.45, 30.10; Jer. 44.23. 




ים  ֱא�ִה֔ ֶבד־ָהֽ ה ֶעֽ ר ְּכתּוָב֙ה ְּבתֹוַר֙ת ֹמֶׁש֣ ֲאֶׁש֤
אנּו ֽלֹו׃ י ָחָט֖  ִּכ֥
out upon us, because we have sinned 
against you. (Dan. 9.11) 
Additionally, 19 occurrences make general reference to the qōl of divine figures. In 1 
Kings 18, Ba‘al is differentiated from Yahweh precisely because, upon praying 
fervently, the priests of Ba‘al receive no answer; they are met with ein-qōl – no answer. 
With astute rhetoric, both 18.26 and 18.29 make use of the phrase ein-qōl to suggest by 
way of metonymic inference that no one is present: Ba‘al is mute, powerless, or even 
non-existent.  
ד ַלֲע֣לֹות          71 ְתַנְּב֔אּו ַע֖ ִים ַוִּיֽ ָּצֳהַר֔ ר ַהֽ  ְיִהי֙ ַּכֲעבֹ֣ ַוֽ
ה  ין־֥קֹולַהִּמְנָח֑ ֶׁשב׃ ְוֵאֽ ין ָקֽ  ְוֵאין־עֶֹנ֖ה ְוֵא֥
As midday passed, they raved on 
until the time of the offering of the 
oblation, but there was no voice, no 
answer, and no response. (1 Kgs. 
18.29) 
Apart from speech, the divine qōl is to a large extent treated with the same capabilities 
or characteristics as a human voice, as shown in #72 and discussed in Section 5.3. 
ה ֶאל־ָּכל־         72 ֶּלה ִּדֶּב֩ר ְיהָו֨ ים ָהֵא֡ ת־ַהְּדָבִר֣ ֶאֽ
ל  ֲעָרֶפ֔ ָעָנ֣ ן ְוָהֽ ר ִמּ֤תֹו� ָהֵאׁ֙ש ֶהֽ ם ָּבָה֗ ְקַהְלֶכ֜
ף ֥קֹול א ָיָס֑ ֹ֣  ָּג֖דֹול ְול
These words the LORD spoke with a 
loud voice to your whole assembly at 
the mountain, out of the fire, the 
cloud, and the thick darkness and he 
added no more. (Deut. 5.22) 
Importantly, the qōl of Yahweh is of significant revelatory weight. It is a singular 
presence as in #73 where Elijah hears the divine voice out of the faintest remnant of 
sound, #74 where the voice comes forth from the temple, and #75 where a voice speaks 
from heaven, itself prefiguring the concept of the “daughter of the voice” (Kedar-




occurred during the giving of the Torah76 (Schwartz, 2004:31). Late texts such as 
Daniel 4.28 express only indirect interaction with the divine (Rothkoff, 2007:213).  
הּו ַוָּיֶ֤לט ָּפָני֙ו ְּבַאַּדְרּ֔תֹו          73 ַ� ֵאִלָּי֗ י׀ ִּכְׁשֹמ֣ ַוְיִה֣
ה ְוִהֵּנ֤ה ֵאָלי֙ו  ַתח ַהְּמָעָר֑ ד ֶּפ֣  ַּיֲעֹמ֖ א ַוֽ  ֔קֹולַוֵּיֵצ֕
ה ֵאִלָּיֽהּו׃  אֶמר ַמה־ְּל֥� ֹפ֖ ֹ֕  ַוּי
When Elijah heard it, he wrapped his 
face in his mantle and went out and 
stood at the entrance of the cave. 
Then there came a voice to him that 
said, “What are you doing here, 
Elijah?” (1 Kgs. 19.13) 
יר          74 ל  ֖קֹול֤קֹול ָׁשאֹון֙ ֵמִע֔ ֵהיָכ֑ ה  ֣קֹולֵמֽ ְיהָו֔
יו׃  ם ְּג֖מּול ְלֹאְיָבֽ  ְמַׁשֵּל֥
Listen, an uproar from the city! A 
voice from the temple! The voice of 
the LORD, dealing retribution to his 
enemies! (Is. 66.6) 
א          75 ם ַמְלָּכ֔ ל֗עֹוד ִמְּלָת֙א ְּבֻפ֣ ל  ָק֖ ִמן־ְׁשַמָּי֣א ְנַפ֑
ת  ה ֲעָד֥ א ַמְלכּוָת֖ ר ַמְלָּכ֔ ְמִרין֙ ְנבּוַכְדֶנַּצ֣ � ָאֽ ָל֤
 �׃  ִמָּנֽ
While the words were still in the 
king’s mouth, a voice came from 
heaven: “O King Nebuchadnezzar, to 
you it is declared: The kingdom has 
departed from you! (Dan. 4.28 
[NRSV 4.31]) 
5.6.2. The qōl and qōlōt of Yahweh 
Biblical conceptualisations of the divine qōl cannot be clearly divided between images 
of the thundering storm theophany, on the one hand, and clearly audible speech, on the 
other. There is too much conflation. For example, in #70 Yahweh is visually imagined 
as appearing in and through a storm (Beuken, 2001:182). Using the Hiphil, Yahweh is 
the agent of his auditory manifestation: he causes his voice to resound in storm and 
flame while he takes the striking pose reminiscent of Ba‘al.  
 




ה ֶאת־֣הֹוד          76 יַ� ְיהָו֜ ְוַנַ֤חת ְזרֹועֹ֙ו  קֹו֗לֹוְוִהְׁשִמ֨
ֶפץ  ה ֶנ֥ ׁש אֹוֵכָל֑ ַהב ֵא֣ ף ְוַל֖ ה ְּבַזַ֣עף ַא֔ ַיְרֶא֔
ד׃  ֶבן ָּבָרֽ  ָוֶז֖ ֶרם ְוֶא֥
And the LORD will cause his majestic 
voice to be heard and the descending 
blow of his arm to be seen, in furious 
anger and a flame of devouring fire, 
with a cloudburst and tempest and 
hailstones. (Is. 30.30) 
Similarly, we can also consider the entirety of Psalm 29 – which Green (2003:262) calls 
“an adaptation of a Canaanite hymn” – as an excursus on the nature of Yahweh’s qōl. 
In seven rapid expressions, the reader is presented with Yahweh the storm god, 
indistinct to some degree from Canaanite and Ugaritic conceptualisations of Ba‘al 
(Green, 2003:262). The psalm is archaic, dated to the 12th century BCE. There is, 
furthermore, a structural parallel in the text between the seven manifestations of 
Yahweh’s qōl and the seven thunders and lightning of Ba‘al, as well as more broadly 
the seven winds of Iškur and Marduk (Green, 2003:261-263).  
Yet, none of this presumes the two gods are merely interchangeable. In v.8, there is 
made a clear invocation of the Sinai theophany, while v.11, quoting John Day, “is more 
Yahwistic than Baalistic” (Brueggemann and Bellinger, 2014:147). In v.3 there is 
mentioned victory over chaos in the form of Yam but most probably read in terms of 
the Egyptian exodus, while in v.7 the gleam of lightning is his weapon, which is 
indebted to the common striking pose of storm gods (Green, 2003:265, 271-272). As 
such, the psalm contains an intermingling of traditions, a Yahwistic revision, that makes 
it truly unique. We can, thus, conclude that conceptually the use and description of 
Yahweh’s qōl in Psalm 29 clearly references his rule as a storm god but within the 
mythopoeic narrative of the Torah.  
The above exploration of Is. 30.30 and Ps.29 introduces our exploration of the use of 
the divine qōl and the specific form qōlōt in the Biblical Hebrew corpus. First, we look 
at the more uncommon qōlōt. In eight texts77, the form qōlōt is used in what can be 
called a relatively naturalistic description of thunder and storm imagery (in the sense 
that there is no explicit mention of qōlōt as a product of Yahweh such as with his voice). 
 




In the book of Exodus, where the majority of cases are to be found, each follows a 
similar pattern, qōlōt collocating with some combination of brd (hail), mtr (rain), lppd 
(torch; lightning), or brk (lightning) that makes clear the naturalistic or environmental 
context within which qōlōt is used. The cases of Exodus can be understood by looking 
at #77 for this standard formula. The surrounding description of naturalistic elements 
suggests that thunder (qōlōt) belongs to the “created” world and, thus, cannot be said 
to exist solely as a direct expression of the divine voice. Such an interpretation relies 
too much on demythologisation and naturalism.   
ד          77 ר ְוַהָּבָר֛ ל ַהָּמָט֧ י־ָחַד֨ ה ִּכֽ  ְוַהּקֹ֖�תַוַּי֣ ְרא ַּפְרעֹ֗
יו׃  ד ִלּ֖בֹו ֥הּוא ַוֲעָבָדֽ א ַוַּיְכֵּב֥ ֹ֑ ֶסף ַלֲחט  ַוּיֹ֣
But when Pharaoh saw that the rain 
and the hail and the thunder had 
ceased, he sinned once more and 
hardened his heart, he and his 
officials. (Ex. 9.34) 
However, a phrase can be found in the book of Job with an unusual collocation. In 
#78and Job 38.25, you find the only two occurrences of ḥzz (thunderbolt) apart from 
one other occurrence in Zechariah. The Aramaic cognate can be found in the Aramaic 
Targum to Song. 2:16 alluding to the Exodus narrative, where Yahweh is said to have 
“rode on a swift thunder-cloud” – an image that can be found repeatedly as a major 
point of similarity between Yahweh and Ba‘al (Sefaria, n.d.) 
יז          78 ֶר� ַלֲחִז֥ ֶד֗ ר חֹ֑ ק ְו֝  ַּבֲעׂש֣תֹו ַלָּמָט֣
 ׃קֹֽלֹות
when he made a decree for the rain, 
and a way for the thunderbolt (Job 
28.26) 
The line between qōlōt as thunder and qōl as voice does blur in #79, even if there is 
some consensus among English translations regarding the use of beqōl here implying 
and not “with a voice” and not “in/with thunder”. The tendency to translate here with 
“thunder” is driven by the broader context of the storm theophany in Exodus 19.  
79           � ר הֹוֵל֖ ר  *ַוְיִהי֙ ֣קֹול ַהּׁשֹוָפ֔ ה ְיַדֵּב֔ ד ֹמֶׁש֣ ְוָחֵז֣ק ְמֹא֑
ּנּו  ים ַיֲעֶנ֥  ׃ ְבֽקֹולְוָהֱא�ִה֖
As the blast of the trumpet grew 




speak and God would answer 
him in thunder. (Ex. 19.19) 
Example #79 states that Yahweh answers Moses beqōl, the phrase occurring 
independently. This could be understood as Yahweh answering Moses “in/with a 
voice”. The verse should also, however, be read within the broader context of the storm 
theophany of Exodus 19. Furthermore, most modern translations opt for thunder, except 
notably for the NIV, which notes the variant reading in a footnote. Targum Pseudo-
Jonathan offers the text as “with a gracious and majestic voice, and with pleasant and 
gracious words” (Etheridge, 1862). Regardless, the NJPS 1985 translation has “God 
answered him in thunder.”  
Oswald (2014:188-189) describes the verse as a post-priestly insertion, translating with 
“God would answer him in a voice”. Oswald (2014:188) reasons that “Different from 
the basic narrative and from the deuteronomistic composition, God does not address 
the people; rather, he speaks to Moses as in the priestly composition […] Crucial are 
the distinctive positions of 19:9a [where Yahweh explicitly states that the people are to 
hear him speak] and 19:19b in the course of the narrative and their iterative force that 
may lead the reader to interpret the whole scene in the way these late authors wanted it 
to be read”. Meyers (2005:155), however, provides a nuanced summary of the cultural 
and textual traditions that could be used to support a reading of beqōl as “in/with 
thunder”: “But most important is the fact that the intense noise and movement, along 
with visual extremes of lightning and dark clouds and smoke, are stereotypical features 
of theophany in ancient Semitic poetry, especially Ugaritic texts depicting storms or 
the convulsing of nature as a signal of divine presence.” 
Upon further examination, seemingly naturalistic language of thunder, however, only 
complements a more complex conceptualisation of thunder where Yahweh’s agency is 
either that of a specialised storm god or an aspect of his role as creator and preserver of 
the natural world. In three occurrences78, Yahweh is directly responsible for the giving 
(ntn) of thunder and – as a vital collocation – rain. As in #80, ntn is the most common 
verb to describe Yahweh’s providence in this regard.  
 




ן ְיהָו֛ה          80 ה ַוִּיֵּת֧ א ְׁשמּוֵא֙ל ֶאל־ְיהָו֔  קֹ֥�תַוִּיְקָר֤
ד  ם ְמֹא֛ א ָכל־ָהָע֥ ר ַּבּ֣יֹום ַה֑הּוא ַוִּייָר֨ ּוָמָט֖
ל׃   ֶאת־ְיהָו֖ה ְוֶאת־ְׁשמּוֵאֽ
So Samuel called upon the LORD, 
and the LORD sent thunder and rain 
that day; and all the people greatly 
feared the LORD and Samuel. (1 
Sam. 12.18) 
The text does not explicitly conflate his voice with thunder. The three occurrences of 
qōlōt in the ntn frame bridge the divide between the preceding use of qōlōt and a 
movement to using qōl regardless of the naturalistic interpretation of “thunder” or the 
theophanic interpretation of “voice”. Indeed, going forward, the question becomes, is 
there a line that separates these phenomena in the conceptual worldview of native 
speakers of Biblical Hebrew? 
5.6.2.1. Yahweh as storm god 
Even with the availability of qōlōt to specify thunder, 12 other occurrences of the ntn 
frame79 instead take qōl as the direct object, which can be seen as a conceptual blend 
of Yahweh’s voice and thunder. The language is innately poetic, but we should not 
resist the idea that it represents a consistent and affective worldview. In this sense, even 
1 Sam.12.18 may have been received by its intended audience as acknowledging 
Yahweh’s role as a storm god.  
These 12 texts cover complex and multifaceted conceptualisations of the divine: Some 
texts convey a strong conceptual relationship between qōl and thunder80 by invoking 
language similarly used of Ba‘al, and yet others supplant the basic conceptualisation of 
the storm god, and view Yahweh as creator and king81. 
As in #81, Yahweh gives forth (ntn) his qōl in a manner reminiscent of Ba‘al. This act 
is situated within a martial context, and in Ps. 18.15, he sends forth his “arrows” – a 
poetic description of lightning, as well as a common collocation of the storm theophany, 
 
79 2 Sam. 22.14; Jer. 10.13, 25.30, 51.16; Joel 2.11, 4.16; Amos 1.2; Ps. 18.14, 46.7, 68.34 
[x2], 77.18 
80 2 Sam. 22.14, Joel 2.11, Ps. 18.14, 68.34 [x2], 77.18 




such as in 2 Sam. 22.14.82 Throughout the Ras Shamra texts Ba‘al is given the epithet 
“the Rider of the Clouds” – a second indication of Yahweh’s nature as a storm god, 
considering Ps. 68.34 and 77.18 (Green, 2003:195). As such, we have a clear indication 
that Yahweh is pictured similarly to Ba‘al. 
ן          81 ֶעְליֹון ִיֵּת֣ ה ְו֭ הָו֗ ִים׀ ְיֽ ם ַּבָּׁשַמ֨ ד  קֹ֑לֹוַוַּיְרֵע֬ ָר֗ ָּב֝
ׁש׃  ֲחֵלי־ֵאֽ  ְוַגֽ
The LORD also thundered in the 
heavens, and the Most High uttered 
his voice. (Ps. 18.14 [NRSV 
18.13])83 
Yet, as in #82, the ntn frame sometimes moves beyond the basic storm god conceptual 
image by imaging Yahweh as the cosmic creator and ruler. The giving of the voice in 
#82 causes catastrophic upheaval and overturns the world’s nations, resulting in their 
subservience before Yahweh as the rightful king.  
ן          82 טּו ַמְמָל֑כֹות ָנַת֥ קֹו֗לֹוָה֣מּו ֖גֹוִים ָמ֣ ָּת֥מּוג  ְּב֝
ֶרץ׃  ָאֽ
The nations are in an uproar, the 
kingdoms totter; he utters his voice, 
the earth melts. (Ps. 46.7 [NRSV 
46.6])84 
In #83, there is still a prototypical storm god conceptualisation (repeated in 51.16), but 
it also melds into Yahweh as sole creator – all other gods are idols, dead, and without 
breath (10.10–16). 
 
82 An ambiguous Ugaritic text potentially identifies Ba‘al as the “Lord of the arrow”, but this 
is an unlikely reading and the archer image is more prototypical of Rešef, Canaanite god of 
pestilence (Del Olmo Lete and Sanmartin, 2015:206, 378).  
83 The NRSV chooses not to translate the final part of Ps. 18.14 (unlike, for example, the CEB 
and ESV), but in a footnote adds that the Hebrew reads “hailstones and coals of fire”. 
84 One uncommon frame element of #82, and again in Ps. 68:34, is the preposition be preceding 
qōl. One plausible interpretation is that this is an irregular use of the instrumental beth (i.e. “he 




ִים  ְל֨קֹול         83 ִי֙ם ַּבָּׁשַמ֔  When he utters his voice, there is a ִּתּ֜תֹו ֲה֥מֹון ַמ֙
tumult of waters in the heavens (Jer. 
10.13) 
Similar to the collocation involving ntn to describe the use of the divine qōl, several 
texts use the verb r‘m (to thunder) in presenting the qōl of Yahweh85 literally as part of 
a storm theophany. Unlike with ntn, qōlōt never occurs as the object of the verbal root 
of r‘m. The thundering storm god has martial skill (1 Sam. 7.10) and is led into combat 
armed with the chaotic waters as in #84 where Yahweh is armed with the sound of his 
thunder (qōl ra‘amka). In #85, the voice of Yahweh is further described through the use 
of gadol (great, large), a common adverbial frame element for the expression of 
loudness or audibility, as discussed in Section 5.4. Furthermore, the fact that Yahweh’s 
loud thundering throws the Philistines “into such confusion” is more sensible if qōl here 
is treated as the overwhelming sound of thunder. This could have been understood as 
Yahweh’s “voice”, but translations should attempt to convey the contextual 
implications of a text, and “voice” here conflicts with the broader narrative thrust. 
ְת֣� ְינּו֑סּון          84 ַעְמ֗� ֵיָחֵפֽזּון׃ ִמן־֥קֹולִמן־ַּגֲעָר֣  At your rebuke they flee; at the ַרֽ֝
sound of your thunder they take to 
flight. (Ps. 104.7) 
ה         85 י ְׁשמּוֵאל֙  ַמֲעֶל֣ה ָהעֹוָל֔  ַוְיִה֤
ל ה ְּבִיְׂשָרֵא֑ ים ִנְּגׁ֔שּו ַלִּמְלָחָמ֖  ּוְפִלְׁשִּת֣
ם  דֹול ְיהָו֣ה׀ ַוַּיְרֵע֣ ַה֤הּוא ַּבּ֨יֹום  ְּבקֹול־ָּג֠
י ם ַוִּיָּנְג֖פּו ִלְפֵנ֥  ַעל־ְּפִלְׁשִּתי֙ם  ַוְיֻהֵּמ֔
ל׃   ִיְׂשָרֵאֽ
While Samuel was sacrificing the 
burnt offering, the Philistines drew 
near to engage Israel in battle. But 
that day the LORD thundered with 
loud thunder against the Philistines 
and threw them into such a panic 
that they were routed before the 
Israelites. (1 Sam. 7.10 [NIV]) 
 




From the storm theophany of #86, Yahweh challenges Job by asking him about the 
strength of his arm and the power of his voice: two important traits of a storm god 
(Green, 2003:55, 161, 258). 
86          � ל׀ ָל֑ הּו ַתְר  ּ֝וְב֗קֹולְוִאם־ְז֖רֹוַ� ָּכֵא֥ ם׃ָּכֹמ֥  Have you an arm like God, and can ֵעֽ
you thunder with a voice like his? 
(Job 40.9) 
5.6.2.2. Yahweh as a roaring lion 
Moving away from the role of storm god, Yahweh can be portrayed directly as a roaring 
lion with the use of š’g and hgh86. The uniqueness of Yahweh, and his opposition to 
other gods such as Ba‘al, is a recurring theme in the Hebrew Bible. In Mesopotamian 
religious thought, both the bull and the lion are sources of conceptual imagery for storm 
gods, while Anatolian traditions relate only the bull to a typological storm god (Green, 
2003:13, 105). However, leonine imagery of Yahweh is important because it has no 
relation to traditions surrounding Ba‘al (Strawn, 2005:251). Thus, we see Yahwistic 
language diverging from some normative conceptualisations associated with the 
Canaanite storm god. Yet, while we can take this to be a divergence from Ba‘al 
language, it is also not Yahwistic in origin. Precedents include the syncretic god Ba‘al-
Seth, who is symbolised by the lion (Strawn, 2005:193, 255-256).  
Yahweh, who is often imaged as a storm god, gradually rose to the top of the Canaanite 
pantheon, displacing El and Ba‘al, who are often compared to bulls (Green, 2003:203-
204). The relationship between Yahweh and the image of the bull is thus a complex 
matter (especially in light of texts such as Exodus 32). It is likely that the evolution of 
Yahwistic theology had a predominant influence on the bull and lion comparisons that 
are located throughout the Hebrew Bible. Strawn (2005:264) also argues that the 
adoption of leonine characteristics from Athirat, the consort El or Ba‘al (depending on 
the tradition), parallels the adoption of storm god characteristics from Ba‘al. For 
 
86 Is. 31.4; Ezek. 19.7; Job 37.4 (The texts of Jer. 25.30, Joel 4.16, and Amos 1.2 are here 





Othmar Keel, this piecemeal theology is termed “cumulative monotheism” (Strawn, 
2005:264). 
Returning to the texts, the leonine image is most often threatening and violent – in 
Amos 1.2 Yahweh threatens his own people, whereas in Joel 4.16 his roar is aimed 
outward at the nations (Strawn, 2005:60-61). The martial savagery of the lion, an 
important quality in Mesopotamian sources, is attributed to Yahweh (Strawn, 
2005:206-207). In #87, although the use of qōl here concerns normal human voices, 
one finds an extended comparison between Yahweh and a lion. 
ר ֶיְהֶּג֩ה          87 י ַּכֲאֶׁש֣ ַמר־ְיהָו֣ה׀ ֵאַל֡ ה ָאֽ י כֹ֣ ִּכ֣
א ָעָלי֙ו  ר ִיָּקֵר֤ יר ַעל־ַטְרּ֗פֹו ֲאֶׁש֨ ה ְוַהְּכִפ֜ ָהַאְרֵי֨
ים  א רִֹע֔ ֹ֣ א ִמּקֹוָל֙ם ְמל ֹ֣ ֲהמֹוָנ֖ם ל ת ּוֵמֽ א ֵיָח֔ ֹ֣ ל
א ַעל־ַהר־ ֹ֥ ן ֵיֵר֙ד ְיהָו֣ה ְצָב֔אֹות ִלְצּב ֲעֶנ֑ה ֵּכ֗ ַיֽ
ּה׃ ִצּ֖יֹון ְוַעל־ִּגבְ   ָעָתֽ
For thus the LORD said to me, As a 
lion or a young lion growls over its 
prey, and—when a band of 
shepherds is called out against it— is 
not terrified by their shouting or 
daunted at their noise, so the LORD 
of hosts will come down to fight 
upon Mount Zion and upon its hill. 
(Is. 31.4) 
Leonine imagery can be seen in #88 as a parallel to the more common ntn + qōl frame. 
Only Jer. 25.30 and Amos 1.2 present similar parallelisms, however. 
ן          88 ֙ם ִיֵּת֣ ֙ ג ּוִמירּוָׁשִלַ ה ִמִּצּ֣יֹון ִיְׁשָא֗  קֹו֔לֹוַויהָו֞
ֶרץ ִים ָוָא֑  ְוָרֲעׁ֖שּו ָׁשַמ֣
The LORD roars from Zion, and 
utters his voice from Jerusalem, and 
the heavens and the earth shake. 
(Joel 4.16 [NRSV 3.16]) 
The verb š’g can be used interchangeable with ntn + qōl, which further cements the 




conceptual metaphor GOD IS A LION and gives credence to the notion that Yahweh was 
commonly attributed to be leonine87.   
ַׁשם          89 יב ַוֵּת֤ ם ֶהֱחִר֑ יו ְוָעֵריֶה֖ ַד֙ע ַאְלְמנֹוָת֔ ַוֵּי֙
ּה  ֶר֙ץ ּוְמ�ָא֔  ַׁשֲאָגֽתֹו׃ִמּ֖קֹול ֶא֙
And he ravaged their strongholds, 
and laid waste their towns; the land 
was appalled, and all in it, at the 
sound of his roaring. (Ezek. 19.7) 
To conclude, leonine language of Yahweh occurs often enough in parallel with that of 
the traditional storm theophany to understand the two as interrelated, although not 
interchangeable (Green, 2005:59). The development of generic storm god language and 
more uncommon leonine imagery form part of the same complex history of Yahwistic 
theology. Furthermore, both expand our understanding of the (often threatening) nature 
of the divine qōl in the Hebrew Bible. 
5.7. Lexicalised references to reported speech 
Extending from the senses categorised under Section 4, there is a pattern in the corpus 
for qōl to reference not only the voice (of a speaker), but explicitly the speech content 
as an object (what was communicated or what message was conveyed). This occurs 
through uncommon yet consistent syntactical frames, with the sense becoming more 
formally used as a fixed expression in Late Biblical Hebrew.  
First, we have several uses88 of qōl in the absolute or construct state where the meaning 
of qōl as “voice” (such as in #90) goes beyond that literal interpretation to represent 
some essence of “message”.  
 
87 Following Strawn (2005:250), the book of Amos can be seen as an extended metaphor of the 
leonine Yahweh.  




ל ּוְבַחְדֵרי֙          90 ֶל� ַאל־ְּתַקֵּל֔ ֲע�֗  ֶמ֚  ַּג֣ם ְּבַמָּדֽ
ִי֙ם  י ֤עֹוף ַהָּׁשַמ֙ יר ִּכ֣ ל ָעִׁש֑ ְב�֔  ַאל־ְּתַקֵּל֖  ִמְׁשָּכ֣
י�  ַעל ֶאת־ַהּ֔קֹול יֹוִל֣ יד ַהְּכָנַפִים ּוַב֥ ַיֵּג֥
ר׃   ָּדָבֽ
Do not curse the king, even in 
your thoughts, or curse the rich, 
even in your bedroom; for a bird 
of the air may carry your voice, 
or some winged creature tell the 
matter. (Ecc. 10.20) 
א ִיְׁשְמ֔עּו          91 ֹ֣ � ְול ינּו ָל֔ א ַיֲאִמ֣ ֹ֣  ְוָהָי֙ה  ִאם־ל
ל  ת ְלקֹ֖ ינּו ָהִראׁ֑שֹון ָהֹא֣ ֱאִמ֔ ל ְוֶהֽ ת ְלקֹ֖ ָהֹא֥
 ָהַאֲחֽרֹון׃
“If they will not believe you or 
heed the first sign, they may 
believe the second sign. (Ex. 4.8) 
ו  92 ירּו  הֹמֶׁש֗  ַוְיַצ֣ ַּמֲחֶנה֮  ֥קֹול ַוַּיֲעִב֨         ַּבֽ
ה ה ַאל־ַיֲעׂשּו־֛עֹוד ְמָלאָכ֖ יׁש ְוִאָּׁש֗  ֵלאֹמר֒ ִא֣
יא׃ ם ֵמָהִבֽ א ָהָע֖ ֶדׁש ַוִּיָּכֵל֥ ת ַהּקֹ֑  ִלְתרּוַמ֣
So Moses gave command, and 
word was proclaimed throughout 
the camp: “No man or woman is 
to make anything else as an 
offering for the sanctuary.” So 
the people were restrained from 
bringing; (Ex. 36.6) 
In each of these texts, qōl in terms of target-in-source metonymy refers to a message, 
which can also be formulated as a conceptual metaphor VOICE IS COMMUNICATION 
(which similarly informs the obedience contextual frame discussed in Section 5.5.3.). 
However, the difference here is the more formal detachment of the message from the 
voice with which it may be said to originate. Hence, qōl while still translated as “voice” 
in these instances actually carries the sense of “speech” or “words” (i.e. literally “what 
you have said”) as in #90 or “message” as in #91 and #92. Notably, #92 is translated 
by the NRSV as “word was proclaimed”, which is completely understandable in 
English due to the overlap between word and message (e.g. as in the phrase “send 
word”). 
I would argue that the same conceptualisation occurs in #93, but it is equally probable 
that the use there is a basic construct state as discussed in Section 5.5.1. The NRSV 
(among others) translates “a fool’s voice”, but the NIV is given below for its alignment 




ב ִעְנָי֑ ן          93 א ַהֲח֖לֹום ְּברֹ֣ י ָּב֥ ב  ְו֥קֹולִּכ֛ יל ְּברֹ֥ ְּכִס֖
ים׃  ְּדָבִרֽ
A dream comes when there are 
many cares, and many words 
mark the speech of a fool. (Ecc. 
5.2 [NIV 5.3])89 
A next syntactic frame is marked by the construct state qōl dbrym / mlh (the latter also 
in Aramaic)90. Literally, someone is said to hear “the sound of words”, which the NRSV 
more often than not keeps word-for-word. The NIV, as given in #95 and #96, often 
translates with “words […] speaking” or merely “speaking”, which would be a more 
direct translation of this sense. Regardless, #97 is one example where the literal phrase 
“the sound of words” is kept in various translations. This can be to emphasise the 
revelatory nuance of the text or merely the importance of how precise it was that only 
“the sound” of Yahweh’s speech was heard. One exception is the Common English 
Bible, which has “You could hear him and understand what he was saying, but you 
couldn't see him.” 
י ְדָב֑רֹו         94 ַ�  עֵֹׂש֣ ֵרי כֹ֭ יו ִּגּבֹ֣ ָכ֥ ה ַמְלָא֫  ָּבֲר֥כּו ְיהָו֗
 �ַ ְׁשֹמ֗  ְּדָבֽרֹו׃  ְּב֣קֹול ִל֝
Bless the LORD, O you his 
angels, you mighty ones who do 
his bidding, obedient to his 
spoken word. (Ps. 103.20) 
ית ָחֵז֣ה  95 ִין ֲהֵו֔ א ִמַּלָּי֣א ִמן־ָקל֙  ֵּבאַד֗         ַרְבְרָבָת֔
ה י ַקְרָנ֖א ְמַמֱּלָל֑   ִּד֥
Then I continued to watch 
because of the boastful words the 
horn was speaking. (Dan. 7.11 
[NIV]) 
 
89 One can also look to Die Bybel 2020-vertaling: “Ja, ’n droom kom deur baie sorge, ’n dwase 
gepraat deur baie woorde”. 





ע 96 יו ֶאת־֣קֹול ָוֶאְׁשַמ֖         ֶאת־ ּוְכָׁשְמִעי֙  ְּדָבָר֑
יו ֹול֣ק   י ְּדָבָר֔ ם ָהִי֛יִתי ַוֲאִנ֗ י ִנְרָּד֥ י ַעל־ָּפַנ֖ ּוָפַנ֥
ְרָצה׃  ָאֽ
Then I heard him speaking, and 
as I listened to him, I fell into a 
deep sleep, my face to the 
ground. (Dan. 10.9 [NIV]) 
ר  97 ם ְיהָו֛ה ַוְיַדֵּב֧ ׁש ִמּ֣תֹו� ֲאֵליֶכ֖         ֤קֹול ָהֵא֑
ים ם רִֹא֖ ים ּוְתמּוָנ֛ה ֵאיְנֶכ֥ ם ׁשְֹמִע֔  ְּדָבִרי֙ם  ַאֶּת֣
י ֽקֹול׃   זּוָלִת֥
Then the LORD spoke to you out 
of the fire. You heard the sound 
of words but saw no form; there 
was only a voice. (Deut. 4.12) 
Lastly, qōl as speech content becomes a fixed expression in Late Biblical Hebrew where 
occurrences of the absolute state explicitly refer to a formal (or independent) 
conveyance of speech content in the form of a “report” or “proclamation”91. A variation 
of this concept can already be seen in #98 below. As in several other translations, the 
NRSV captures this sense with “report”, but the informality of the context is more 
precisely captured by the NIV with “news”. 
ל         98 ר ְוַהּקֹ֣ ית ַּפְרֹע֙ה ֵלאֹמ֔ ע ֵּב֤ ף  *ִנְׁשַמ֗ י יֹוֵס֑ אּו ֲאֵח֣ ָּב֖
יו׃ ה ּוְבֵעיֵנ֖י ֲעָבָדֽ  ַוִּייַט֙ב ְּבֵעיֵנ֣י ַפְרעֹ֔
When the news reached 
Pharaoh’s palace that Joseph’s 
brothers had come, Pharaoh and 
all his officials were pleased. 
(Gen. 45.16 [NIV]) 
Apart from #98, all occurrences belong to the post-exilic texts of Ezra, Nehemiah, and 
2 Chronicles, and feature a uniform referent: a formal or administrative decree spread 
either across the Persian empire #99 or localised to “Judah and Jerusalem” #100, “in 
their towns and in Jerusalem” #101, and “all Israel, from Beer-sheba to Dan” #102. 
Each of these expressions contains the same formula of the verb ‘br (to pass over)92 
with qōl, apart from 2 Chron. 24.9 where the verb is ntn (to give). 
 
91 Gen. 45.16; Ezra 1.1, 10.7; Neh. 8.15; 2 Chron. 24.9, 30.5, 26.22. 




ס ִלְכ֥לֹות ְּדַבר־         99 ֶל� ָּפַר֔ ת ְל֙כֹוֶרׁ֙ש ֶמ֣ ּוִבְׁשַנ֣ת ַאַח֗
ֶרׁש  ה ֶאת־֙רּוַ�֙ ּכֹ֣ יר ְיהָו֗ י ִיְרְמָי֑ה ֵהִע֣ ְיהָו֖ה ִמִּפ֣
ס  ֶל�־ָּפַר֔ ֲעֶבר־קֹול֙ ֶמֽ ְּבָכל־ַמְלכּו֔תֹו ְוַגם־ ַוַּיֽ
ר׃ ב ֵלאֹמֽ  *ְּבִמְכָּת֖
In the first year of King Cyrus of 
Persia, in order that the word of 
the LORD by the mouth of 
Jeremiah might be accomplished, 
the LORD stirred up the spirit of 
King Cyrus of Persia so that he 
sent a herald throughout all his 
kingdom, and also in a written 
edict declared (Ezra 1.1) 
ירּו  100 ה ֜קֹול ַוַּיֲעִב֨ ם ִּביהּוָד֣         ְלכֹל֙  ִויֽרּוָׁשִלַ֗
ם׃ ֽ ץ ְירּוָׁשִלָ ה ְלִהָּקֵב֖  ְּבֵנ֣י ַהּגֹוָל֔
They made a proclamation 
throughout Judah and Jerusalem 
to all the returned exiles that they 
should assemble at Jerusalem 
(Ezra 10.7) 
ר  101 יעּו ַוֲאֶׁש֣ ירּו ַיְׁשִמ֗         ְּבָכל־ָעֵריֶהם֮  ֥קֹול ְוַיֲעִב֨
יאּו֙  ר ְוָהִב֙ ֣ם ֵלאֹמר֒ ְצ֣אּו ָהָה֗  ּוִבירּוָׁשִלַ
י י ֲהַד֙ס  ַוֲעֵל֣ ֶמן ַוֲעֵל֤ ץ ֶׁש֔ ִי֙ת  ַוֲעֵלי־ֵע֣  ֲעֵלי־ַז֙
ת ַּכָּכֽתּוב׃ פ  ת ֻסּכֹ֖ ת ַלֲעׂשֹ֥ ץ ָעבֹ֑ י ֵע֣ ים ַוֲעֵל֖  ְתָמִר֔
and that they should publish and 
proclaim in all their towns and in 
Jerusalem as follows, “Go out to 
the hills and bring branches of 
olive, wild olive, myrtle, palm, 
and other leafy trees to make 
booths, as it is written.” (Neh. 
8.15) 
ידּו 102 ֲעִמ֣ יר רָדבָ֗  ַוַּיֽ         ְּבָכל־  ֤קֹול ְלַהֲעִב֨
ן ַבע ְוַעד־ָּד֔ ר־ֶׁש֣   ִיְׂשָרֵאל֙  ִמְּבֵאֽ
So they decreed to make a 
proclamation throughout all 
Israel, from Beer-sheba to Dan (2 
Chron. 30.5) 
Unsurprisingly, when addressed locally to what was the Persian province of Yehud, the 
subject matter regularly concerns local as opposed to imperial affairs. In particular, the 
local affairs are explicitly religious, concerning the cult of Yahweh centralised in 




maintain the Jerusalem temple, while #102 concerns the celebration of Pesach – also in 
Jerusalem. 
Throughout this chapter, it has been noted that qōl can express through target-in-source 
metonymy someone’s reported speech, the essence of what they have said or are saying. 
For example, while “a voice” can be heard purely as an object (as discussed in Section 
5.5.1.), listening to someone’s “voice” can also mean adhering to what has been 
conveyed through that voice (as discussed in Sections 5.5.2. and 5.5.3.). As such, the 
connection between qōl and speech content is a consistent theme of this chapter, and 
here in Section 5.7. we can see something of a final version of this semantic extension 
where the lexeme itself is used to refer to reported speech as a specified message, such 
as a proclamation. 
5.8. Conclusion 
As stated previously, the problem identified in currently available lexicons and 
theological dictionaries is a lack of coherence in differentiating between the senses of 
qōl and providing a rational categorisation of the senses. This chapter has aimed to 
provide a new categorisation consisting of six main categories that then contain various 
inflections of the broader category. The categorisation begins with the most 
prototypical, or most concrete, sense of acoustic phenomena. While mostly connected 
with occurrences of “sound”, this concrete sense entails almost an equal engagement 
with “voice”. The interjectional sense is offered as an extension of this concrete sense, 
but a lack of data makes its presence a matter of speculation. Building on the idea of 
qōl as “sound”, the third sense relates to the concept of “audibility”, where qōl is a 
frame element within adverbial expressions. The fourth sense introduces qōl as 
something heard in terms of communication. Concerning human (and 
anthropomorphic) communication, the syntactic frames of qōl here become more 
complex, such as with the interaction between the particle ’et and prepositions le and 
be, qōl and the verb šm'. Following on from this, the sixth sense category explored the 
divine qōl, which while functioning similar to the frames governing human 
communication also shares a conceptual blend with the phenomenon of thunder. This 
is predominantly due to the history of Yahweh as a storm god, but several variations on 




Yahweh. Lastly, indirect speech as the referent of qōl lexicalises in the Late Biblical 






Chapter 6: Conclusion 
6.1 Summary  
Returning one last time to our research question, how can the application of a cognitive 
linguistics approach to categorisation and sense mapping help one to better construe the 
senses of qōl as well as the relationships between them in a principled manner?  This 
thesis set out to improve upon the lack of coherent categorisation visible in our extant 
body of knowledge regarding the lexeme qōl. It was repeatedly noted that syntactic and 
semantic generalities of the lexeme are well known from available lexicons and 
theological dictionaries, with some disagreement. Nevertheless, the true problem is that 
available lexicons and dictionaries lack a well-founded approach to sense 
categorisation. There is also almost no attempt (apart from Labuschagne, 1997) to 
understand the sense extensions that provide the impetus for individual senses. 
It was hypothesised that certain notable tools from cognitive linguistics, an increasingly 
complex and nuanced research framework for general linguistic study, is of practical 
use for Biblical Hebrew semantics regardless of its status as an ancient language with 
no available native speakers (apart from those “voices” that comprise the texts of the 
Hebrew Bible itself). Prototype theory, it was noted, offers the researcher an account of 
how the lexeme comprises individual, sometimes contradictory, senses on the basis of 
a conceptual prototype and graded membership, both of which are linked to a speaker’s 
encyclopaedic knowledge for language use; frame theory accounts for the way in which 
a particular sense becomes activated in terms of its syntactic expression and contextual 
use by a speaker, thus bridging the gap between the mental encyclopaedic knowledge 
that supports semantics and the contextual communicative clues that allow for language 
users to communicate and share understanding; and, lastly, conceptual metaphor theory 
and conceptual blending help in understanding the way in which language use and sense 
extension are products of generalised cognitive processes, thus also adding to our 
understanding of language as a dynamic and complex system and meaning as a matter 
of contextual construal based on both the nature of human embodiment (i.e. language 
arising from an embodied perspective) and the socio-cultural specificity that each 




In summarising the findings of this study, the following radial map can be understood 
as a provisional illustration93 of both the various senses laid out in Chapter 5 as well as 
their interrelationships by way of sense extensions. 
 
Figure 1: A radial map of the semantic potential of qōl. 
 






Figure 1 represents the six main sense categories identified by this study based on 
syntactical and contextual frames. The basic level sense acoustic phenomenon, which 
exists as a prototypical referent, is easiest understood as the division between sound 
and voice, which here is illustrated by way of two circles numbered as “1”. Arrowed 
lines represent sense extensions while dotted lines represent relationships that develop 
dynamically, such as Yahweh’s “voice” blending with the “sound” of thunder or the 
relationship between a human voice and the performance of certain non-speech vocal 
acts, which are often described via adverbial expressions. Plain black lines represent 
senses of the broader sense categories (e.g. the various verbal expressions that 
accompany qōl in the context of a voice being heard or obeyed). 
6.2. Final remarks  
A weakness of this study, which may be identified as a challenge for all cognitive 
linguistics-based research for ancient languages, is the complexity posed by cognitive 
linguistics itself. It is a broad framework for research and is continuously engaging with 
fields such as psycholinguistics and neuroscience. The speed at which such research 
yields ever-increasingly complex results regarding how the brain works and language 
as a cognitive product is a challenge for anyone, let alone someone seeking to 
“translate” some of the more practical insights for the study of ancient languages. 
Nevertheless, this should not be accepted as reason enough to discount the efficacy of 
cognitive linguistics for Biblical Hebrew semantics, as illustrated by the productive 
methodologies already existing with Van Wolde (2009, specifically), Shead (2011), 
Burton (2017), and Thompson and Lyle (2019). Furthermore, Van der Merwe’s 
extensive dialogue with cognitive linguistics has informed his work, for example, with 
the latest Afrikaans translation, Die Bybel 2020-vertaling. This is but one example of 
how the complex theoretical work can trickle down into more practical, but no less 
complex, work such as bible translation. 
Furthermore, the future of lexicography and the functionality of dictionaries requires 
semanticists of ancient languages such as Biblical Hebrew to reflect on the potential for 
improving upon the current linearity of lexicons. Internet-based lexicons with hypertext 
functionality, which more correctly relates to the encyclopaedic way in which linguistic 




exponentially higher level of complexity; however, as cognitive linguistics research 
continues to demonstrate, the complexity of language use and cognition can only be 
matched by equally complex (or, realistic) understandings of language use. Perhaps the 
question to ask is how such complex tools could be made accessible so as to bridge the 
reality of complexity with the coherence that one seeks in a dictionary. 
Lastly, as dictionaries are a constant form of revision, so this study has attempted to 
illustrate the potential of adding to what is already semantically known regarding a 
specific lexeme: insights from the innovative, developing field of cognitive linguistics. 
Others have successfully done so before this study, even so as to produce complex 
models of semantics research, some of which are listed above. However, just as any 
language is a universe of its own, with an infinitude of interrelated pieces, this study 







Aikhenvald, A.Y. 2006. Serial verb constructions in typological perspective, in A.Y. 
Aikhenvald and R.M.W. Dixon (Eds.) Serial verb constructions: a cross-
linguistic typology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1-68. 
Aikhenvald, A.Y. 2018. Serial verbs. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Allan, K. 2016. A history of semantics, in N. Riemer (Ed.) The Routledge handbook 
of semantics. London: Routledge. 48-68.  
Ameka, F. 1992. Interjections: the universal yet neglected part of speech. Journal of 
Pragmatics. 18:101-118. 
Andrason, A. 2019. Categorical gradience and fuzziness—The QWM gram (serial verb 
construction) in Biblical Hebrew, in G.R. Kotzé, C.S. Locatell, and J.A. 
Messarra (Eds.) Ancient texts and modern readers: studies in ancient Hebrew 
linguistics and bible translation. Leiden: Brill. 100-126. 
Andrason, A. and Dlali, M. 2020. The (crucial yet neglected) category of interjections 
in Xhosa. Sprachtypologie und Universalienforschung. 73(2):159-217. 
Andrason, A. and Hutchison, D.A. 2020. Interjections in Biblical Aramaic: a radial 
model. Aramaic Studies. 18:1-45. 
Andrason, A. and Koo, B. 2020 Verbal serialization in Biblical Aramaic – a dynamic 
network approach. Altorientalische Forschungen. 47(1):3-33. 
Arnold, B.T. 2009. Genesis. New Cambridge Bible Commentary. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Barcelona, A. 2015. Metonymy, in E. Dąbrowska and D. Divjak (Eds.) Handbook of 
cognitive linguistics. Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton. 143-167. 
Bergen, B. 2015. Embodiment, in E. Dąbrowska and D. Divjak (Eds.) Handbook of 




Beuken, W.A.M. 2000. Isaiah part II: Isaiah chapters 28-39. Historical commentary 
on the Old Testament. Leuven: Peeters. 
Birdsell, B.J. 2014. Fauconnier’s theory of mental spaces and conceptual blending, in 
J. Littlemore and J.R. Taylor (Eds.) The Bloomsbury companion to cognitive 
linguistics. London: Bloomsbury. 72-90. 
Boeynaems, A., Burgers, C., Konijn, E.A. and Steen, G.J. 2017. The impact of 
conventional and novel metaphors in news on issue viewpoint. International 
Journal of Communication. 11:2861–2879. 
Brown, F., Driver, S.R. and Briggs, C.A. (2000). The Brown-Driver-Briggs Hebrew 
and English Lexicon. Peabody, Massachusetts: Hendrickson Publishers. 
(Original work published 1906). 
Brueggemann, W. and Bellinger, W.H. 2014. Psalms. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Burton, M.E. 2017. The semantics of glory: a cognitive, corpus-based approach to 
Hebrew word meaning. Leiden: Brill.  
Cassuto, U. 1989. A commentary on the book of Genesis. Part one: from Adam to 
Noah. Translated by I. Abrahams. Jerusalem: Magnes Press.Cienki, A. 2007. 
Frames, Idealized Cognitive Models, and Domains, in D. Geeraerts and H. 
Cuyckens (Eds.) The Oxford handbook of cognitive linguistics. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 170-187. 
Clines, D.J.A. (Ed.). (1993-2011). The Dictionary of Classical Hebrew (7). Sheffield: 
Sheffield Phoenix Press. 
Clines, D.J.A. 2017. How is the dictionary of Classical Hebrew (DCH) different from 
all other Hebrew dictionaries? And how will the dictionary of Classical 
Hebrew revised (DCHR) be different from DCH? (Unpublished). (Ed.) 





Del Olmo Lete, G. and Sanmartín, J. 2015. A dictionary of the Ugaritic language in 
the alphabetic tradition. Third revised edition. 2 volumes. Translated and 
edited by W.G.E. Watson. Leiden: Brill.  
De Mendoza, R. 2014. On the nature and scope of metonymy in linguistic description 
and explanation: towards settling some controversies, in J. Littlemore and J.R. 
Taylor (Eds.) The Bloomsbury companion to cognitive linguistics. London: 
Bloomsbury. 143-166. 
Dingemanse, M. 2017. On the margins of language: Ideophones, interjections and 
dependencies in linguistic theory. Dependencies in language. 195-202. 
Dirven, R., Wolf, H. and Polzenhagen, F. 2007. Cognitive linguistics and cultural 
studies. In D. Geeraerts and H. Cuyckens (Eds.) The Oxford handbook of 
cognitive linguistics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1203-1221.  
Divjak, D., Levshina, N. and Klavan, J. 2016. Cognitive linguistics: looking back, 
looking forward. Cognitive Linguistics. 27(4):447-463. 
Dobbs-Allsopp, FW. 1995. Ingressive qwm in Biblical Hebrew. Zeitschrift für 
Althebraistik. 8(1):31-54. 
Domeris, W.R. 1997. קֹול  qôl, in VanGemeren, W. (Ed.) The new international 
dictionary of Old Testament theology and exegesis. Grand Rapids, MI: 
Zondervan. 
Dozeman, T.B. 2015. Joshua 1-12: a new translation with introduction and 
commentary. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Etheridge, J.W. 1862. The Targums of Onkelos and Jonathan Ben Uzziel On the 
Pentateuch with the Fragments of the Jerusalem Targum from the Chaldee. 
Available: http://targum.info/targumic-texts/pentateuchal-targumim/ (2021, 
January 5). 





Evans, V. 2019. Cognitive linguistics: a complete guide. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press. 
Evans, V., Bergen, B.K. and Zinken, J. 2007. The cognitive linguistics enterprise: an 
overview. The cognitive linguistics reader. London: Equinox Publishing. 1-36. 
Geeraerts, D. 2010. Theories of lexical semantics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Geeraerts, D. 2015. Lexical semantics, in E. Dąbrowska and D. Divjak (Eds.) 
Handbook of cognitive linguistics. Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton. 273-295.  
Geeraerts, D. 2016a. Sense individuation, in N. Riemer (Ed.) The Routledge 
handbook of semantics. London: Routledge. 90-105. 
Geeraerts, D. 2016b. The sociosemiotic commitment. Cognitive Linguistics. 
27(4):527-542.  
Geeraerts, D. and Cuyckens, H. 2007. Introducing cognitive linguistics, in D. 
Geeraerts and H. Cuyckens (Eds.) The Oxford handbook of cognitive 
linguistics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 3-21.  
Gesenius, W. 2013. Hebräisches und Aramäisches Handwörterbuch über das Alte 
Testament. Gesamtausgabe. 18th ed. H. Donner and R. Meyer (Eds.). Berlin: 
Springer.  
Gesenius, W. and Tregelles, S.P. 2003. Gesenius’ Hebrew and Chaldee lexicon to the 
Old Testament Scriptures. Available: Logos Bible Software [2020, 3 August]. 
(Original work published 1846). 
Gibbs, R.W. 2015. Metaphor, in E. Dąbrowska and D. Divjak (Eds.) Handbook of 
cognitive linguistics. Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton. 167-189.  
Grady, J. 2007. Metaphor, in D. Geeraerts and H. Cuyckens (Eds.) The Oxford 
handbook of cognitive linguistics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 188-213.  





Gries, S.T. 2015. Polysemy, in E. Dąbrowska and D. Divjak (Eds.) Handbook of 
cognitive linguistics. Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton. 472-490.  
Grondelaers, S., Geeraerts, D. and Speelman, D. 2007. A case for a cognitive corpus 
linguistics, M. Gonzales-Marquez, I. Mittelberg, S. Coulson and M.J. Spivey 
(Eds.) Methods in cognitive linguistics. Amsterdam: John Benjamins 
Publishing Company. 149-169. 
Hanks, P. 2013. Lexical analysis: norms and exploitations. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
Haspelmath, M. 2016. The serial verb construction: Comparative concept and cross-
linguistic generalizations. Language and Linguistics. 17(3):291-319. 
Kahle, R., Kittel, P., Elliger, K. and Rudolph, W. Eds. 1997. Biblica Hebraica 
Stuttgartensia. 5th edition. Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft. 
Kedar-Kopfstein, B. 2003. קֹול  qôl, in G.J. Botterweck, H. Ringgren, and H. Fabry 
(Eds.) Theological dictionary of the Old Testament. Vol .12. Grand Rapids, 
MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 576-588. (Original work 
published 1993).  
Koehler, L. and Baumgartner, W. 1994-2000. The Hebrew and Aramaic lexicon of the 
Old Testament. Leiden: Brill.  
Kövecses, Z. 2005. A broad view of cognitive linguistics. Acta Linguistica 
Hungarica. 52(2-3):135-172. 
Labuschagne, C.J. 1997. קֹול  qôl voice, in E. Jenni and C. Westermann (Eds.) 
Theological lexicon of the Old Testament. Vol. 3. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson 
Publishers. 1132-1136.  
Lemmens, M. 2016. Cognitive semantics, in N. Riemer (Ed.) The Routledge 




Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk, B. 2007. Polysemy, prototypes, and radial categories, in 
D. Geeraerts and H. Cuyckens (Eds.) The Oxford handbook of cognitive 
linguistics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 139-169. 
Locatell, C.S. 2017. Grammatical polysemy in the Hebrew Bible: A cognitive 
linguistic approach to ִכי. Ph.D. Thesis. University of Stellenbosch. 
Lundbom, J.R. 2004. Jeremiah 21–36. A new translation with introduction and 
commentary. Anchor Bible Commentary. New York, NY: Doubleday. 
Meyers, C. 2005. Exodus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Motyer, J.A. 1998. Zephaniah, in T.E. McComiskey (Ed.) The minor prophets: an 
exegetical and expository commentary. Vol. 3. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker 
Books. 897-962. 
Moulin-Frier, C., Schwartz, J. L., Diars, J. and Bessière, P. 2011. Emergence of 
articulatory-acoustic systems from deictic interaction games in a “vocalize to 
localize” framework, in A. Vilain, J.L. Schwartz, C. Abry, and J. Vauclair 
(Eds.) Primate communication and human language: vocalisations, gestures, 
imitation and deixis in humans and non-humans. Amsterdam: John Benjamins 
Publishing Company. 193-220. 
Muraoka, T. 2013. In the Footsteps of Gesenius, in S. Schorch and E. Waschke (Eds.) 
Biblische Exegese und herbräische Lexikographie: Das ,,Hebräisch-deutsche 
Handwörterbuch” von Wilhelm Gesenius als Spiegel und Quelle 
alttestamentlicher und hebräischer Forschung, 200 Jahre nach seiner ersten 
Auflage. Berlin: De Gruyter. 3-15 
Negro, I. 2019. Metaphor and metonymy in food idioms. Languages, 4(47):1-8. 
O’Connor, M. 2002. Semitic lexicography: European dictionaries of Biblical Hebrew 
in the twentieth century, in I. Shlomo (Ed.) Israel oriental studies XX. Semitic 
linguistics: the state of the art at the turn of the twenty-first century. Winona 




Oswald, W. 2014. Lawgiving at the mountain of God (Exodus 19-24), in The book of 
Exodus. Leiden: Brill. 169-192. 
Panther, K. and Thornburg, L.L. 2007. Metonymy, in D. Geeraerts and H. Cuyckens 
(Eds.) The Oxford handbook of cognitive linguistics. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 236-263.  
Pham, X.H.T. 1999. Mourning in the Ancient Near East and the Hebrew Bible. 
AandC Black Publishing. 
Rochberg, F. 2005. Mesopotamian cosmology, in D.C. Snell (Ed.) A companion to the 
ancient Near East. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing. 316-329. 
Radden, G. and Dirven, R. 2007. Cognitive English grammar. Amsterdam: John 
Benjamins Publishing Company. 
Rohrer, T. 2007. Embodiment and experientialism, in D. Geeraerts and H. Cuyckens 
(Eds.) The Oxford handbook of cognitive linguistics. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 25-47.  
Romanova, R.V. 2015. Tracing the roots of cognitive linguistics in Hermann Paul’s 
Principles of the History of Language. Respectus Philologicus. 28(33):81-88.  
Rothkoff, A. 2007. Bat Kol, in, M. Berenbaum and F. Skolnik (Eds.) Encyclopaedia 
Judaica. 2nd edition. Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA. 
Sefaria. n.d. Aramaic Targum to Song of Songs 2. Translated by E. Treat. Available: 
https://www.sefaria.org/Aramaic_Targum_to_Song_of_Songs.2?lang=bi 
(2020, 5 January). 
Schmid, H. 2007. Entrenchment, salience, and basic levels, in D. Geeraerts and H. 
Cuyckens (Eds.) The Oxford handbook of cognitive linguistics. Oxford, 
Oxford University Press. 144-165. 
Schorch, S. and Waschke, E. 2013. Vorwort, in S. Schorch and E. Waschke (Eds.) 
Biblische Exegese und herbräische Lexikographie: Das ,,Hebräisch-deutsche 




alttestamentlicher und hebräischer Forschung, 200 Jahre nach seiner ersten 
Auflage. Berlin: De Gruyter. xi-xx. 
Shead, S.L. 2011. Radical frame semantics and Biblical Hebrew: exploring lexical 
semantics. Leiden: Brill.  
Schniedewind, W. M. 2005. How the Bible became a book: the textualization of 
Ancient Israel. Cambridge: Cambridge University. 
Shutova, E., Devereux, B.J. and Korhonen, A. 2013. Conceptual metaphor theory 
meets the data: a corpus-based human annotation study. Language Resources 
and Evaluation. 47(4):1261-1284.  
Schwartz, S. 2004. Imperialism and Jewish Society: 200 B.C.E. to 640 C.E. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Speed, L.J., Vinson, D.P. and Vigliocco, G. 2015. Representing meaning, in E. 
Dąbrowska and D. Divjak (Eds.) Handbook of cognitive linguistics. Berlin: De 
Gruyter Mouton. 190-211.  
Strawn, B.A. 2005. What is stronger than a lion? Leonine image and metaphor in the 
Hebrew Bible and the ancient Near East. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and 
Ruprecht. 
Stubbs, M. 2016. Corpus semantics, in N. Riemer (Ed.) The Routledge handbook of 
semantics. London: Routledge. 106-121. 
Tay, D. 2014. Lakoff and the theory of conceptual metaphor, in J. Littlemore and J.R. 
Taylor (Eds.) The Bloomsbury companion to cognitive linguistics. London: 
Bloomsbury. 49-59. 
Taylor, J.R. 2015. Prototype effects in grammar, in E. Dąbrowska and D. Divjak 
(Eds.) Handbook of cognitive linguistics. Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton. 562-
579.  
Thompson, J. and Lyle, K. 2019. A behavioral profile analysis of Biblical Hebrew 




J.A. Messarra (Eds.) Ancient texts and modern readers: an introduction. 
Leiden: Brill. 127-148. 
Turner, M. 2007. Conceptual integration, in D. Geeraerts and H. Cuyckens (Eds.) The 
Oxford handbook of cognitive linguistics. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
377-393.  
Turner, M. 2015. Blending in language and communication, in E. Dąbrowska and D. 
Divjak (Eds.) Handbook of cognitive linguistics. Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton. 
211-232.  
Van der Merwe, C.H.J. 2006. Lexical meaning in Biblical Hebrew and cognitive 
semantics: a case study. Biblica. 87(1):85-95.  
Van der Merwe, C.H.J. 2014. The challenge of better understanding discourse 
particles: The case of ָלֵכן. Journal of Northwest Semitic Languages, 40(2):127-
157. 
Van der Merwe, C.H.J. 2018. The polysemous relationships between the senses of the 
verbal root חזק: a cognitive semantic perspective. Biblica. 99(3):311-333. 
Van der Merwe, C.H.J. 2021. Biblical Hebrew and cognitive linguistics: a general 
orientation. (Unpublished). 
Van der Merwe, C.H.J., Naudé, J.A. and Kroeze, J.H. 2017. A Biblical Hebrew 
reference grammar. 2nd edition. London: Bloomsbury.  
Van Wolde, E. 2009. Reframing biblical studies: when language and text meet 
culture, cognition, and context. Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns. 
Waltke, B.K. 1993. Micah, in T.E. McComiskey (Ed.) The minor prophets: an 
exegetical and expository commentary. Vol. 2. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker 
Books. 591-764. 
Widder, W.L. 2014. “To teach” in Ancient Israel: a cognitive linguistic study of a 




Wierzbicka, A. 1992. The semantics of interjection. Journal of Pragmatics. 18(2-
3):159-192. 
Wilkins, D.P. 1992. Interjections as deictics. Journal of Pragmatics. 18:119-158. 
Yang, Y. 2011. A cognitive interpretation of discourse deixis. Theory and Practice in 
Language Studies. 1(2):128-135. 
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
